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the United States conducts its foreign affairs. In this Article, Professor Koh
suggests that, contrary to popular perception, the Iran-Contra Affair was not
simply an historical aberration. Rather, he argues, the Affair is symptomatic
of a chronic dysfunction in the current foreign policy process. After tracing the
Affair's historical roots, Professor Koh suggests that the flaws in the current
decisionmaking system stem from a growing trend of executive initiative, abet-
ted by congressional acquiescence and judicial tolerance. He further asserts
that this dramatic accretion of presidential power contravenes the constitu-
tional and policy visions of foreign polic)making set down more than forty
years ago. This diagnosis leads Professor Koh to call for a reform of the for-
eign policy process t6 restore and reinvigorate the constitutional roles properly
envisioned for Congress and the federal judiciary.
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For those who lived through the Watergate summer of 1974, the Con-
tragate summer of 1987 painted eerie historical parallels.' A congressional
panel and special prosecutor convened to question the President's men
about the legality of their activities, asking what the President knew and
when he knew it. The congressional committees concluded that the Presi-
dent's men had been running an illegal secret operation out of the White
House and placed ultimate blame upon the President himself.2 But even
1. See, e.g., This Is Watergate, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 16, 1987, at 7 (editorial).
2. "[T]he ultimate responsibility for the events in the Iran-Contra Affair must rest with the Presi-
dent. If the President did not know what his National Security Advisers were doing, he should have."
HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN AND SENATE
SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION,
REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMS. INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, S. REP. No.
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after those committees had completed their work,3 the President continued
to deny responsibility and Washington rang with talk of pardons for the
accused.
Of the many noteworthy findings in the Iran-Contra committees' ma-
jority report, the most controversial was "that the Iran-Contra Affair re-
sulted from the failure of individuals to observe the law, not from defi-
ciencies in existing law or in our system of governance."'5 Declaring that
"Congress cannot legislate good judgment, honesty, or fidelity to law,"
the majority implied that all would be well again once the current crop of
rascals either leave or are thrown out. The minority report agreed "that
the underlying cause of the Iran-Contra Affair had to do with people
rather than with laws,' 7 thereby dismissing the majority's accompanying
legislative recommendations as either "unconstitutional and unwise" or
"unconscionably meddlesome.""
Before these conclusions harden into conventional wisdom, it seems
worth inquiring whether the Iran-Contra committees asked the right
questions, much less reached the right answers. In my judgment, the com-
mittees misjudged the Iran-Contra Affair's true import in three crucial
respects. First, they failed to recognize that the relevant historical prece-
dent for the Affair was not Watergate at all, but rather, Vietnam. Second,
they misdiagnosed the underlying problem. The Iran-Contra Affair repre-
sented not simply an aberration, a failure on the part of certain individu-
als within a particular administration, but deeper systemic flaws in the
current legal structure of our foreign policymaking process. Third, the
committees' misunderstanding of both the precedent and the problem inev-
itably led them to the wrong prescription. For if, as the committees con-
cluded, the Iran-Contra Affair sprang mainly from the wayward acts of a
few colorful personalities, then the proper policy prescription would in-
deed be to enforce the laws currently on the books. But if the Affair
stemmed from a more fundamental failure of legal structure, then a legis-
lative revamping of the statutory framework that governs our foreign af-
fairs is now in order.
Section I analyzes three decisive errors committed by the Iran-Contra
216, H.R. REP. No. 433, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1987) [hereinafter IRAN-CONTRA REPORT.]
3. The committees formally concluded business at the end of February 1988. See N.Y. Times,
Feb. 29, 1988, at B6, col. 5.
4. See Beg Pardon, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1988, at 23.
5. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 423 (emphasis added). The other nonjudicial investi-
gation of the Affair reached the same conclusion. See PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD, THE
TOWER COMMISSION REPORT 4 (N.Y. Times ed. 1987) [hereinafter TOWER REPORT] ("The
problems we examined in the case of Iran/Contra caused us deep concern. But their solution does not
lie in revamping the National Security Council system."). For discussion of the Tower Report, see
infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
6. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 423.
7. Id. at 583 (minority report).
8. Id.
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committees: their failure to place the Affair within the pattern of history;
their misconception of their legislative role; and their failure to articulate
either a coherent policy vision of how the various branches of government
should deal with national security issues or a coherent constitutional vi-
sion of how the President, the Congress, and the courts should participate
in the foreign policymaking process. Had the committees placed the Iran-
Contra Affair in proper perspective, they would have recognized that the
Iran-Contra Affair was not quintessentially a presidential scandal, but a
failure of foreign policy process: the latest episode in a history of executive
avoidance of legislative constraint in foreign affairs that stretches back to
Vietnam.
If the Iran-Contra committees had drawn the proper historical paral-
lels, they would have seen that a far more important question than "what
did this President know and when did he know it?" is "why does the
President almost always seem to win in foreign affairs?" Had the commit-
tees addressed this structural question, Section II suggests, they would
have found the answer in a combination of three institutional factors: ex-
ecutive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance. Fur-
thermore, had the investigators acknowledged that the Iran-Contra Affair
indicated a systemic failure within America's foreign policy apparatus,
rather than an isolated episode of individual wrongdoing, they would have
recognized that Congress' work, far from ending, is just beginning. For
the right questions would have forced the committees toward a prospec-
tive, legislation-oriented inquiry, rather than toward the retrospective,
fault-allocating exercise in which they ultimately engaged.
If, as I believe, the Iran-Contra Affair resulted not from bad people
violating good laws (as the investigators concluded), or from good people
violating bad laws (as Oliver North maintained), but from misguided peo-
ple violating ineffective laws, then the time is now ripe for a systematic
legislative reconsideration of the proper relationship among the President,
Congress, and the courts in foreign affairs. Section III argues that while
memories of the Iran-Contra Affair remain fresh, the incoming Adminis-
tration and Congress should make a comprehensive effort to enact a new
national security charter. That charter should aim to restructure the in-
centives that executive branch officials face when they consider whether to
violate or circumvent existing foreign affairs laws. To accomplish this
goal, national security reform efforts should focus not only on restraining
executive adventurism, but also on attacking the institutional sources of
congressional acquiescence and judicial tolerance that have contributed
equally to recent executive excesses. Only a structural solution aimed at
revitalizing both Congress and the courts as institutional counterweights
to the President can fully redress the constitutional imbalance in national
security decisionmaking that the Iran-Contra Affair has exposed.
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I. How THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATORS FAILED
The Iran-Contra committees and the Tower Commission have already
drawn the most obvious analogies between the Iran-Contra Affair and
Watergate.9 Yet both of their final reports reflect three fundamental fail-
ings: of historical understanding, of role definition, and of normative vi-
sion about how the foreign policy process should operate.
A. Recognizing Historical Patterns
The Iran-Contra investigators failed first by focusing exclusively upon
what happened during the Affair itself, rather than trying to understand
the broader pattern of history into which that event fit. To comprehend
fully how history repeated itself during the Iran-Contra Affair, the com-
mittees should have reviewed not just the immediate history of presidential
scandals, but rather, the string of congressional-executive conflicts that
have recently swept across the spectrum of United States foreign policy
concerns. Had the committees conducted a more comprehensive survey of
warmaking, treaty affairs, emergency economic powers, arms sales, mili-
tary aid and covert operations, they would have uncovered a pattern of
executive circumvention of legislative constraint in foreign affairs that
stretches back to the Vietnam War and persists even after the Iran-Contra
Affair.
1. War Powers
This pattern emerges most clearly in the realm of the war powers. In
August 1964, American ships conducting covert operations were attacked
in the Tonkin Gulf. Their response, allegedly in self-defense, led Presi-
dent Johnson to ask Congress for a joint resolution of support, the infa-
mous Tonkin Gulf Resolution.10 Construing that Resolution as broad con-
gressional authorization,11 the President dramatically escalated the
Vietnam War. By 1973 that foreign policy nightmare had triggered the
passage, over President Nixon's veto, of the War Powers Resolution,1" a
9. In both cases, high executive officials disregarded or stretched the rule of law. Both incidents
stemmed from executive efforts to sustain a war in a Third World country by bypassing established
channels of command and using unaccountable funds and private agents to conduct covert actions
directly from the White House. See infra note 64. The Iran-Contra Affair proved more extreme,
however, insofar as the means chosen were not simply covert operations, but a covert foreign policy
run by a private cadre, upon whose judgments neither Congress, the people, nor other parts of the
executive branch had opportunity to pass. See Testimony of Richard V. Secord: Joint Hearings Before
the House Select Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select
Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1987) (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye) [hereinafter Iran-Contra Hearings].
10. Joint Resolution of August 10, 1964, H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Stat. 384,
repealed by Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053.
11. See Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, The Legality of United States Participa-
tion in the Defense of Viet Nam, 75 YALE L.J. 1085, 1102-06 (1966).
12. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982)).
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statute imposing consultation and reporting requirements and a sixty-day
time limit upon the President's commitment of troops overseas without
express congressional authorization.
Congress passed the War Powers Resolution to prevent future
Vietnams: undeclared creeping wars that start and build before Congress
or the public are fully aware. Yet Congress undercut the Resolution's ef-
fectiveness by failing to address two new types of military action that have
come to dominate the 1980's: covert wars, in which intelligence operatives
acting under civilian supervision conduct paramilitary activities against
foreign governments,"3 and short-term military strikes that can be com-
pleted well within the Resolution's sixty-day time limit.1 4 Nor has the
Resolution consistently prevented even the creeping escalation it was ex-
pressly designed to control.'"
Thus today, nearly two years after the Iran-Contra furor began, Amer-
ican ships patrol the Persian Gulf, protecting reflagged Kuwaiti tankers.
To forestall Iranian attacks on United States ships, which could lead the
President to ask Congress for another joint resolution of support, the Sen-
ate has passed a bill that imposes a new sixty-day reporting requirement
on the President and that contemplates a future resolution setting dura-
tional limits on his commitment of troops overseas without express con-
gressional authorization.'" In short, fifteen years after the War Powers
13. Because the Resolution chose to regulate only "United States Armed Forces," 50 U.S.C. §§
1542-1543 (1982), it did not reach the allegedly "private" activities of operatives such as Eugene
Hasenfus, who worked during the Iran-Contra Affair for the "Enterprise" supervised by Lt. Col.
Oliver North. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 144-47, 287-88 (describing Hasenfus
affair).
14. Since 1973, the executive branch has treated the Resolution's time limits as defacto congres-
sional permission to commit troops abroad for up to sixty days, at times eschewing even minimal
consultation and reporting requirements. See Note, The War Powers Resolution: An Act Facing "Im-
minent Hostilities" A Decade Later, 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 915, 964-1013 (1983) (describing,
inter alia, President Ford's May 1975 dispatch of troops to Cambodia to release the Mayaguez, Presi-
dent Carter's April 1980 attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran, and President Reagan's Octo-
ber 1983 military action in Grenada). More recently, the Reagan Administration has conducted "sur-
gical" strikes against Libya in April 1986, against Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf in
October 1987 and April 1988, and, even as the first Iran-Contra indictments were being announced in
March 1988, a brief introduction of U.S. troops into Honduras. See Statement by the Assistant to the
President for Press Relations on the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Honduras, 24
WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 355 (Mar. 16, 1988).
15. For example, President Reagan sent U.S. troops to Lebanon in August 1982 without prior
consultation with Congress, and kept them there until February 1984. After more than two hundred
combat fatalities, Congress finally sought to force troop removal. The President then bargained suc-
cessfully for a joint resolution that extended the time deadlines of the War Powers Resolution from 60
days to 18 months, without ever articulating what policy the U.S. military presence was meant to
serve. See Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, S.J. Res. 159, 97 Stat. 805 (1983) (codified at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1544 (Supp. I 1987)). See generally Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and
the President Under the War Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 79, 94-95 (1984).
16. See War Powers Act Compliance Resolution, S.J. Res. 194, 133 CONG. REc. S14630 (daily
ed. Oct. 21, 1987). At this writing, the House has taken no action on the Senate's resolution, prefer-
ring instead to await the D.C. Circuit's ruling in a suit brought by more than 100 representatives to
invoke the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution with respect to U.S. activities in the
Persian Gulf. See Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987), appeal filed, No. 87-5426
(D.C. Cir. 1988); infra notes 205, 283.
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Resolution was first passed, Congress has contemplated reenacting a vari-
ant of it in order to enforce the Resolution's original purpose. As Yogi
Berra would say, "it's deja vu all over again": years of congressional-
executive struggle over the war powers have brought us from the Tonkin
Gulf only so far as the Persian Gulf.
2. The Treaty Process
Had the investigators turned their gaze to the realm of treaty affairs,
they would have detected a similar historical pattern of executive circum-
vention of legislative constraint. Despite the constitutional suggestion that
such affairs should be managed through congressional-executive partner-
ship, 17 by 1972 the President had firmly asserted his prerogative to con-
clude international accords through means that avoid prior congressional
consent, principally, the executive agreement.1" During the Vietnam War,
congressional objections to presidential treatymaking culminated in fears
that the President would employ secret executive agreements to make
binding commitments about overseas bases and troop deployment.19
To curb that possibility, Congress enacted the Case-Zablocki Act,
which required the President to notify Congress of any recently concluded
agreements.20 In response, modern administrations have developed innova-
tive methods to create or amend international obligations without congres-
sional review: the techniques of "nonagreement agreement,"21 selective
treaty compliance,22 parallel unilateral policy declaration,2" and most re-
17. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (authorizing President to "make" treaties with advice and consent
of two-thirds of Senate, but otherwise saying nothing about respective congressional-executive roles in
treaty process).
18. President Roosevelt's famous 1940 "Destroyer Deal" with Great Britain triggered the ex-
panded use of the executive agreement for national security ends and paved the way for the postwar
rise of the United Nations and Bretton Woods multilateral treaty systems. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 171-74, 237. Subsequently, the Supreme Court has largely validated the President's use of
the executive agreement on the merits. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (uphold-
ing Iranian Hostages Agreement); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Bel-
mont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (upholding Litvinov Assignment). See generally McDougal & Lans, Trea-
ties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of
National Policy (pts. 1 & 2), 54 YALE L.J. 181, 534 (1945).
19. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 607 (2d ed. 1976).
20. See Transmittal Act, Pub. L. No. 94-303, 86 Stat. 619 (1972) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 112b
(1982)) [hereinafter Case-Zablocki Act]. Before settling for this relatively toothless restraint, Congress
had considered a more stringent law calling for legislative review of all executive agreements. See
generally Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements: Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Sub-
comm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
21. Presidents Nixon and Reagan expanded the use of executive agreements in international trade
by characterizing some not as agreements, but as "unilateral voluntary export restraints." See, e.g.,
Consumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975)
(upholding President Nixon's voluntary restraint agreement with Japan on steel); J. JACKSON & W.
DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 617-22 (2d ed. 1986) (simi-
lar Japanese restraints on auto exports); Administration Announces Import Restraints, Other Mea-
sures to Aid Machine Tool Industry, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1537 (Dec. 24, 1986) (Japanese and
Taiwanese restraints on machine tools); 25 I.L.M. 1408 (1986) (similar "arrangement" with Japan
regarding semiconductors).
22. To avoid adhering to all provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
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cently, the "treaty reinterpretation."24 Moreover, since the Supreme
Court's 1979 decision in Goldwater v. Carter,25 the executive branch has
developed an array of gambits to terminate,2 6 modify,27 selectively nul-
lify,"' or circumvent 9 existing treaties without Congress' prior consent. In
President Reagan refused to sign it, then selectively complied with its provisions as a matter of cus-
tomary international law. See United States Ocean Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 383
(1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 464 (1983); Proclamation No. 5030 of March 10, 1983, 3 C.F.R. 22-
23 (1984).
23. In 1977, President Carter unilaterally declared that the United States would comply with the
expired SALT I treaty so long as the Soviet Union did the same. See Unilateral Policy Declaration by
the United States with respect to the SALT II Treaty, reported in 123 CONG. REC. S31,901 (daily
ed. Oct. 3, 1977) (letter from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Senator John Sparkman, Chairman,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, dated Sept. 21, 1977). President Reagan similarly complied
with the warhead limits in the unratified SALT II treaty until December 1986. See Over the Top,
TIME, Dec. 8, 1986, at 43.
24. The Reagan Administration has sought to accommodate its Strategic Defense Initiative with
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by giving that treaty a reading far broader than that
originally accepted by the Senate when it initially gave its advice and consent. See generally R.
GARTHOFF, POLICY VERSUS THE LAW: THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY (1987);
Chayes & Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great
Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1956 (1986); Nunn, The ABM Reinterpretation Issue, 10
WASH. Q. 45 (Autumn 1987) (all arguing that this constitutes defacto treaty amendment without
congressional approval). For a defense of the Administration's position, see Sofaer, The ABM Treaty:
Legal Analysis in the Political Cauldron, 10 WASH. Q. 59 (Autumn 1987). Cf Rainbow Navigation,
Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy, 686 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that Navy may not unilaterally
reinterpret United States-Iceland memorandum of understanding regarding military cargo routes).
25. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (dismissing on justiciability grounds Senator's challenge to President's
unilateral decision to terminate U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in accordance with its
terms). In Goldwater, only one Justice voted to uphold the President's treaty-termination decision on
the merits, and even then, only because the case involved recognition of foreign governments, an issue
over which the President exercises plenary power. See id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., concurring).
26. See, e.g., Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1199 (D. Mass. 1986), affd,
841 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) (dismissing private challenge to State Department's notice of termination
of bilateral U.S. Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty with Nicaragua); see also Letter from
Secretary of State George P. Shultz to Secretary-General of the United Nations Javier Perez de Cuel-
lar (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985) (terminating U.S. acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction of International Court of Justice).
27. See Letter from Secretary of State George P. Shultz to Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions Javier Perez de Cuellar (Apr. 6, 1984), reprinted in 23 1.L.M. 670 (1984) (immediately and
temporarily "modifying" United States' 1946 acceptance of International Court of Justice's compul-
sory jurisdiction, notwithstanding treaty provision requiring six months' notice of termination).
28. The Reagan Administration has applied a "line-item veto" approach to certain multilateral
treaties, attaching so many conditions to its request for Senate advice and consent that those exceptions
have significantly altered the terms of the acceptance. See, e.g., Leich, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 612-22 (1986) (describing condi-
tions offered by Reagan Administration to secure advice and consent to ratification of Genocide Con-
vention); Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Other Inhuman
Treatment or Punishment, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 642 (May 20, 1988); Letter of May 10,
1988 from Secretary of State George P. Shultz to President Ronald Reagan regarding the Convention
Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (copy on file
with author) (advising transmittal of that convention to Senate with seventeen reservations, under-
standings and declarations); Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan, PROTOCOL II AD-
DITIONAL TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PRO-
TECTION OF VICTIMS OF NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, S. TREATY Doc. No. 2, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. III (1987), reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910 (1987) (refusing to submit for advice
and consent Protocol I of Geneva Convention, which the United States had previously signed, while
accepting some of its provisions as customary international law).
29. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (upholding
Commerce Secretary's refusal to certify that new executive agreement authorizing Japanese fishermen
to evade "zero quota" on whale-killing "diminishes the effectiveness" of the International Convention
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short, just as the years leading up to Vietnam witnessed dramatic presi-
dential domination of the process of agreement-making, the years since
Vietnam have marked a parallel era of executive aggrandizement of the
coordinate phases of agreement-breaking and "bending."' O
3. Emergency Economic Powers
The vast majority of the foreign affairs powers the President exercises
daily are not inherent constitutional powers, but rather, authorities that
Congress has expressly or impliedly delegated to him by statute. Yet
closer examination of the foreign affairs areas in which Congress has ex-
tensively legislated reveals a pattern of executive ascendancy in statutory
realms even more striking than the President's continued domination of
the constitutional realms of warmaking and treaty affairs.
During the 1970's, the Vietnam debacle, coupled with dramatic institu-
tional changes within Congress,81 stimulated the enactment of statute after
statute subjecting the President's delegated foreign affairs powers to strin-
gent procedural constraints.2 These enactments typically conditioned
for the Regulation of Whaling). In a decision construing dicta from the Supreme Court's famous
opinion in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit recently sustained the President's authority "to disregard international law in service of
domestic needs ... ." Garda-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1455 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
289 (1986). As Professor Henkin has noted, the Eleventh Circuit's dicta could be read to support an
"assertion that ... the President and lesser executive officials may disregard a treaty or a rule of
international law." See Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chi-
nese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 864 (1987).
30. Compare infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text with infra notes 179-83 and accompany-
ing text. In two important respects, however, the presidential agreement-making years of the 1950's
and 1960's differed markedly from the agreement-breaking and bending years of the 1980's. First, in
the former era, the President used his agreement-making powers primarily to enhance multilateral
cooperation, while in the latter, he has employed new techniques to withdraw from this postwar
vision of multilateralism, often breaking or modifying preexisting commitments without consulting
either Congress or our treaty partners. Second, although the Supreme Court has generally validated
the President's executive agreement-making authority, see supra note 18, it has yet to approve on the
merits the President's more recent techniques of treatybreaking and bending. See supra note 25.
31. Between 1970 and 1974, the seniority system was substantially transformed (particularly in
the House) and congressional rules were altered to enhance the independence of subcommittee chair-
men and the influence of rank-and-file members. See Ornstein, The House and the Senate in a New
Congress, in THE NEW CONGRESS 363 (T. Mann & N. Ornstein eds. 1981). An extraordinarily large
number of reformist liberal Democrats were elected in the Watergate-driven congressional election of
1974. Ornstein, Interest Groups, Congress and American Foreign Policy, in AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 49, 54 (D. Forsythe ed. 1984) [hereinafter Ornstein, Interest
Groups]. To close the expertise gap between itself and the executive branch, Congress augmented
committee staffs with foreign policy specialists (the so-called "S. Res. 4" staffers). See T. FRANCK &
E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 228 (1979). Congress also developed important in-
house foreign affairs research capability within the Congressional Research Service, the General Ac-
counting Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Office of Technology Assessment. Id. at
228, 242-45.
32. See, e.g., International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982);
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1982); Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-
2487 (1982); Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2413 (1982); Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982); International Development and Food Assis-
tance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161, 89 Stat. 849 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
and 22 U.S.C.); Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982)
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presidential exercises of delegated authority upon adherence to elaborate
statutory procedures, including factual findings, public declarations, prior
reporting, subsequent consultation requirements, and the legislative
veto-the congressional control technique of choice in the post-Vietnam
era.
33
Virtually overlooked at the time, however, was that this generation of
statutes created not only procedural constraints, but also substantial fresh
delegations of foreign affairs authority." By 1988, it had become clear
that the executive branch had successfully tapped many of these broad
new authorizations while paying only lip service to the accompanying
procedural strictures.
The most glaring example has been the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act (IEEPA),3 5 which Congress enacted in 1977 to limit
executive abuses of the national emergency powers conferred on the Presi-
dent sixty years earlier by the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). 6
TWEA had authorized the President to wield an enormous store of dele-
gated power in both wartime and nonwartime situations, simply by de-
daring the existence of a national emergency. Stung by perceived abuses
of that delegated power, Congress drafted IEEPA specifically to narrow
the President's authority in nonwartime situations, conditioning his exer-
cise of emergency powers upon prior congressional consultation, subse-
quent review, and legislative veto termination provisions.3 7 Yet three suc-
cessive Supreme Court decisions quickly emasculated IEEPA's various
congressional control devices.38 Those rulings freed the President to invoke
(intelligence oversight); International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22
U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796 (1982); Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2304
(1982); and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
22 and 42 U.S.C.). For descriptions of this intense period of legislative activity, see generally T.
FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 31; THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY: CONGRESSIONAL RE-
STRAINTS ON EXECUTIVE POWER (T. Franck ed. 1981).
33. See generally Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S.
v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191, 1204-08 (1986) (describing typical post-Vietnam
legislative package); Franck & Bob, The Return of Humpty-Dumpty: Foreign Relations Law After
the Chadha Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 912 (1985).
34. The most prominent exception was the War Powers Resolution, which expressly denied the
President new warmaking authority. See 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d)(2) (1982) ("[njothing in this [joint
resolution] . . . shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces .... ."). But see supra note 14 (describing how executive
branch has treated Resolution's time limits as de facto congressional permission to commit troops
abroad for up to sixty days).
35. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982).
36. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-6, 7-39, 41-44 (1982).
37. Presidents rarely terminated TWEA national emergencies. See Note, The International
Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency
Power, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1104 (1983) (while Congress was considering IEEPA's enactment in
1977, President Roosevelt's 1933 TWEA declaration of national banking emergency was still in
force). Thus, "TWEA emergency authority operated as a one-way ratchet to enhance greatly the
President's discretionary authority over foreign policy." Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 245 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (upholding President's authority to exercise statutory
authorities against Cuba pursuant to IEEPA's grandfather clause); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
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IEEPA to conduct widescale economic warfare merely by declaring a na-
tional emergency with respect to a particular country, as Presidents
Carter and Reagan have subsequently done against Iran, Libya, Nicara-
gua, South Africa, and Panama.39 Moreover, lower court decisions have
afforded the President broad discretion in complying with IEEPA's proce-
dural requisites and allowed him to use these "emergency" powers to
combat conditions that have persisted for years.40 Thus, in only one dec-
ade, the executive branch has succeeded in extracting from IEEPA the
same sweeping delegation of authority that Congress had expressly sought
to remove from it after Vietnam.
4. Arms Sales, Military Aid, the NSC, and Covert Operations: The
Iran-Contra Affair
Had the committees placed the Iran-Contra Affair against this broader
historical background, they would have recognized that it represented not
just a passing historical aberration, but merely the latest act in a foreign
policy drama that has been playing out since the early 1970's. Indeed, far
from being unprecedented, each of the four aspects of the Iran-Contra
tableau upon which the committees focused-the covert sale of arms to
Iran, the diversion of funds to the contras in apparent violation of the
Boland Amendments, 1 the "operationalization" of the National Security
Council (NSC), and the abuse of covert operations-repeated historical
events that had first occurred during the Nixon era. Thus, viewed in light
of events of the early 1970's, the Iran-Contra Affair emerges as an ex-
(1983) (invalidating IEEPA's legislative veto provision); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981) (generously construing President's IEEPA authorities). See also infra notes 211-14, 250-68
(describing Court's technique of statutory interpretation in these cases).
39. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979) and Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45
Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980) (Iran); Exec. Order No. 12,513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985) (Nicaragua);
Exec. Order No. 12,543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875 (1986) and Exec. Order No. 12,544, 51 Fed. Reg. 1235
(1986) (Libya); Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed Reg. 36,861 (1985) (South Africa); Exec. Order No.
12,635, 50 Fed. Reg. 12,134 (1988) (Panama).
40. See, e.g., Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Mass. 1986), affid, 841
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) (whether particular country poses sufficient threat to trigger IEEPA declara-
tion of national emergency constitutes nonjusticiable political question). Like the TWEA national
emergencies that preceded it, see supra note 37, the IEEPA national emergency with respect to Iran
has now persisted for nearly a decade. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979)
(promulgated November 1979). Ironically, administration officials have recently characterized as
"draconian" even the requirement that the President declare an emergency before invoking his
IEEPA powers. See Trade Policy: Administration Weighing Emergency Powers Act Changes, State
Department Official Says, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1300, 1300 (Oct. 21, 1987) (statement of Am-
bassador-at-Large L. Paul Bremer III).
41. The Boland Amendments, which were attached to successive appropriations bills between
1982 and 1986, generally prohibited the expenditure of funds "available" to any "entity of the United
States involved in intelligence activities" for assistance to the "Nicaraguan democratic resistance to
support military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua." See also IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, Supra
note 2, at 395-407; 133 CONG. REc. H4982-87 (daily ed. June 15, 1987) (cataloging various
amendments).
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treme, but foreseeable, episode in the continuing post-Vietnam flow of for-
eign affairs power from Congress to the Executive.
a. The Arms Sale
The Reagan Administration was not the first to sell weapons systems
secretly to Iran. In May 1972, President Nixon sold fighter aircraft and
associated equipment to the Shah over the opposition of both the State and
Defense Departments.42 The public furor over that and later weapons
sales to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait stimulated passage of arms export con-
trol legislation that authorized Congress to veto, by concurrent resolution,
all government-sponsored arms sales above certain dollar amounts." But
the Supreme Court's 1983 invalidation of the legislative veto"4 prompted
an amendment to that law, which authorized Congress to nullify planned
arms sales only by joint resolutions that are subject to presidential veto."'
Moreover, executive branch lawyers successfully embedded into the suc-
cessor legislation numerous provisions for presidential waiver of reporting
requirements in "exceptional circumstances" or "in the national inter-
est.' 84 This subsequent legislation also left ambiguous whether the execu-
tive branch could transfer weapons abroad secretly, so long as that trans-
fer occurred as part of an intelligence operation conducted under other
laws.'7 Consequently, even a joint resolution of disapproval would not bar
the President from selling arms abroad openly, so long as he could veto
that resolution and defeat an override by securing more than one-third of
the votes in either chamber of Congress. At the same time, he could sell
42. See H. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 1264 (1979). Because that sale was primarily for
cash on commercial terms, it evaded the legislative controls built into the 1949 Mutual Defense Assis-
tance Act, which authorized the President to approve government-to-government cash sales to foreign
countries without congressional approval. See Madison, The Arms Sale Say-So, 19 NAT'L J. 667, 668-
69 (1987).
43. See Nelson-Bingham Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559,
88 Stat. 1795, 1814 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2776 (1982)) (requiring President to give
Congress advance notice of any offer to sell to foreign countries defense articles and services valued at
$25 million or more and empowering Congress to disapprove such sales within 20 calendar days by
concurrent resolution). Congress later incorporated this legislative veto provision, along with numer-
ous reporting and certification requirements designed to reach commercial sales and third-country
transfers of U.S. arms, into the comprehensive International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2318
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
44. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
45. See Arms Export Control Act, Legislative Veto, Pub. L. No. 99-247, 100 Stat. 9 (1986).
46. See generally Scheffer, U.S. Law and the Iran-Contra Affair, 81 Am. J. INT'L L. 696, 698-
713 (1987) (enumerating numerous loopholes in arms sale statutes that were exploited during Iran-
Contra Affair).
47. See id. at 698 ("The Reagan administration's covert sale of military arms to Iran falls into a
legal quagmire because of the conflict between the laws governing the export of military arms and the
laws governing covert activities by the United States Government."); IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra
note 2, at 451, 539-46 (minority report) (arguing that covert transfers under National Security Act
and Economy Act can substitute for transfers under Arms Export Control Act). But see id. at 418-19
(majority report) (disputing minority's conclusion).
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arms abroad covertly, so long as he could claim to be acting pursuant to
the intelligence, rather than the arms control, laws.
This precise scenario played out in 1986, when the now-infamous cov-
ert arms sales to Iran took place. Perhaps more important, but largely
unnoticed by the general public, was the executive branch's simultaneous
overt sale of advanced missiles to Saudi Arabia over the objection of large
majorities in both Houses.4 Thus, fourteen years after covert arms sales
to Iran had first sparked the enactment of restrictive arms export legisla-
tion, Members of Congress enraged by new Middle East arms sales were
once again introducing a statute "designed to restore a balance between
the executive and legislative branches on foreign arms transfers.
'49
b. Funding Secret Wars
Nor did the Boland Amendments mark the first time that Congress had
invoked its appropriations power to harness executive funding of secret
warmaking. The prototype for such legislation had aimed not at Central
America, but at Southeast Asia. The unmasking of the Nixon Administra-
tion's secret Cambodian incursions in 1970 revealed that the President
had used his special funds and transfer authorities to allot millions of dol-
lars in secret military aid to Cambodia without prior congressional ap-
proval.5 0 In 1973 and 1974, Congress enacted seven separate provisions
declaring that no funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to various
laws could be expended to support United States military or paramilitary
forces in Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos.51 As Central Intelligence Agency
48. The $354 million Saudi arms sale dwarfed the $20 million in arms transferred during the
Iran-Contra Affair. Congress originally supported the joint resolution disapproving the Saudi deal by
votes of 356-62 in the House and 73-22 in the Senate. Madison, supra note 42, at 669. But after
vetoing the resolution, President Reagan persuaded eight Senators to switch their positions and four
others who had not previously voted to support his position. He thereby averted an override of his veto
by a single vote. See N.Y. Times, June 6, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
49. See Letter from Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and Representative Mel Levine, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 2, 1987, at A30, col. 3 (supporting S. 419 and H.R. 898, their bills to amend Arms Export
Control Act).
50. See generally Meyer, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 69,
73-76 (1988) (chronicling presidential abuses of military aid process from 1961 to 1972). In one
instance, the Administration had sent Cambodia "7.9 million in military aid and, after the fact, ob-
tained a Presidential determination which was made retroactive in an effort to legalize what had
already been done." S. REP. No. 431, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972) (emphasis in original). The
CIA's general counsel made a similar retroactive finding during the Iran-Contra Affair. See IRAN-
CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 185-86; Victor, CIA Counsel's Role Questioned, NAT'L L.J., Feb.
2, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
51. These provisions employed language almost identical to the Boland Amendments. Compare
provisions cited supra note 41 with Section 30 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, 22 U.S.C. §
2151, 87 Stat. 732, as amended by Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 30, 80 Stat.
714 ("[n]o funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended to finance
military or paramilitary operations by the United States in or over Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia").
See also Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-437, § 839, 88 Stat.
1212, 1231; Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-238, 87 Stat. 1026
(1973); Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-55, § 806, 87
Stat. 615 (1973); Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 1255
(CIA) involvement in the Cambodian operations became public, Congress
enacted the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974,5' which imposed report-
ing requirements on the CIA as a prerequisite to its expenditure of appro-
priated funds.
Yet even these Vietnam-era statutory funding limitations did not curtail
the Executive's foreign military and paramilitary campaigns. President
Ford contravened the Vietnam funding restrictions less than a year after
their enactment.53 Even after the Hughes-Ryan Amendment became law,
secret United States paramilitary aid to Angola persisted, forcing Con-
gress in 1976 to pass the Boland Amendments' direct ancestor: a funding
restriction specifically barring aid to private groups that would have the
purpose or effect of aiding military or paramilitary operations in that
country."
c. The NSC Operationalized
Similarly, the operationalization of the NSC commenced not with the
peregrinations of Oliver North, or Robert McFarlane's odyssey to Tehran
with Bible and birthday cake, but with Henry Kissinger's secret trip to
mainland China nearly two decades earlier.55 The National Security Act
of 1947,56 which established both the NSC and the CIA, did not create
the NSC as a decision-making, much less a decision-executing, body.
5 7
126, § 13, 87 Stat. 454 (1973); Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-52, §
108, 87 Stat. 130 (1973); Fulbright Amendment to Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-50, § 307, 87 Stat. 129 (1973). The progenitor for all of these provisions was the
famous 1971 Cooper-Church Amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act, which cut off funds for
U.S. troops, advisers and air support in and over Cambodia. See Tower, Congress Versus the Presi-
dent: The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 229, 237
(1981/82).
52. Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, 88 Stat. 1795, 1804-05 (1974) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2422
(1982)).
53. The President sent U.S. armed forces to rescue the Mayaguez and to evacuate personnel from
Vietnam and Cambodia, notwithstanding express statutory funding prohibitions barring use of United
States forces to carry out "military operations" or "combat activities" in, over, or off the shores of
Cambodia or South Vietnam. See Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers Resolution: The Case for
Purse-Strings Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1975).
54. See Clark Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 404,
90 Stat. 729, 757-58 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-533, tit. I § 118(a)-(d), 94 Stat. 3141
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2293 note (1980)). The executive branch apparently complied
with the Clark Amendment, but successfully lobbied for its repeal in July 1985. See G. TREVERTON,
COVERT AcTIoN 220 (1987).
55. See H. KISSINGER, supra note 42, at 698-763.
56. 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-405 (1982).
57. Congress no more designed the NSC to execute national security policy than it designed the
Council of Economic Advisers to print the money. See National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §
402(a) (1982) (NSC's function "shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security.. .") (emphasis added). Con-
gress made only the President, the Vice-President, and two cabinet officers-the Secretaries of State
and Defense-statutory members of the NSC. Id. Thus, the President, not the National Security
Assistant, presides over NSC meetings, and the Director of Central Intelligence, like the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Attorney General, attends NSC meetings only by invitation. See
TOWER REPORT, supra note 5, at 6.
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The position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
which did not exist until six years later, was founded to supervise the
NSC staff, not to act as a policy advocate or executor.5" By the same
token, in 1947 Congress did not envision that the Central Intelligence
Agency would formulate, as opposed to execute, intelligence policy, but
rather, authorized the CIA to act only under close NSC direction. 59
By the early 1960's, however, both institutions had deviated noticeably
from their original organizational mandates. The National Security Assis-
tant's peculiar legal status effectively immunized his activities from con-
gressional examination. 0 The NSC's accumulation of decisionmaking,
then decision-executing, power at the expense of the State Department
culminated in National Security Assistant Kissinger's secret negotiating
missions to Vietnam, China, Berlin, and the Soviet Union.61 Over the De-
fense Secretary's initial objections, Kissinger and his deputy, Major Gen-
eral Alexander Haig, directly supervised the secret bombing of Cambo-
dia.62 Meanwhile, even before the Bay of Pigs, the CIA had begun to
move in the opposite direction, executing and then formulating policy gov-
erning not just foreign intelligence, but covert operations and covert war
as well."S By 1974, the NSC had taken on significant operational respon-
58. In 1947 Congress established no position called "National Security Adviser," authorizing only
the creation of a small executive secretariat to serve as the NSC's staff. See Franck, The Constitu-
tional and Legal Position of the National Security Adviser and Deputy Adviser, 74 AM. J. INT'L L.
634, 635 (1980). In 1953, President Eisenhower created the National Security Assistant's position
under an obscure statute authorizing the appointment of "employees in the White House Office," 3
U.S.C. § 105(a)(1) (1982), to set the Council's agenda, to brief the President on national security
matters, and to supervise the Council's staff. Although McGeorge Bundy substantially upgraded the
position during the Kennedy Administration, it was not until Richard Nixon's initial presidential
press conference that a President first referred to the National Security Assistant as "my Adviser for
National Security Affairs . . . ." Brzezinski, The NSC's Midlife Crisis, 69 FOREIGN POL'Y 80, 86-7
(1987) (emphasis added).
59. See 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(5) (CIA shall "perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time
direct.") (emphasis added).
60. Because the National Security Assistant has been treated as an "inferior Officer" whose ap-
pointment Congress has vested "in the President alone" for purposes of the appointments clause, he
has not been subjected to Senate confirmation. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2. Nor does any statute
require the Assistant to report to Congress. Indeed, until the Iran-Contra Affair, every President had
refused to allow his National Security Assistant to testify before Congress on grounds of executive
privilege. See Franck, supra note 58, at 634-39.
61. See H. KISSINGER, supra note 42, at 277-82, 733-87, 823-33, 1124-64. When Kissinger re-
turned from China, President Nixon instructed him to give the Secretary of State only a "sanitized"
account of his trip. Id. at 756-57.
62. See id. at 242-54; Sharpe, The Real Cause of Irangate, 68 FOREIGN POL'Y 19, 24 (1987)
(Kissinger created elaborate covert network to keep Cambodian bombing secret even from Strategic
Air Command).
63. See generally J. PRADOS, PRESIDENTS' SECREr WARS (1986); G. TREVERTON, supra note
54. Congress created the CIA with expectations that it would follow three internal control principles.
First, Congress expressly denied the CIA "police, subp[olena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-
security functions" to ensure that it would act as a national security agency, not as a domestic law
enforcement unit. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1982). Second, an early NSC directive instructed the CIA
to employ covert means only in pursuit of announced American foreign policy ends. See A. WHITING,
COVERT OPERATIONS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAN/CONTRA
AFFAIR 8-27 (1987). Third, subsequent NSC directives made clear that the CIA's covert activities
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sibility and the CIA had become an important national security policy
player." Thus, the revelations that during the Iran-Contra Affair the
NSC staff had conducted, with private monies, a covert operations policy
partially formulated by the Director of Central Intelligence only brought
full circle an inversion of institutional responsibility that had surfaced
during the Vietnam era.
d. Covert Operations
Once the Executive's Vietnam-era abuses came to light, Congress
sought to prevent future executive adventurism by amending existing in-
telligence legislation to reach covert activities. Yet even a brief review of
this revisionary movement unveils eerie historical parallels between 1974
and 1988. In late 1974, as revelations of executive misconduct multiplied,
the President declared that he would not tolerate illegal activities by intel-
ligence agencies, and formed a presidential commission to investigate in-
telligence abuses. 5 Congress enacted a law that sought to ensure future
accountability for covert operations through stiffer certification and re-
porting requirements.6" The President replaced the Director of Central
Intelligence, and Congress established select, and later permanent, House
and Senate Committees to study governmental intelligence operations.
8 7
Oversight advocates then offered a comprehensive 263-page charter for the
should proceed only after full consultation and coordination with other executive branch agencies and
Congress. Id. at 28-36, 41-55.
By 1974, the CIA had violated each of these three internal control principles. During the Vietnam
War, the agency conducted secret illegal domestic break-ins, mail intercepts, wiretaps, and domestic
surveillance. See generally M. HALPERIN, J. BERMAN, R. BOROSAGE & C. MARWICK, THE LAW-
LESS STATE: THE CRIMES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 135-54 (1976). Congressional in-
vestigations uncovered CIA death plots against foreign leaders in Cuba and the Congo and secret CIA
military and paramilitary activities in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Chile, all conducted contrary to
stated foreign policy objectives and without accountability to either Congress or the rest of the execu-
tive branch. See generally id. at 15-57; J. PRADOS, supra, at 171-296; Bernstein, The Road to Water-
gate and Beyond: The Growth and Abuse of Executive Authority Since 1940, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1976, at 58, 81-84.
64. Indeed, the Watergate break-in was itself executed by the "Plumbers"-a White House unit
funded with private campaign contributions, partly staffed by former CIA agents, and supported by
the CIA-which was formed to "plug leaks" by government officials suspected of having exposed the
secret bombing of Cambodia. See P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER,
CASES AND MATERIALS 138 (1988). Thus, any relevant historical parallels between Watergate and
the Iran-Contra Affair ultimately derive from Watergate's own place atop the much larger iceberg
that was our Southeast Asian foreign policy in the 1970's.
65. See COMMISSION ON CIA AcTIvrriEs WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE PRES-
IDENT (1975); J. PRADOS, supra note 63, at 333.
66. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974, 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982), abandoned the prior prac-
tice of denial of presidential responsibility. The amendment required the President to make an explicit
"finding" that each covert operation is "important to the national security of the United States" and to
report "in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation" to the appropriate congres-
sional committees. See A. WHITING, supra note 63, at 36-41.
67. The most famous of these was the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera-
tions With Respect to Intelligence Activities (the "Church Committee"). See generally L. JOHNSON,
A SEASON OF INQUIRY (1985) (describing Church Committee investigations).
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intelligence community, which opponents trimmed down into the two-
page Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.8
As finally enacted, the 1980 Oversight Act did little more than codify
the executive practice followed by the Carter Administration over the pre-
vious four years. 9 The Act's effectiveness therefore hinged upon informal
congressional-executive accords and the President's willingness to issue
and enforce the executive orders and national security decision directives
necessary to discharge his statutory responsibilities.70 In the Reagan years,
this choice of informality proved costly. As public memories of CIA mis-
conduct in the 1970's dimmed,7 1 the Administration began to protest the
stringency of the statutory reporting and consultation requirements and
unilaterally modified previously issued executive orders and national se-
curity decision directives.72 Even after the intelligence committees reached
68. Pub, L. No. 96-450, 94 Stat. 1981 (1980) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1982)), described in
Paterson, Oversight or Afterview?: Congress, the CIA, and Covert Actions Since 1947, in CONGRESS
AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: CONTROLLING THE USE OF FORCE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
164-65 (M. Barnhart ed. 1987). The 1980 Oversight Act stiffened the reporting requirements of the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment by requiring the Executive to provide the intelligence committees with
prior notice of any "significant anticipated intelligence activity" (including covert operations). 50
U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (1982). In exchange, Congress reduced from eight to two the number of congres-
sional committees to which the President was required to report and permitted him to act without
prior notice if he reported on the operation "in a timely fashion." Id. § 413(b). In "extraordinary
circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States," the number of members to be notifed of
pending covert actions was reduced to the so-called "Gang of Eight": the chairmen and ranking mi-
nority members of both intelligence committees, plus the majority and minority leaders of the Senate
and the Speaker and minority leader of the House. Id. § 413(a)(1)(B).
69. The Act included almost verbatim the provisions for intelligence oversight contained in Presi-
dent Carter's 1978 Executive Order restricting intelligence activities. Compare § 3-4 of Exec. Order
No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (1978), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,139, 44 Fed. Reg. 30,311
(1979) with 50 U.S.C. § 413(a) (1982). See 126 CONG. REC. S13,106 (daily ed. June 3, 1980) (re-
marks of Senator Moynihan) ("[Wlhat we have here is a codification in law of the practice our
committee has followed with the administration for the past 3 1h years."). Even so, the Carter Admin-
istration opposed provisions of that Act that were identical to those in its own regulations "because the
President did not want to give those restraints the force of law." Note, Policing Executive Adventur-
ism: Congressional Oversight of Military and Paramilitary Operations, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 327,
357 (1982).
70. See Paterson, supra note 68, at 165 (the 1980 Act "hardly satisfied those who preferred a
major statutory charter; it carried a certain ambiguity permitting the president to skirt prior notifica-
tion; it placed no time limit on covert actions and did not provide for a congressional veto .... In
essence, then, Congress only had to be informed.").
71. The fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both viewed as intelli-
gence failures, helped dampen public concern over CIA misconduct. See Goodman, Reforming U.S.
Intelligence, 67 FOREIGN POL'Y 121, 123-24 (1987).
72. President Carter's Executive Order governing intelligence had required consistency between
covert and overt policies by defining "special [i.e. covert] activities" as secret "activities conducted in
support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are designed to further official United
States programs and policies abroad.. . ." Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674, 3692 (1978)
(emphasis added). But President Reagan's 1981 Executive Order dropped that limiting language. See
Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). In
defense of the Iran-Contra Affair, Justice Department officials later reasoned that "[a]ctivities author-
ized by the President cannot 'violate' an executive order in any legally meaningful sense ... because
his authorization creates a valid modification of, or exception to, the executive order." Memorandum
from Assistant Attorney General Charles J. Cooper for the Attorney General, Legal Authority for
Covert Arms Transactions to Iran, Dec. 17, 1986, at 14, cited in IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note
2, at 542 n.** (minority report) (making similar argument with regard to National Security Decision
Directives).
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accords with the Director of Central Intelligence requiring notice of new
covert actions "as soon as practicable," the CIA went on to violate those
accords almost immediately."
Following the Iran-Contra revelations, one might have expected Con-
gress now to have learned the lesson of the last war. But current signs are
that in covert operations, as in other fields, history will repeat itself. To
forestall future Iran-Contra Affairs, both houses are considering amend-
ments to the Intelligence Oversight Act that would require the President
to inform Congress in writing about all new covert operations within
forty-eight hours after they begin. 4 Rather than promptly enacting those
amendments into law, however, key legislators have again entered an ac-
cord with the President to achieve the same result.7 5 With the appoint-
ment of a new CIA director pledged to internal procedural reforms,
7 1
public outcry for new legislation has subsided and restrictive intelligence
oversight legislation will become increasingly difficult to secure.77 Because
73. After learning in 1984 that the CIA had secretly mined Nicaraguan harbors without giving
the statutorily required notice, the Senate initially passed a nonbinding resolution proclaiming that no
money could be spent for such purposes. See B. WOODWARD, VEIL 325 (1987). Rather than embody-
ing that resolution into binding legislation, however, the Senate settled for the so-called "Casey Ac-
cords," which imposed strict new reporting requirements on the Director of Central Intelligence. See
Scheffer, supra note 46, at 722. Yet "[wlithin days ... , the Reagan administration began planning
the secret arms sale to Iran." Goodman, supra note 71, at 125-26.
74. See H.R. 3822, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H11,866 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1987)
(introduced by Congressman Stokes); S. 1721, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S12,852 (daily
ed. Sept. 25, 1987) (introduced by Senator Cohen). Under the terms of the Senate bill, "[ejach finding
shall be in writing, unless immediate action by the United States is required and time does not permit
the preparation of a written finding, in which case a written record of the President's decision shall be
contemporaneously made and shall be reduced to a written finding as soon as possible but in no event
more than forty-eight (48) hours after the decision is made." S. 1721, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 133
CONG. REc. at S12,853. If, however, the President should determine that "it is essential to limit
access to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,"
he may report that finding to the "Gang of Eight," described in supra note 68.
75. See Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1987, at 10, col. 1; Covert Action Programs, Letter to the Chairman
and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Regarding Procedures for Presi-
dential Approval and Notification of Congress, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 910 (Aug. 7, 1987)
(remarks of President Reagan) (accepting accord, but declaring his belief "that the current statutory
framework is adequate").
76. Although the new CIA director has disciplined the officers responsible for the Iran-Contra
Affair, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1987, at A19, col. 1, he has rejected the need for legislative reform of the
CIA. See The Director: 'We're Not Out of Business,' Nr.wswEa, Oct. 12, 1987, at 30 (remarks of
CIA Director William Webster) ("As far as covert action [is concerned] . . . the procedures are
already there. We need only people who will follow the procedures.").
77. At this writing, the Senate bill, see supra note 74, has passed the Senate by a vote of 71-19.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at A8, col. 4. After being jointly referred to both the House Intelligence
and Foreign Affairs committees, the House bill was marked up and reported out of both, and is
currently awaiting floor action. See H.R. Rep. No. 705, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I (June 15, 1988)
(Intelligence Committee); pt. II (July 6, 1988) (Foreign Affairs Committee). President Reagan has
already suggested that he would veto any such measure as an unconstitutional limit on his prerogative
to initiate, direct, and control extremely sensitive national security activities. See Morrison, An Eye on
the CIA, 20 NAT'L J. 1009, 1010 (1988); Testimony of Charles J. Cooper, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of Legal Counsel, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on S. 1721, at 3 (on
file with author) ("We believe . . . that by purporting to oblige the President, under any and all
circumstances, to notify Congress of a covert action within a fixed period of time, S. 1721 infringes on
[a] constitutional prerogative of the President.") (emphasis in original).
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any future President could claim that President Reagan's intragovernmen-
tal accord is not binding, Congress could once again be left remediless
should a future President violate the terms of the latest covert action
deal."8
5. Missing The Pattern of History
In sum, if the Iran-Contra commitees had looked back past Watergate
to the Vietnam era, they would have seen that all of the congressional-
executive struggles that occurred during the Affair merely replicated bat-
tles that had transpired during that earlier period. That history should
have repeated itself across so many spheres of foreign affairs, even after
Congress had passed so many statutes to avoid repetition of the Vietnam-
era evasions, suggests that the Iran-Contra Affair exposed systemic, rather
than localized, problems in the American foreign policy process.
Had the Iran-Contra investigators asked why we have been forced to
relive this history, they would have recognized a pattern familiar to any
student of regulation. It was the Vietnam War that originally spurred
Congress to pass the War Powers Resolution in an attempt to regulate
overt executive warmaking. Yet far from eliminating such warmaking, the
War Powers Resolution only drove it underground, stimulating the Exec-
utive to substitute covert for overt operations and to transfer control of
those operations from the military establishment to the intelligence agen-
cies, particularly the CIA. Increased congressional regulation of the CIA
through the special oversight committees then led to the partial capture of
those committees by that agency" and a shifting of agency activities to-
78. Even if the new oversight legislation were to pass over the President's veto (or if the President
were to sign it while expressing doubts about its constitutionality), the President could still instruct his
Director of Central Intelligence not to implement it, citing the constitutional infirmities alleged in
supra note 77. Cf N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1987, at B12, col. 1 (President's directive to Attorney Gen-
eral not to implement provision in annual spending bill for intelligence agencies requiring annual
report to Congress on certain movements of Soviet diplomats). To challenge that action in court,
Members of Congress or private citizens would have to overcome the numerous obstacles to jus-
ticiability. See infra notes 270-84 and accompanying text.
79. During the 1960's and 1970's, numerous economists and political scientists advanced the no-
tion that regulated entities "capture" the governmental bodies that regulate them. See generally Pos-
ner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. Sc. 335, 341-44 (1974). Al-
though most versions of the capture theory address the claim that regulatory agencies become
dominated by the private industries they regulate, some scholars have described situations in which a
government "bureau and [its congressional] review committee fare] 'in bed with each other.'" See W.
NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 148 (1971); see also Fiorina, Con-
gressional Control of the Bureaucracy, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 332, 337 (L. Dodd & B. Op-
penheimer eds. 2d ed. 1981) ("The federal agencies exist in a symbiotic relationship with the congres-
sional committees and subcommittees to which they report.... fAn agency] purchases freedom ... by
playing ball in the areas that are of concern."). Claims of this second form of "capture" have recently
beset the congressional intelligence committees. See N.Y. Times, July 7, 1986, at Al, col. 1 (remarks
of Senator Moynihan) ("Like other legislative committees, [the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence] came to be an advocate for the agency it was overseeing."); T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND,
supra note 31, at 132 ("Senate committees face an unenviable dilemma when they attempt to oversee
government secrets. If they expect to get data, the Agencies will expect discretion in return.").
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ward an unregulated alternative, the NSC. When the NSC found its own
resources inadequate to execute covert operations, it subcontracted its du-
ties to private agents and financed the payments with contributions from
private parties and foreign governments. Exdsting laws limiting overt arms
sales then inspired NSC officials and their delegates to sell arms covertly.
And after the Boland Amendments restricted any official U.S. funding to
the contras, military aid was privatized. In short, Congress' postwar ef-
forts to enact legislation that would stop the last war simply channeled
executive action into new, unregulated forms of warfare. In a familiar
regulatory pattern, Congress' successive efforts to catch up with executive
evasion of its legislative controls served only to shift executive activity into
a new pattern of evasion.
If the Iran-Contra investigators had recognized this broader historical
pattern, they would have seen that new patchwork legislation would not
prevent-but only alter the form of-future Iran-Contra Affairs. Yet the
principal investigators of the Affair sharply disputed the need even for
patchwork legislation. The Tower Commission's only structural recom-
mendations were that the National Security Assistant should have greater
access to legal counsel, 0 and that Congress should combine the existing
intelligence committees into a smaller joint committee (which would be
even more vulnerable to CIA capture).8 Moreover, the Tower Commis-
sion pointedly rejected proposals that Congress either stiffen the National
Security Act of 1947 or subject the National Security Assistant to congres-
sional confirmation." By criticizing President Reagan's lax "management
style," rather than the structure of the national security laws, the Tower
Commission implicitly reaffirmed the view that the President, not Con-
gress, should call more shots in foreign affairs than he currently does."
80. See TowER REPORT, supra note 5, at 97-98. The President's curious response to this recom-
mendation was to create a new post of NSC Legal Adviser, ignoring the Tower Commission's more
important suggestion that NSC actions be subjected to interagency legal review by the Justice Depart-
ment or the Legal Adviser to the Department of State. Compare TOWER REPORT, supra note 5, at 97
with infra notes 323-29 and accompanying text.
81. TOWER REPORT, supra note 5, at 98. The President and the Iran-Contra minority report
have made the same recommendation. See Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy: Statement by the
Assistant to the President for Press Relations on the Report of the Congressional Investigating Com-
mittees, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1344 (Nov. 18, 1987); IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note
2, at 583 (minority report). But see id. at 427 (majority report) ("such consolidation would inevitably
erode Congress' ability to perform its oversight function . . ").
82. See TOWER REPORT, supra note 5, at 94-95. The Commission reasoned that "if the National
Security Advisor were to become a position subject to confirmation, it could induce the President to
turn to other internal staff or to people outside government to play that role." Id. at 95; accord IRAN-
CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 583 (minority report). But see infra note 147 and accompanying
text (Executive may not constitutionally delegate national security functions to private or governmen-
tal entities that were created to operate outside the existing national security apparatus). Although the
Iran-Contra majority recommended "that Presidents adopt as a matter of policy the principle that the
National Security Adviser . . . should not be an active military officer," IRAN-CONTRA REPORT,
supra note 2, at 426, the President promptly ignored that recommendation, appointing Army Lt.
General Colin Powell as his new National Security Assistant.
83. See TOWER REPORT, supra note 5, at xviii ("The N.S.C. system will not work unless the
President makes it work."). Thus, under the Tower Commission's view, the President failed during
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Unlike the Tower Commission, the congressional committees investigat-
ing the Iran-Contra Affair at least recognized the need for more extensive
structural reform of the foreign policy process, recommending a number of
laudable, but unconnected, legislative proposals.8" But the committees
blunted the force of those proposals with their central conclusion: that the
national need is "not for new laws but for a renewal of the commitment to
constitutional government and sound processes of decisionmaking."' 5 Hav-
ing rejected the need for new framework legislation to reassert legislative
control over national security matters, the committees issued some horta-
tory pronouncements 6 and moved on, with most participants acting as if
the scandal were over and the last word spoken. 7
B. Role Definition
By adopting a quasi-judicial tone for their report, the Iran-Contra com-
mittees compounded their failure to recognize historical patterns with a
serious error of role definition. In the end the Report treated the Affair as
a morality play, in which the American public played the jury, and Con-
gress played both the judge and prosecutor.8 By taking this approach, the
committees narrowly defined the role of a congressional investigation as a
retrospective search for individual responsibility-a search far better
the Iran-Contra Affair not by calling too many shots, but by personally calling too few (then forget-
ting those shots that he did call). See id. at 28-29 (President claimed first that he had approved
August 1985 arms sale to Israel, then that he had not, and finally that he could not remember).
Although two Tower Commission members, John Tower and Edmund Muskie, were former Sena-
tors, the former had long favored executive prerogative, see Tower, supra note 51, and the latter had
served as Jimmy Carter's Secretary of State. Thus, it came as no surprise that their report, co-au-
thored with former National Security Assistant Brent Scowcroft, should generally favor the Presi-
dency, even while laying the blame at the door of a specific President.
84. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 423-27 (listing 27 recommendations). The major-
ity's principal recommendations were: stiffening the "finding" and reporting requirements in the in-
telligence oversight laws; modifying the laws governing the NSC; creating a CIA Inspector General;
mandating Senate confirmation of the CIA's general counsel and revitalization of the Intelligence
Oversight Board; calling for congressional review of numerous statutes at issue in the Affair; and
recommending several policy changes (e.g., that the National Security Assistant not be an active mili-
tary officer). See infra note 312. The minority report countered with five recommendations, all of
which were designed to strengthen presidential discretion. See id. at 583-85 (minority report).
85. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 423 (majority report).
86. See, e.g., id. (President has "moral and legal responsibility" to take care that laws are faith-
fully executed; "[glovernment officials must observe the law, even when they disagree with it;"
"Joipposing views must be weighed, not ignored;" and "Congress is the partner, not the adversary of
the executive branch, in the formulation of policy.").
87. See Madison, A Puzzle That's Missing Some Pieces, 19 NAT'L J. 2982, 2983 (1987) (remarks
of Sen. Inouye) (it is "time to put the Iran-contra affair behind us"); New Haven Register, Mar. 3,
1988, at 2, cols. 4-5 (remarks of Chief Senate Counsel Arthur Liman) ("We can't be preoccupied
with one scandal for the rest of our lives.").
88. See Bems, Public Trial by Public Jury, Wall St. J., July 24, 1987, at 16, cols. 4-6. This, of
course, is what Lt. Col. Oliver North said that Congress would do. See 0. NORTH, TAKING THE
STAND 264 (1987) ("I believe that this is a strange process that you are putting me and others
through.... It's sort of like a baseball game in which you are both the player and the umpire. It's a
game in which you call the balls and strikes and where you determine who is out and who is safe.
And in the end you determine the score and declare yourselves the winner.").
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suited to the Independent Counsel than to Congress-rather than as a
prospective quest for legislative reform. 9
Once the committees had so misdefined their task, institutional con-
straints inherent in the unwieldy congressional investigation process dis-
abled them from completing it. The Affair's high public profile engen-
dered two select committees of larger than optimal size, 0 and subjected
them to severe time pressures.9 ' The jurisdictional jealousy of the perma-
nent committees then denuded the select committees of meaningful legisla-
tive clout.92 The House's failure to agree upon a single staff counsel and
the absence of hierarchy among the questioners led to endless multiple
questioning of the most important witnesses and to disjointed questioning
of logically related witnesses.9" The televising of the hearings greatly en-
hanced the opportunity for individual Members to engage in grandstand-
89. The vast bulk of the 690-page Report recounts facts and legal violations, with only four and
one-half pages of the majority report and three pages of the minority report discussing recommenda-
tions for legislative reform. Compare IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 20-22 ("Who was
responsible for the Iran-Contra Affair?") with id. at 423-27 (majority report); 583-85 (minority re-
port) (legislative recommendations).
90. The Senate Watergate committee had only seven members plus majority and minority coun-
sel; the Iran-Contra committees, by contrast, numbered 26 Members and close to 100 staff. Much Ado
About Not Much: An Inquiry Out of Questions, INSIGHT, Aug. 10, 1987, at 14. The committees
conducted parallel investigations for about two months before those inquiries were finally merged, and
even then the commmittees continued working with separate staffs (and with separate Democratic and
Republican staffs on the House side). See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1987, at A6, col. 1. The Affair's high
public profile led the Speaker of the House to include on the House committee the chairmen of the
House Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Government Operations, Intelligence, and Judiciary Commit-
tees. See Madison, Turf Wars, Long Waits May Defuse Iran Probe, 19 NAT'L J. 29, 30 (1987).
Those Members' other assignments left them with little time to prepare for the hearings or to attend
planning sessions, and their questioning suffered accordingly. See Speech by John Nields, Jr., Chief
Counsel, House Select Committee, Iran-Contra Hearings, at Yale Law School (April 7, 1988) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Nields Speech].
91. Nields Speech, supra note 90 (noting that the two committees had only five months before the
hearings began to prepare a case that would have occupied 18 months of a prosecutor's time).
92. Ordinarily, Members of Congress use a process of self-selection to sort themselves into com-
mittees. See generally K. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE: DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE ASSIGN-
MENTS IN THE MODERN HOUSE (1978). Those committees then exercise "gatekeeping powers" to
wield special influence regarding particular pieces of legislation over which they have jurisdiction. See
Denzau & Mackay, Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and
Sophisticated Behavior, 27 AM. J. POL. Sci. 740 (1983). The numerous permanent committees with
legislative jurisdiction over various aspects of the Affair were reluctant to cede their jurisdiction to one
another or to the Iran-Contra committees that they would create. The leadership therefore chose to
constitute those ad hoc bodies as two temporary investigative committees, which ultimately held joint
hearings, but lacked continuing legislative jurisdiction. As a result, Congress created a transient entity
with significantly less institutional influence than its permanent committee counterparts. Cf. Weingast
& Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not
Organized as Markets, 96 J. PoL. ECON. 132, 143-48 (1988) (permanent committee system restricts
ability of legislators to form coalitions on issues that transcend committee boundaries).
93. Although the committees generally used a "designated hitter" system, whereby a single Mem-
ber bore chief responsibility for questioning each witness, all 26 Members and three different sets of
staff counsel questioned Lt. Col. Oliver North and Vice Admiral John Poindexter. Madison, Iran:
Act Two, 19 NAT'L J. 1050, 1053-54 (1987). See The Maui News, Feb. 19, 1988, at Al, col. 4-5
(interview with Arthur Liman, Chief Counsel of Senate Select Committee) (explaining why Liman
led questioning of Poindexter, while John Nields, Chief Counsel of House Select Committee, ques-
tioned North).
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ing and "credit-claiming,"'" and reduced inquisitorial control by the com-
mittee counsel as the hearings proceeded. 5 The use of trial lawyers and
former prosecutors as committee counsel, rather than experts in adminis-
trative process or foreign affairs law, enhanced the proceedings' flavor as a
quasi-criminal prosecution." Finally, the absence of a judge to rule on the
numerous objections made by the witnesses' attorneys created the odd
spectacle of the chief investigator, the Senate committee chairman, repeat-
edly overruling objections to his own rulings."
Despite their institutional disqualification from prosecuting the respon-
sible individuals, the committees' errant role definition led several mem-
bers to fasten on the question asked endlessly about President Nixon dur-
ing Watergate: "What did he know and when did he know it?"' ,8 Yet that
question would have been central only if the principal issue before the
committees had been whether or not to seek impeachment of those respon-
sible. The committees' inability to find a "smoking gun" damning the
President effectively mooted the impeachment question, leading several
members to act as if their inquiry were exhausted. 9
More egregiously, the superficial analogies between the Iran-Contra
Affair and Watergate misled some committee members-particularly
those in the minority-to argue that the Affair, like Watergate, repre-
sented an extreme case of "politics as usual."100 The Watergate analogy
implies that the defendants dispute only the facts and not the validity of
94. Compare D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECrORAL CONNECTION 52-61 (1974) (defining
credit-claiming as a prime congressional incentive) with IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, Supra note 2, at 438
(minority report) (decrying "'j'accuse' atmosphere with which witnesses were confronted ... as
Members used the witnesses as objects for lecturing the cameras").
95. See The Maui News, supra note 93, at col. 4 ("Members of Congress got so jumpy during
Olliemania, Liman said, that Liman's questioning of North was cut short by several days.").
96. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 661 (additional views of Rep. William S.
Broomfield). Because each questioner was left to define his own role, some counsel aggressively ques-
tioned witnesses in the style of a traditional courtroom lawyer, while others allowed the same witness
to testify at length without discrediting or challenging their testimony. Compare 0. NORTH, supra
note 88, at 10-260 (aggressive cross-examination of North by Chief House Counsel), with Liman, The
Iran-Contra Hearings: From the Inside, YALE L. REP., Fall 1987, at 70 ("[M]y role [in cross-
examining North] was very different from the one I was accustomed to as a trial lawyer.... My role,
as I saw it, was ... to try to avoid . . .mak[ing] this into a classic case of lawyer versus hostile
witness.").
97. See, e.g., 0. NORTH, supra note 88, at 7-10 (Senate committee chairman's compulsion of
testimony pursuant to committee subpoenas over North's Fifth Amendment objection).
98. See, e.g., Iran-Contra Hearings, supra note 9, at 6 (introductory statement of Rep. Lee H.
Hamilton) ("Who was responsible for devising these policies and supervising their execution? ...
What was the extent of the President's knowledge and involvement?"); id. at 29 (introductory state-
ment of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) ("In my mind, there are two questions for us to try to answer: What
did the President know? And where did the money go? Almost everything else centers on those two
questions.").
99. See, e.g., IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 659 (supplemental views of Sen. James A.
McClure); id. at 661 (additional views of Rep. William S. Broomfield). Even after the investigation
has concluded, the mass media remains fascinated with that question, now asking it obsessively about
the Vice-President, rather than the President. See, e.g., The President's News Conference, 24
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 255, 258 (Feb. 24, 1988).
100. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 437 (minority report).
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the laws allegedly violated, making the appropriate remedy retrospective
individual punishment rather than prospective structural reform. 10' But in
the Iran-Contra Affair, unlike Watergate, the defendants admitted the
facts but denied that they had violated valid laws. Excepting a few charges
of unlawful personal enrichment,' the defendants claimed that the
charges leveled against them by the Independent Counsel sought to punish
their patriotic decisions to carry out the President's, rather than Congress',
foreign policy.
03
Given this fundamental interbranch dispute over what the rules of law
governing national security should be, the committees' majority members
simply begged the question when they claimed that the real issue was
executive accountability to the "rule of law." For if the majority had truly
believed that the Iran-Contra Affair represented more than "politics as
usual," it should have gone on to conclude that structural reform was
necessary.1
0 4
Furthermore, had the committees contrasted their institutional role to
that of their fellow investigators, the Tower Commission and the Indepen-
dent Counsel, they would have recognized that their unique mission was
to recommend legislative, rather than executive or judicial, action. As a
blue-ribbon special review board created by Executive Order, the Tower
Commission had an institutional mandate to recommend changes in exec-
101. See Liman, supra note 96, at 70 ("The only issue in Watergate... was, who was involved?
In particular, what was the president's involvement? No one tried to justify the burglary. It was
accepted that it was wrong and that if the president or anyone else participated ... they would have
to bear the consequences.").
102. See, e.g., Counts 2, 17-22, Indictment, United States v. Poindexter, No. 88-0088 (D.D.C.,
filed March 16, 1988) (on file with author) (charging defendants with payment and receipt of illegal
gratuities and conversion of government property to private uses).
103. The Affair's apologists have argued that most of the criminal charges stem from congres-
sional attempts "to criminalize policy differences between co-equal branches of government and the
Executive's conduct of foreign affairs." 0. NORTH, supra note 88, at 266. Under their reasoning,
exigent political circumstances justified false statements to and the withholding of information from
Congress. See Indictment, supra note 102, Counts 4-13, 15-16. See 0. NORTH, supra note 88, at 256
("we all had to weigh in the balance the difference between lives and lies"); IRAN-CONTRA REPORT,
supra note 2, at 659 (remarks of Sen. James A. McClure) ("Would you lie to save the life of your
wife or child?"); Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 1988, at 3, col. 2 (remarks of President Reagan) (former
National Security Assistant Robert McFarlane "just pleaded guilty to not telling Congress everything
it wanted to know. I've done that myself."). Under this view, circumventing the Boland Amendments
cannot constitute "conspiracy to defraud the United States," see Indictment, supra note 102, Count 1,
because those statutory provisions are not only ambiguous, but also unconstitutional exercises of the
appropriations power. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 489-500 (minority report); infra
note 218 and accompanying text. Nor, the apologists contend, can diverting profits from the Iran arms
sales to the contras constitute "theft of government property," see Indictment, supra note 102, Count
2, because the U.S. government received the full legally required payment for the arms. See IRAN-
CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 556 (minority report); N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1988, at D27, col. 5
(remarks of President Reagan) (no laws were broken by the arms sale to Iran because "we got the
purchase price we asked for").
104. Cf Elliott, Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v. Synar, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 317, 350
(1987) (discussing Professor Ackerman's theory of "constitutional moments") ("A constitutional mo-
ment ... begins when people realize that throwing the rascals out will not suffice; the problem is no
longer perceived as solvable merely by replacing the people in authority. Rather, the structure of
authority itself must be changed.").
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utive policy. As a special prosecutor appointed by a specjal court, the In-
dependent Counsel had an institutional mandate to investigate individual
wrongdoing, bring indictments, and obtain convictions.10 5 As select com-
mittees chosen by the congressional leadership, the Iran-Contra commit-
tees were charged not only with uncovering the particular facts of the
Iran-Contra Affair, but also with recommending future legislative ac-
tion. °8 By narrowly focusing on particular events and retrospective ques-
tions of individual responsibility, the committees paid insufficient attention
to this critically important second part of their institutional mandate.
C. Normative Vision
The committees' decision to lay blame, rather than legislative ground-
work, allowed them to avoid specifying what the foreign policy process
should look like and how the statutes regulating that process should be
structured.10 7 Indeed, the fact-intensive, personality-oriented nature of the
hearings left unclear to many viewers which foreign policy processes were
normal and which were aberrational' 08 Yet viewed against the historical
background outlined above, the Iran-Contra Affair stands revealed not as
a collection of unconnected statutory violations, but as a fundamental as-
sault on the assumptions underlying our postwar national security system.
Undergirding that system are complementary visions of how governmental
decisions regarding national security issues should be made: a policy vision
embodied in the National Secuity Act of 1947 and the post-Vietnam era
105. The committees' decision partially to replicate the Independent Counsel's work has already
engendered one cost: the obstacles placed before the special prosecutor's efforts by the committees'
broad grants of testimonial immunity. See N.Y. Times, June 20, 1988, at B6, col. 3 (recounting costs
to prosecution of congressionally granted immunity).
106. See H.R. Res. 12, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in Iran-Contra Hearings, supra
note 9, at 607 (resolution creating House Select Committee); S. Res. 23, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in Iran-Contra Hearings, supra note 9, at 619 (resolution creating Senate Select
Committee).
107. Although their report speaks of the "seriously flawed policymaking process" that led to the
Iran-Contra fiasco, IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 12, the committees offer only homilies
regarding what the appropriate relationship between Congress and the President in foreign poli-
cymaking should be. See, e.g., id. at 423 ("Decisionmaking processes in foreign policy matters, includ-
ing covert action, must provide for careful consideration of all options and their consequences ...
Congress is the partner, not the adversary of the executive branch, in the formulation of policy.").
108. As a tactical matter, the committees clearly erred by waiting until the end of the hearings to
hear testimony from the Secretaries of State and Defense. Cf W. COHEN & G. MITCHELL, MEN OF
ZEAL: A CANDID INSIDE STORY OF THE IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS 65 (1988) (committees considered
calling panel of so-called "Wise Men" as first witnesses, but eventually chose not to do so "because
they would be too dull"). One would have expected those witnesses to have been called first, to de-
scribe how the foreign policy process ideally should operate. Only then should the committees have
called Lt. Col. North and Vice Admiral Poindexter, to demonstrate how thoroughly the players in the
Iran-Contra Affair had misunderstood and subverted that process. Instead, the committees allowed the
hearings to climax with North's and Poindexter's melodramatic testimony, leaving many observers
with the impression that those witnesses' conduct had been normal and necessary. See The Curtain
Begins to Fall, ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1987, at 19 (describing flow of hearings).
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statutes, and a constitutional vision guided by those statutes and Justice
Robert Jackson's 1952 concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case.109
1. The Policy Vision: The National Security System
The central innovation of the 1947 National Security Act was to place
American governmental decisions regarding warmaking, intelligence, cov-
ert operations, military sales, and military aid under the control of a na-
tional security system centered in the executive branch. 10 As originally
structured by that Act, the system had two key features. First, the system
was designed to be personally managed by a strong plebiscitary Presi-
dent,"' with the support of a bureaucratic institutional presidency. 1 2 Sec-
ond, the system was intended to operate not just in times of declared war,
but also during false peace. 13 The system envisioned not just an overt
warmaking power wielded by military officials subject to civilians under
the control of the President," 4 but also a covert warmaking power with
109. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
110. See Sharpe, supra note 62, at 20-21. Because the Act was designed to unify the President's
capacity to make and coordinate national security decisions, it was known informally as the "Unifica-
tion Act." See T. LowI, THE Personal PRESIDENT 165-66 (1985).
111. Professor Lowi defines the "plebiscitary presidency" as a presidency in which "[tlhe lines of
responsibility run direct to the White House, where the president is personally responsible and ac-
countable for the performance of government." See T. LowI, supra note 110, at 99. Although presi-
dential power had expanded since the beginning of the republic, constitutional scholars and political
scientists agree that a change in kind occurred after World War II, when Franklin Roosevelt estab-
lished the model of personal presidential leadership central to the postwar national security system.
See Patterson, The Rise of Presidential Power Before World War II, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring, 1976, at 39, 56. Roosevelt personalized his role in world leadership through summitry and
personalized his role as America's leader through frequent press conferences and fireside chats. See
generally Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The First Modern President, in LEADERSHIP IN
THE MODERN PRESIDENCY 7 (F. Greenstein ed. 1988) [hereinafter F. GREENSTEIN].
112. Franklin Roosevelt did not simply centralize national power unto himself, he institutional-
ized it into a bureaucracy that would wield the executive power. See Greenstein, In Search of a
Modern Presidency, in F. GREENSTEIN, supra note 111, at 347 ([Flour major changes . . beginning
in 1933, produced the modern presidency-increased unilateral policy-making capacity, centrality in
national agenda setting, far greater visibility, and acquisition of a presidential bureaucracy .... ).
When Roosevelt took office, his personal staff consisted only of a press secretary and a few special
assistants. But following the recommendations of the President's Committee on Administrative Man-
agement, Roosevelt created an Executive Office of the President that eventually came to include the
Council of Economic Advisers in 1946, the National Security Council in 1947, the Special Trade
Representative in 1963, the Council of Environmental Quality in 1970, the Office of Management
and Budget (previously the Bureau of the Budget) in 1970, and the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy in 1976. See generally S. HESS, ORGANIZING THE PRESIDENCY 1-2 (1976);
STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, SUBCOMM. ON EMPLOYEE ETHICS
AND UTILIZATION, PRESIDENTIAL STAFFING-A BRIEF OVERVIEW, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-53, 55-
61 (1978). By the end of the Truman Administration, the White House staff had grown to more than
200, a figure that has stood at close to 600 under the Reagan Administration. See T. Lowi, supra
note 110, at 4.
113. The Cold War, overt undeclared wars such as the Korean conflict, and overt creeping wars
such as Vietnam all fit this description.
114. To deal with overt declared and undeclared wars, the National Security Act of 1947 con-
verted the Department of War into a Department of Defense comprising all three military depart-
ments. It also integrated all military services under the command of a Joint Chiefs of Staff subject to
"unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense," who was in turn answerable to
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accompanying intelligence capability exercised by agencies directed by a
President advised by a National Security Council.115 Thus, in much the
same way as the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946116 imposed the
concept of due process of administration upon the domestic actions of ex-
ecutive officials, the National Security Act of 1947 formalized the princi-
ple of centralized presidential management of those officials' external acts.
Significantly, the 1947 Act made no explicit mention of the role of ei-
ther Congress or the courts in foreign policy decisionmaking, an omission
that enabled the Presidency increasingly to aggrandize foreign affairs au-
thority over the next quarter-century." 7 But the sweeping legislative en-
actments of the post-Vietnam era""' dramatically reasserted Congress'
right to participate in nearly all arenas of foreign policy decisionmaking
by expressly allocating policymaking responsibility not just vertically
within the executive branch, but also horizontally between the President
and Congress.11 By imposing on the President a range of notification,
reporting, and certification requirements, 20 those statutes sought to en-
sure that the President and Congress would jointly agree upon broad for-
eign policy objectives. Furthermore, they envisioned that after the Presi-
dent, with the aid of the NSC, had coordinated a full internal debate
within the executive branch and secured a consensus among the major
foreign policy bureacracies (particularly the Departments of State and
Defense), he would then propose particular policy initiatives to Congress
to carry out those objectives. Experts outside the executive
branch-particularly the congressional committees-would then consider
and test the wisdom of those initiatives. 21 With committee approval, the
relevant executive agencies would then execute those initiatives, subject to
a civilian President. 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). In my judgment, Congress' decision to vest the overt
warmaking power in civilians was constitutionally compelled. See infra notes 150, 334.
115. See supra note 57. The Church Committee concluded that Congress had never expressly
intended to authorize covert action in 1947. see SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLI-
GENCE: FINAL REPORT (BOOK I), S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976). Recently,
however, one drafter of the 1947 Act has testified that Congress did intend the CIA to perform such
operations, but expected those operations "to be restricted in scope and purpose." See Statement of the
Honorable Clark M. Clifford on S. 1721 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 4 (Dec. 16,
1987) (on file with author) [hereinafter Clifford Statement]. Thus, the 1947 system apparently envi-
sioned that the intelligence agencies (particularly the CIA) would conduct covert operations subject to
presidential and cabinet direction, albeit according to the three "internal control" principles described
in supra note 63. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 402-403 (1982); see also supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
116. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982).
117. See J. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 107 (1981) (In 1947
"[n]o corresponding steps were taken to bring into coordination in the Congress the separate commit-
tees handling foreign and military affairs.").
118. See provisions cited supra note 32.
119. See generally J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 117, at 238-314; T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND,
supra note 31, at 61-154 (recounting how post-Vietnam Congress legislated a role for itself in virtu-
ally every area of foreign policy).
120. See supra text accompanying note 33.
121. See supra note 31 (describing post-Vietnam rise in foreign affairs power and expertise of
congressional committees).
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congressional consultation, oversight, and a meaningful opportunity for
objection.122 While a particular policy initiative was being executed, the
President would seek political support for it from both Congress and the
public, giving each access to all information necessary to evaluate the ac-
tion's legality.
2. The Constitutional Vision: The National Security Constitution
Justice Jackson's famous concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case,12 3 is-
sued five years after the passage of the National Security Act, comple-
mented this policy vision of the national security system with a constitu-
tional vision of how Congress, the courts, and the Executive should
interact in the foreign policy process. That vision rests principally not on
the Constitution's text-which vests relatively few foreign affairs powers
in the President' 24-but on what I have elsewhere called "quasi-constitu-
tional custom," 2 5 a category that includes norms generated by all three
federal branches: executive practice of which Congress has approved or in
which it has acquiesced,' 26 "framework legislation" enacted by Congress
to provide a legal framework for government decisions, 127 and certain
122. This was the purpose of the "finding" requirements in the intelligence laws, the "consulta-
tion" provisions in the warmaking, emergency economic powers, and military aid statutes, and the
various legislative veto provisions described above. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 20, 32-33,
37 & 45-47.
123. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
124. See U.S. CONsT. art. II (enumerating President's commander-in-chief power, power to make
treaties, power to appoint and to receive ambassadors, and general grant of "executive Power").
125. See Koh, Introduction: Foreign Affairs Under the United States Constitution, 13 YALE J.
INr'L L. 1, 3 & n.7 (1988); see also Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers
Disputes, 64 B.U.L. REv. 109 (1984).
126. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ("[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned, ...making as it were such exercise of power part of the
structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President by
§ 1 of Art. II.").
127. "[Clonstitutional 'framework' legislation... interprets the Constitution by providing a legal
framework for the governmental decisionmaking process." Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the
Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 482 (1976);
accord Casper, The Constitutional Organization of the Government, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 177,
187-93 (1985) (including National Emergencies Act of 1976, Congressional Budget and Impound-
ment and Control Act of 1974, and War Powers Resolution as examples of such framework statutes).
See also Elliott, supra note 104, at 318-19, 361-62 (also including Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of
1985 in this category); Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 271, 278-89
(1977) (treating the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the Congressional Budget and Impound-
ment and Control Act of 1974 as quasi-constitutional); Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE
L. J. 1343, 1363 & n.98 (1988) (including as "framework statutes governing appropriations and
spending processes" the Anti-Deficiency Act of 1905, the Miscellaneous Receipts statute, and other
provisions defining terms in appropriations statutes). For reasons set forth in the text, I would add to
this list the National Security Act of 1947 and the various foreign affairs statutes cited in supra note
32. Committees of Congress may also seek to state norms of constitutional law through means other
than legislation, as the Iran-Contra committees did, for example, by issuing their joint report. Cf
Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privi-
lege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 462, 477-81 (1987) (describing various nonlegisla-
tive means Congress has used to develop customary law of executive privilege).
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vacated judicial opinions. a2
In Youngstown, the Court invalidated President Truman's Korean War
attempt to invoke "emergency powers" enumerated nowhere in the Con-
stitution to seize domestic steel mills that were under nationwide strike.
129
Justice Black's formalistic opinion for the Court found that the President's
acts were not authorized by the congressional statute dealing with such
strikes, and concluded that the President had transgressed Congress' ex-
clusive prerogative to engage in lawmaking. 30 But Justice Jackson's clas-
sic concurring opinion articulated a more flexible theory, whereby these
separated institutions could share power: "Presidential powers are not
fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with
those of Congress."'' 3 1 Using congressional action as a guide, he went on
to establish the three-tiered hierarchy of presidential actions now so famil-
iar to first-year law students. 13 2
Read together with the constitutional text and the sources of quasi-con-
stitutional custom enumerated above, Jackson's Youngstown concurrence
describes a "National Security Constitution" that both facilitates and con-
strains the national security policy process outlined above.'3 3 That "Con-
128. See, e.g., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (invalidating pocket veto at interses-
sion adjournment), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Ramirez de
Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (enjoining executive action over-
seas infringing American citizen's enjoyment of private property), vacated and remanded for recon-
sideration in light of subsequent legislation, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d
697 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (upholding presidential termination of treaty in accordance with its
terms), vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss complaint, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). Each
opinion ruled on the merits of a foreign affairs claim, but was vacated by the Supreme Court on
procedural grounds. Although these vacated opinions carry no precedential weight, the President and
Congress frequently cite them against one another as predictions of how a court would rule were a
particular constitutional claim to arise again in the future. These opinions have therefore contributed
to the creation of "customary norms" in the realm of foreign affairs law. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 339 reporters' note 2, § 444 reporters' note 4
(1987) (treating some of these as rulings with persuasive, although not dispositive, weight).
129. For a recent evocative account of the case by Justice Jackson's then-law clerk, see W. REHN-
QUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 41-98 (1987). The Iran-Contra committees made only fleeting mention
of Youngstown's role in the constitutional framework of the foreign policymaking process. See IRAN-
CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 389.
130. See 343 U.S. at 589. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), an equally formalistic opinion
issued more than three decades later, the Court applied the flipside of this reasoning, holding uncon-
stitutional congressional efforts to regulate executive action by nonlegislative means. See infra note
213.
131. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
132. 1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Con-
gress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own
right plus all that Congress can delegate....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of au-
thority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twi-
light in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribu-
tion is uncertain....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitu-
tional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
Id. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
133. Cf. Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the
Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 125, 159-60 (describing contours of analogous "administrative
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stitution" specifies first, the role of Congress in the foreign policy deci-
sionmaking process; second, the role of the courts; and third, normative
principles to guide foreign policy decisionmaking within the executive
branch.
Justice Jackson's opinion first defined Congress' role in national secur-
ity decisionmaking. In essence, Jackson's three-part schema recognized
that, except within those limited areas in which the Constitution grants
the President "conclusive and preclusive" power,134 Congress must have
an opportunity to participate in the setting of broad foreign policy objec-
tives or those objectives cannot truly be called policies of the "United
States."1 5 To be meaningful, Congress' constitutional right to participate
in the setting of foreign policy objectives must carry an attendant right to
information and consultation.' When the President and Congress jointly
agree upon broad foreign policy objectives in a particular area, and Con-
gress has by statute expressly authorized the President to proceed, presi-
dential initiatives taken to implement those broader objectives fall within
Jackson Category One, i.e., they are "supported by the strongest of pre-
sumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the bur-
den of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.'
37
But when Congress has not specifically authorized a particular initiative,
the case drops down to Jackson Category Two, where the dispositive
questions become whether the initiative has occurred within a constitu-
tional zone of concurrent congressional-executive authority, and if so,
constitution"); Dam, supra note 127; Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAUF. L. REv. 593 (1988) (describing analogous "fiscal constitution"). To
paraphrase Professor Elliott, "the central idea of a [national security] constitution is the insight that
one core function of a constitution-creating the basic institutions of government and defining power
relationships among them-is being performed for [national security] matters in the United States by
legal structures that are not part of the Constitution." Elliott, supra, at 169.
134. 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring). Although Justice Jackson did not attempt pre-
cisely to define the scope of the President's sole constitutional authority, he included within that au-
thority the President's textually enumerated powers, see supra note 124, as construed with "the scope
and elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable, practical implications instead of the rigidity
dictated by a doctrinaire textualism." 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
135. Jackson's tripartite analysis would be rendered meaningless if the President could constitu-
tionally deny Congress even the opportunity to approve or disapprove foreign affairs actions that he
takes within the scope of concurrent congressional-executive authority.
136. The proliferation of post-Vietnam era statutes mandating some form of notification, report-
ing, certification, and consultation buttress this requirement's claim to quasi-constitutional status. See
provisions cited in supra note 32. Even when President Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution in
1973, he praised the "constructive measures [in the Resolution] which would... enhanc[e] the flow of
information from the executive branch to the Congress." He also approved the Act's consultation
requirements as "consistent with the desire of this Administration for regularized consultations with
the Congress in an even wider range of circumstances" than commitment of armed forces. See MEs-
SAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT VETOING H.J. RES. 542, A JOINT REoLuTION CONCERNING THE
WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT, H. Doc. No. 171, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1973).
Subsequent Presidents have largely complied with those requirements, albeit without conceding that
their actions have occurred under legal compulsion. See Note, supra note 14, at 1040-48 & n.831
(recounting cases). Thus, consistent executive practice could be read to validate a "customary constitu-
tional norm" of reporting and consultation in foreign affairs matters. Cf. supra note 126.
137. 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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whether Congress and the President have in fact agreed about the broad
policy objectives that initiative was designed to serve. " 8 Finally, if Con-
gress has expressly or impliedly objected to the President's actions, then in
most cases, Jackson Category Three would require him to abstain from
acting (as the Court ordered in Youngstown itself), and either to modify
his policy initiative or to seek additional congressional support for his
original proposal. 3 9
Far from excluding the judiciary from the national security process,
Jackson's opinion secondly defined a pivotal role for the courts as arbiters
within it. When others challenge the President's sweeping claims of exclu-
sive control over foreign affairs matters, Jackson suggested, the courts
should not abstain, but rather, "must . . .scrutiniz[e those claims] with
caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitu-
tional system." °0 Furthermore, he intimated, courts should not invoke
constitutional bases to uphold presidential action when express statutory
authorization is present. " Finally, even while recognizing the President's
dramatic accretion of power in the postwar era and the peculiar need for
flexibility, secrecy and dispatch in foreign affairs, Justice Jackson refused
to find that foreign policy matters so differ from domestic affairs that the
courts must defer whenever the President invokes his Commander-in-
Chief power, his general Executive Power, or his "inherent" emergency
foreign affairs powers. " 2 Thus, Justice Jackson expressly rejected the di-
minished role for the courts in the national security process that the fed-
eral courts have more recently come to embrace."
Read together with the 1947 National Security Act and the post-Viet-
nam era foreign affairs statutes, Jackson's Youngstown concurrence
thirdly suggested quasi-constitutional principles regarding lines of author-
138. Here both constitutional text and congressional and executive practice become relevant, for in
cases where the President and Congress share "concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain," "congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility." Id.
139. The exception would be the rare case in which the President possessed the plenary constitu-
tional power to execute the foreign policy initiative without congressional approval, as, for example, if
he unilaterally chose to recognize a foreign government. In such a case, Justice Jackson suggested, a
court could "sustain exclusive presidential control... [but] only by disabling the Congress from acting
upon the subject." Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937) (upholding, pursuant to recognition power in article II of Constitution, President's
authority to make sole executive agreement without congressional approval).
140. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 635-36 n.2 (reading United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936), as involving not "the question of the President's power to act without congressional authoriza-
tion, but the question of his right to act under and in accord with an Act of Congress.").
142. Id. at 640-47, 653-54 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also id. at 646-47 (rejecting "[1]oose and
irresponsible use of adjectives" such as "'[ilnherent' powers, 'implied' powers, 'incidental' powers,
'plenary' powers, 'war' powers and 'emergency' powers . . ."). Justice Black's opinion for the Court
also declined to sustain the President's actions based on these claims of exclusive executive authority.
See id. at 587-88.
143. But cf. infra notes 246-69 and accompanying text (discussing Burger and Rehnquist Courts'
growing acceptance of a "Curtiss-Wright" vision of judicial deference to executive authority).
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ity and internal accountability within the executive branch. These princi-
ples may be thought to describe a "Due Process of Foreign Policy Admin-
istration" constraining the discretion of executive foreign policymaking
officials. In 1947 Congress designed the National Security Act to consoli-
date the President's control over the national security apparatus by estab-
lishing "a clear and direct line of command."14  Justice Jackson's Youngs-
town analysis rested on an implicit assumption that the executive actions
being challenged were either the President's own, or those carried out in
his name and with his clear approval.1 " These principles suggest that an
executive official's action cannot carry the weight of presidential authority
unless the President either directly controls or authorizes that act through
a clear line of authority.1 4 They further bar executive branch agencies
created by Congress from subdelegating their governmental responsibili-
ties for foreign policymaking or execution to inappropriate official entities
or private parties.
1 47
In 1947 Congress further directed the President not only to coordinate
through the NSC the development and implementation of national secur-
ity policy, but also to keep his subordinate foreign policy bureaucracies
carefully separate.1 4 s That directive, coupled with the President's constitu-
tional responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted," 49 imposes a solemn duty upon the President to maintain civilian
control of the military,150 to establish intrabranch procedures that will en-
144. 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) (congressional declaration of purpose). See also J. SUNDQUIST,
supra note 117, at 107.
145. See supra note 132. Congress has made this assumption explicit in the post-Vietnam intelli-
gence and arms export control statutes by erecting "presidential finding" requirements, which elimi-
nate the possibility of presidential deniability. See supra note 66; Scheffer, supra note 46, at 698-713
(describing these provisions).
146. Thus, individuals on the NSC staff, such as Oliver North, could not lawfully invoke the
President's constitutional authority to justify their covert actions unless they could also establish that
they were acting under direct presidential order or under a line of executive supervision that led
directly to the President. Nor could the executive branch defend, as "presidential," decisions that were
in fact reached by a junta within the government, rather than through a genuine process of intra-
executive branch debate. Cf Draper, The Rise of the American Junta, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Oct. 8,
1987, at 47; Draper, Reagan's Junta, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Jan. 29, 1987, at 5 (characterizing the
Iran-Contra Affair as government by junta).
147. Under this reasoning, both the NSC and the CIA act unconstitutionally when they deviate
from the foreign policy tasks that Congress expressly created them to perform. Compare supra notes
55-64 and accompanying text with L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-17, at 363 (2d
ed. 1988) ("an agency can assert as its objectives only those ends which are connected with the task
that Congress created it to perform."). Accordingly, the President may not constitutionally delegate
national security functions to governmental entities that were created to operate outside the existing
national security apparatus. Cf Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 114 (1976) (Civil Service
Commission may not assert foreign policy ends to defend its challenged regulation, because "[t]hat
agency has no responsibility for foreign affairs."). Nor may the President or his subordinates constitu-
tionally delegate their public responsibilities for national security matters to private citizens. See gen-
erally Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650
(1975); Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937).
148. See 50 U.S.C. § 402 (1982).
149. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
150. The bedrock principle of civilian supremacy over the military suggests that the President acts
unconstitutionally when he permits military officials to formulate foreign policy. See Youngstown, 343
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able him to supervise the foreign affairs bureaucracies,151 and to preserve
those bureaucracies' accountability both to Congress and to the people.152
Simply put, the 1947 National Security Act and Justice Jackson's
Youngstown opinion state quasi-constitutional principles of institutional
balance among the branches of government in foreign affairs.1 5' This
"National Security Constitution" both protects and facilitates the constitu-
tional functioning of the national security system by articulating a norma-
tive vision of the policymaking process, in which all three branches of
government play integral roles. In zones of shared constitutional authority,
the President and Congress must share information about and jointly
agree upon the United States' broad foreign policy objectives. The Presi-
dent must then coordinate full internal debate among the decision-formu-
lating entities of the executive branch; from that debate emerge particular
policy proposals to Congress to fulfill those broad objectives. When Con-
gress has endorsed particular initiatives, the appropriate decision-execut-
ing agencies must then execute them in accordance with law, under direct
presidential supervision, and subject to the watchful eyes of Congress, the
public, and the courts.
U.S. at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The purpose of lodging dual titles in one man was to insure
that the civilian would control the military, not to enable the military to subordinate the presidential
office."). See also The Declaration of Independence paras. 2, 14 (U.S. 1776) ("The history of the
present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations,... He has affected to
render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power."); U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, els.
10, 13 (Congress, a civilian entity, shall have power to declare war and make rules for governing the
armed forces.); id. art. II, § 2 (naming President, a political not military leader, as commander-in-
chief; id. amend. XXV, § I (naming civilian Vice-President President in case of President's death).
Even if the Constitution could not be read to oblige the President to prevent the mixing of military
and civilian functions within his subordinate agencies, the National Security Act of 1947 reflects
Congress' intent to impose such a requirement by statute. See 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) ("each military
department shall be separately organized ... and shall function . . . under civilian control of the
Secretary of Defense but [Congress' purpose is] not to merge these departments or services.").
151. Cf. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 599-604, 662-66 (1984) (discussing constitutional requirement that
President be unitary, politically accountable head of government with authority to direct all law-
administrators); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 463
(1987) (suggesting wisdom of centralized presidential supervision of federal bureaucracy).
152. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring) (when the President acts in ac-
cordance with authority delegated by Congress, "[t]he public may know the extent and limitations of
the powers that can be asserted, and persons affected may be informed from the statute of their rights
and duties."). This language suggests that the President bears a quasi-constitutional duty to ensure
that he and his subordinates will remain accountable to institutions outside the executive branch, see
Strauss, supra note 151, at 600, and to provide the people and their representatives with at least as
much information as is necessary to evaluate the legality of his actions. Cf. A. BICKEL, THE MORAL-
ITY OF CONSErr 18 (1975) (citing Edmund Burke) ("Consent will not long be yielded to faceless
officials, or to mere servants of one man, who themselves have no 'connexion with the interest of the
people.'. . . [W]e may today oppose excessive White House staff-government by private men whom
Congress never sees.") (citation omitted).
153. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("what is at stake is the equilib-
rium established by our constitutional system") (emphasis added); accord T. Lowi, supra note 110,
at 175 ("[W]ithout a constitutional balance the presidency flies apart."). In practical terms, this means
"'that while the President is usually in a position to propose, the Senate and Congress are often in a
technical position at least to dispose." Katzenbach, The Constitution and Foreign Policy, in A
WORKABLE GOVERNMENT? 62 (B. Marshall ed. 1987) (quoting E. Corwin) (emphasis in original).
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3. Policy Inversion: What Really Went Wrong During the Iran-Con-
tra Affair
If this is how American foreign policy should be made, then during the
Iran-Contra Affair, the Reagan Administration conducted a major foreign
policy initiative in precisely the opposite manner. The Iran-Contra Affair
occurred in two constitutional areas of shared congressional-executive au-
thority: military aid and covert operations.1 5 " Before the Iran-Contra Af-
fair, the President made two deals with Congress in each of these areas
regarding the nation's broad foreign policy objectives. Acting together, the
President and Congress reached substantive policy agreements not to ne-
gotiate with terrorists over hostages and, through congressional passage
and presidential signature of the Boland Amendments, not to fund mili-
tary activities by the contras. Furthermore, by congressional enactment
and presidential signature of the arms export control and covert opera-
tions statutes, the branches reached a related procedural accord: that the
President would personally participate in decisions authorizing covert op-
erations and arms sales, and that he would always keep Congress in-
formed of those decisions. Yet during the Iran-Contra Affair, the Presi-
dent secretly breached both the substantive and the procedural accords.
Without consulting with Congress, the President unilaterally endorsed
two opposite policy objectives: release of the Lebanon hostages by any
means, and private support for the contras. By so doing, he denied Con-
gress its constitutional entitlement to participate in the setting of broad
foreign policy objectives, as well as its attendant rights to information and
consultation.
After authorizing the initial phases of the initiative, by his own admis-
sion, the President became disengaged from the process of decisionmak-
ing.155 Acting without the knowledge of the major foreign affairs bureau-
cracies, 156 and apparently without the full awareness of the President or
154. See Meyer, supra note 50, at 89-94; Note, Keeping Secrets: The Church Committee, Covert
Action, and Nicaragua, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 601, 606-24 (1987) (discussing constitutional
allocations of competence in these two areas). One commentator has argued that covert war is not
subject to concurrent congressional-executive authority, but as a use of force short of declared war,
falls within Congress' exclusive authority to issue letters of marque and reprisal under article I, § 8 of
the Constitution. See Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten
Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035 (1986).
155. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 37, 167-68, 271-73 (President authorized ini-
tial arms sales to Iran and ordered his subordinates to keep the contras together "body and soul");
TOwER REPORT, supra note 5, at 79 (by his own account, President then placed "the principal
responsibility for policy review and implementation on the shoulders of his advisors").
156. The Constitution explicitly refers to "executive Departments." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
18; id. art. II, § 2, cl. I & 2. Of these, the Departments of State and Defense have historically held
special status. Early drafts of the Constitution actually referred to the Department of Foreign Affairs
and the Department of War by name, and those were the first two departments Congress established
by statute. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 292 (M. Farrand ed. 1911);
Act approved July 27, 1789, 1 Stat. 28-29 (1789) (Department of Foreign Affairs); Act approved
August 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 49-50 (1789) (Department of War). The Secretaries of State and and Defense
are statutory NSC members, while the Director of Central Intelligence and the National Security
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the Vice-President, the CIA (a decision-executing entity) then helped for-
mulate the details of a policy initiative to meet those objectives. 157 The
National Security Assistant and his staff (an advisory entity that included
active military officers1 58) then executed that initiative with the aid of pri-
vate parties and third countries, without meaningful internal debate
within the executive branch and in violation of internal agency control
principles.159 All of these actions were taken without the legally required
congressional notification, knowledge or oversight. 60 The executive
branch then concealed the existence of the entire initiative from both Con-
gress and the public, manipulating information to dampen public
debate. 1 '
Assistant are not. See supra note 57. Yet during the Iran-Contra Affair both Secretaries testified that
they were cut out of a deliberative process regarding a policy initiative that centrally involved both
foreign and military policy. See Sorenson, The President and the Secretary of State, FOREIGN AFF.
231 (1987/88) ("the Iran-contra hearings . . . revealed a pattern of White House disdain for the
Department of State so pervasive that Secretary George Shultz's own blunt testimony, while preserv-
ing his personal reputation, confirmed his department's emasculation").
157. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 20 ("At the operational level, the central figure
in the Iran-Contra Affair was Lt. Col. North [of the NSC staff], who coordinated all of the activities
and was involved in all aspects of the secret operations. . . .[W]e believe that the late Director of
Central Intelligence, William Casey, encouraged North, gave him direction, and promoted the concept
of an extra-legal covert organization [while] for the most part, insulat[ing] CIA career employees from
knowledge of what he and the NSC staff were doing.").
158. North and Poindexter were both active military officers. Robert McFarlane, the third mem-
ber of the NSC triumvirate, and Richard Secord were retired military officers, as were numerous
other functionaries in the Iran-Contra "Enterprise," such as Eugene Hasenfus. See supra note 13;
infra note 334.
159. Contrary to the internal agency control principles described in supra note 63, the NSC's
actions during the Iran-Contra Affair ran counter to announced U.S. foreign policy objectives and
were conducted without the knowledge of either Congress or the rest of the executive branch.
160. The first shipments of arms to Iran in August and September of 1985, which took place
through Israeli intermediaries, were authorized by "oral" findings not mentioned in the intelligence
statutes. The second shipment in November 1985, which was executed in part by the CIA, was
subsequently deemed authorized by a novel "retroactive" finding generated by the CIA's general
counsel, which Vice Admiral Poindexter later destroyed. See supra note 50. The third finding of
January 6, 1986 (and its amended version of January 17, 1986) President Reagan admittedly signed,
but later claimed he never actually read. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 208.
161. The cumulative use of information control techniques to shape or limit foreign policy debate
has characterized not only the Iran-Contra Affair, but also the conduct of much of U.S. foreign policy
during the 1980's. Like previous administrations, the Reagan Administration has denied visas to for-
eigners with views critical of American foreign policy. See, e.g., Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043
(D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987); Allende v. Shultz, 845
F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988); Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political Dissi-
dents, 100 HARV. L. REv. 930 (1987). It has followed earlier administrations in using statutory and
constitutional devices to restrict the travel of Americans abroad. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222
(1984); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). It has labeled imported foreign films as "political propa-
ganda," see Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987), and refused to certify disfavored domestic films
as "educational" materials qualified for duty-free export. See Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F.
Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal. 1986), affd, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidating under First and Fifth
Amendments U.S. Information Agency regulations regarding exemptions of certified material from
customs duties and licensing requirements). The Administration has supplemented these statutory
information control devices with new regulations narrowing the access of journalists to events occur-
ring abroad. See Comment, The Press and the Invasion of Grenada: Does the First Amendment
Guarantee the Press A Right of Access to Wartime News?, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 873 (1985). Through
polygraph tests, secrecy pledges, and prosecutions brought under the espionage statutes, it has sought
to restrain leaks by government employees. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir.
1988) (upholding conviction under espionage and theft statutes of government employee who leaked
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The Iran-Contra Affair thus ran afoul of both the constitutional and
policy visions of the national security process described above. The Affair
proves remarkable not simply because the President failed to take care
that individual laws were faithfully executed, but because he condoned a
near-total subversion of the United States foreign policy process. By the
President's own account, the only constitutionally authorized players in
that process-the President, the Vice-President, and Congress-as well as
the key statutory players, the Secretaries of State and Defense, were
largely excluded from decisionmaking. Within the executive branch, the
process turned upside-down, as the CIA formulated and the NSC exe-
cuted policy without presidential supervision. Each of the legal principles
comprising the "Due Process of Foreign Policy Administration" described
above was violated: executive officials claimed presidential authority for
actions the President had not directly approved; foreign policymaking and
execution were delegated to private entities and foreign governments; mili-
tary personnel ran foreign policy; and the President failed either to super-
vise his own foreign affairs apparatus or to preserve that apparatus' ac-
countability to Congress and the people.
Had the Iran-Contra committees stated their analysis in these terms,
they would have encountered far less difficulty in demonstrating the cor-
rectness of their two central conclusions: that individual laws were broken
and that "[tihe Administration's departure from democratic processes cre-
ated the conditions for policy failure."1 2 For once the constitutionally
prescribed foreign policy process became inverted, it was only a matter of
time before the spirit, if not the letter, of particular laws that were meant
to constrain and guide that process were also violated. It also became inev-
itable that such an upside-down process would yield fundamentally un-
sound foreign policy initiatives.1 63
The broader lesson of the Iran-Contra Affair is that Congress' ambi-
tious attempts during the post-Vietnam era to reassert its constitutional
role in foreign policymaking have met with only mixed success. In statute
after statute enacted during that period, Congress sought to impose upon
the President restrictions whose fundamental premises he apparently did
not accept. Although the President signed nearly all of those statutes, ex-
classified information to press), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3275 (Oct. 18, 1988); Nat'l Fed'n of Fed.
Employees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1988) (preliminary ruling regarding govern-
ment employees' constitutional challenge to Administration's use of secrecy pledge forms); Abrams,
The New Effort to Control Information, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 22 (discuss-
ing proposed polygraph testing). And by the admission of its own officials, the Administration has
spread "disinformation" abroad and conducted "spin control" at home. See Mega-Spin Don, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 8, 1986, at 11.
162. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 11 (majority report).
163. Cf. 0. NORTH, supra note 88, at 741 (statement of Rep. Lee H. Hamilton) ("the [arms-for-
hostages] policy achieved none of the goals it sought. The Ayatollah got his arms, more Americans are
held hostage today than when this policy began, subversion of U.S. interests throughout the region by
Iran continues.").
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ecutive officials later jumped through those statutes' loopholes, or simply
defied them. The President's growing willingness to break his deals with
Congress has gradually eviscerated Congress' post-Vietnam attempts to
increase its participation in foreign policymaking, thereby disrupting the
institutional equilibrium envisioned by the National Security Constitution.
But why hasn't Congress been able to force the President to keep his
bargains in foreign affairs? Why have these painstakingly negotiated stat-
utes proven so porous? Whenever Congress and the President differ over
foreign policy, why does the President almost always seem to win? In the
end, these structural inquiries, not questions about individual responsibil-
ity, remain the real unanswered questions of the Iran-Contra Affair. For
unless we consider and answer these structural questions, we can have no
guarantee that the Iran-Contra Affair itself will not happen all over
again.
II. WHY THE PRESIDENT ALMOST ALWAYS WINS IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
Why does the President almost always seem to win in foreign affairs?
The reasons may be grouped under three headings, which not coinciden-
tally, mirror general institutional characteristics of the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches, respectively. First, and most obviously, the
President has won because the executive branch has taken the initiative in
foreign affairs, and has often done so by construing laws designed to con-
strain his actions as authorizing them. Second, the President has won be-
cause Congress has usually complied with or acquiesced in what he has
done, because of legislative myopia, inadequate drafting, ineffective legis-
lative tools, or sheer lack of political will. Third, the President has won
because the federal courts have usually tolerated his acts, either by refus-
ing to hear challenges to those acts, or by hearing those challenges and
then affirming his authority on the merits. This simple three-part combi-
nation of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tol-
erance explains why the President almost invariably wins in foreign
affairs.1
8 4
164. This three-part reasoning enters directly into the calculus of an executive branch lawyer
asked to draft a legal opinion justifying a proposed foreign affairs initiative. If asked, for example,
whether the President can impose economic sanctions on Libya or bomb Colonel Qaddafi's headquar-
ters, the President's lawyers must answer three questions: (1) "Do we have the legal authority to
act?"; (2) "Can Congress stop us?"; and (3) "Can anyone challenge our action in court?" Or, to use
the framework outlined in the text: (1) "Do the Constitution and laws of the United States authorize
the President to take this executive initiative?"; (2) "If the executive branch takes the initiative, will
Congress acquiesce?"; and (3) "If Congress does not acquiesce and challenges the President's action,
will the courts nevertheless tolerate it, either by refusing to hear Congress' challenge, or by hearing
the challenge and ruling in the President's favor?"
The Yale Law Journal
A. Executive Initiative
What drives the executive branch to take the initiative in foreign af-
fairs? Most critics of the Iran-Contra Affair have offered no explanation,
simply assuming that the President's men were foolish, misguided, or evil.
However true this explanation might be, two institutional explana-
tions-based on domestic constitutional structure and international regime
change-plausibly supplement it.
The simple yet sensible domestic explanation, offered by Charles Black,
attributes executive seizure of the initiative in foreign affairs to the struc-
ture of the Constitution. Although article I gives Congress almost all of
the enumerated powers over foreign affairs, and article II gives the Presi-
dent almost none of them, Congress is poorly structured for initiative and
leadership, because of "its dispersed territoriality of power-bases and...
its bicamerality."1 5 The Presidency, in contrast, is ideally structured for
the receipt and exercise of power:
[W]hat very naturally has happened is simply that power textually
assigned to and at any time resumable by the body structurally un-
suited to its exercise, has flowed, through the inactions, ac-
qui[e]scences, and delegations of that body, toward an office ideally
structured for the exercise of initiative and for vigor in administra-
tion.... The result has been a flow of power from Congress to the
presidency. 6
The notion that the Presidency is institutionally best suited to initiate
government action is hardly new.187 Nor, in theory, is there anything
wrong with the President initiating international action. As in the domes-
tic context, a plebiscitary President is uniquely visible, and hence account-
able, to the electorate; he is the only individual capable of centralizing and
coordinating the decisionmaking process; and he can energize and direct
policy in ways that could not be done by either Congress or his own bu-
reaucracy. 6 His decisionmaking processes can take on degrees of speed,
secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no other governmental institution
can match."8 "
165. Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 13, 17 (1980); see also infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
166. Black, supra note 165, at 17, 20.
167. To the contrary, the notion underlies most of the vast literature on the Presidency since
Hamilton's Federalist No. 70. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961) ("Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government."). For a
now-classic discussion of the same concept, see generally R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE
POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM FDR TO CARTER (rev. ed. 1980).
168. Cf Sunstein, supra note 151, at 452-53 (articulating these reasons as arguments favoring
presidential control of the bureaucracy).
169. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting U.S.
Senate, Reports, Committee on Foreign Relations, vol. 8, at 24, (Feb. 15, 1816)) (" 'The President
...manages our concerns with foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine
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But the structural fact that the President may more easily exercise the
foreign affairs power than Congress does not explain why he chooses to
wield it. International relations theorists might explain such choices in
terms of the rise and fall of American hegemony during the postwar
era. 170 Franklin Roosevelt's activist presidency triggered an "extrovert
phase" in American foreign policy, which was marked by wars, military
spending, treatymaking, and international summitry."" This era, which
began before Pearl Harbor and ended with Vietnam, marked the Presi-
dent's emergence as not only America's leader, but also the world's.
17 2
During this era of the United States as world hegemon, America acted
through its President to erect the entire postwar multilateral political and
economic order. The era was marked by the creation of international in-
stitutions governed by written constitutions: on the political side, the
United Nations and its regional and functional agencies, and on the eco-
nomic side, the so-called Bretton Woods System.173 The President spurred
an optimistic vision of world public order with an orgy of treatymaking,
which secured our participation in international organizations and led us
into the brave new era of multilateralism. An entire generation of Ameri-
cans grew up and came to power believing in the wisdom of muscular
presidential leadership of foreign policy, while Congress played a reactive,
relatively isolationist role. 71 '
when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest prospect of success
.... The nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of de-
sign, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch.' ").
170. The implications of declining American hegemony for world order have been extensively
treated by the recent work of political economists David Calleo, Robert Gilpin, Charles Kindleberger
and Stephen Krasner, historian Paul Kennedy, and economist Mancur Olson. See D. CALLEO, BE-
YOND AMERICAN HEGEMONY (1987); R. GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (1987); R. GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD PoLrrsCS (1981); R. GILPIN, U. S.
POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION (1975); P. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE GREAT POWERS (1987); M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982) (explaining
U.S. economic decline as a function of special interest group government fostered in part by nation's
hegemonic status); Kindleberger, Systems of International Economic Organization, in MONEY AND
THE COMING WORLD ORDER 15, 33 (D. Callo ed. 1976); Krasner, Transforming International
Regimes: What the Third World Wants and Why, 25 INrr'L STOD. Q. 119 (1981); see also R. KEO-
HANE, AFTER HEGEMONY (1984) (recognizing decline of American postwar hegemony but question-
ing whether hegemony constitutes either necessary or sufficient condition for stable international or-
der). But see Russett, The mysterious case of vanishing hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain really dead? 39
INT'L ORG. 207 (1985) (questioning predictions of American decline); Strange, The persistent myth of
lost hegemony, 41 INT'L ORG. 551 (1987) (questioning notion of America's lost hegemony).
171. See generally S. AMBROSE, RISE TO GLOBALISM (1971); Huntington, Coping With the Lipp-
man Gap, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 453 (1987/88); Vasquez, Domestic contention on critical foreign-policy
issues: the case of the United States, 42 INT'L ORG. 643 (1988).
172. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); T. Lowi, supra note
110.
173. That system envisioned a World Bank to stimulate international development and recon-
struction, an International Monetary Fund to monitor balance of payments, and an International
Trade Organization to manage international trade. See generally F. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS (1977). Congress refused to ratify the charter of the proposed International Trade Organi-
zation, leaving the provisional General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the principal
operating world trade entity. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 21, at 293-96.
174. See Roskin, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms and Foreign
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The activist logic of this extrovert era made presidential initiatives vir-
tually inevitable. Yet Vietnam caused an entire generation to rethink its
attitude toward foreign policy. 1" National elites became less willing to
intervene to defend other nations and to bear the costs of world leader-
ship.1"6 Why then, have presidential initiatives not only continued, but
appeared to accelerate, in the post-Vietnam era?
Put simply, America's declining role as world hegemon has forced
changes in the postwar structure of international institutions, which have
in turn stimulated further presidential initiatives. In place of formal mul-
tilateral political and economic institutions, which enact bodies of positive
international law through treaties, have arisen newly minted informal re-
gional and functional regimes. Those regimes-which the United States
may not dominate, but in which it must participate-now manage global
economic and political events through bargaining and soft quasi-legal pro-
nouncements.1 77 Within these regimes, the United States can no longer
simply suppress conflicts of national interest; it must constantly manage
relations even with close historic allies through repeated applications of
economic carrots and political sticks.178 And the rise of new and unantici-
pated problems not subject to the control of any nation-state, such as
global terrorism and the debt crisis, have increasingly forced the United
States into a reactive international posture.
Given the President's superior institutional capacity to initiate govern-
mental action, it does not surprise that the burden of generating reactive
responses to external challenges has fallen on the President. Although
Policy, 89 POL. ScI. Q. 563 (1974). Congress revealed its initial antipathy toward multilateralism by
refusing to ratify the Charter of the League of Nations, the Charter of the International Trade Or-
ganization, the Genocide Convention, and other human rights conventions. The Senate also imposed
the Connally Resolution on the United States' acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of justice, see H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 19, at 326, and repeatedly
attempted to pass the Bricker Amendment to limit the treaty power. See Buergenthal, International
Human Rights: U.S. Policy and Priorities, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 611, 612-14 (1974).
175. See Vasquez, supra note 171, at 646; Vasquez, A Learning Theory of the American Anti-
Vietnam Movement, 13 J. PEACE REs. 299 (1976); E. MAY, "LESSONS" OF THE PAST: THE USE
AND MISUSE OF HISTORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 143-71 (1973).
176. 0. HoLsTr & J. ROSENAU, AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN WORLD AFFAIRS: VIETNAM AND
THE BREAKDOWN OF CONSENSUS 29-78 (1984); Russett, The Americans' Retreat from World Power,
90 POL. SC. Q. 1, 5 (1975); see Ornstein, Interest Groups, supra note 31, at 52-55 (describing the
rise of influential national antiwar interest group composed of students, parents of potential draftees,
and alumni of the 1960's civil rights movement).
177. Examples on the political side include: the Contadora Process, the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency, the Helsinki Accords, and the international peacekeeping and nuclear nonproliferation
regimes; on the economic side, the Group of Seven nations, the "COCOM" (Coordinating Committee
on Multilateral Export Controls), the Paris Club, and other regimes that have been the subject of
intensive political science analysis. See, e.g., R. PuTNAM & N. BAYNE, HANGING TOGETHER (rev.
ed. 1987) (studying cooperation and conflict in the Seven-Power summits); R. KEOHANE, supra note
170; Keohane & Nye, Two Cheers for Multilateralism, 60 FOREIGN POL'Y 148 (1986). For a survey
of international regimes, see generally INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (S. Krasner ed. 1983).
178. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 33, at 1227 (describing how reorientation of the world economy
has stimulated United States to turn to unilateral economic sanctions, bilateral free trade agreements
and investment programs, and plurilateral monetary bargaining within Group of Seven and Paris
Club).
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post-Vietnam congressional reforms have stimulated a resurgence of con-
gressional interest and activism in foreign policy," 9 those reforms have
left Congress too decentralized and democratized to generate its own co-
herent program of foreign policy initiatives.18 0 Increasingly, Congress has
exhibited its interest and activism in foreign affairs by exerting pressure
on the President through means short of legislation. Particularly in fields
such as international trade, which directly affect congressional constituen-
cies, Congress has forced the President into a range of recent preemptive
strikes to respond to or forestall even more drastic congressional activ-
ity."' The same public opinion that has empowered the plebiscitary Pres-
ident has simultaneously subjected him to almost irresistible pressures to
act quickly in times of real or imagined crisis." 2 Just as the 1950's consti-
tuted America's era of treatymaking, the 1980's have become its era of
treaty-breaking and bending, as the Reagan Administration has largely
led America's flight from multilateralism and international organizations
as well as its movement toward alternative mechanisms of multilateral
cooperation.' 83
Thus, the relative weakening of America in the world arena may have
promoted an increase, rather than a decrease, in executive initiatives. A
pervasive perception that the Presidency must act swiftly and secretly to
respond to fast-moving international events has almost inevitably forced
the executive branch into a continuing pattern of evasion of congressional
179. See supra note 31. Moreover, the key foreign affairs committees have recently gained dra-
matically in both expertise and influence. See Koh, supra note 33, at 1211-21 (discussing enhanced
powers of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees under the 1984 Trade and
Tariff Act); R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITrEES 26-35 (1973) (discussing power of foreign
affairs committees); Hammond, Congress in Foreign Policy, in THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS,
AND FOREIGN PoLIcy 81 (E. Muskie, K. Rush & K. Thompson eds. 1986) [hereinafter E. MUSKIE]
(listing informal congressional foreign policy caucuses).
180. Ornstein, The Constitution and the Sharing of Foreign Policy Responsibility, in E. MUSKiE,
supra note 179, at 35, 57.
181. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 33, at 1225-33 (enumerating presidential preemptive strikes in
trade field); Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (1985) (executive order imposing sanctions
upon South Africa in order to preempt congressional enactment of comprehensive anti-apartheid legis-
lation); Designation of Palestine Information Office as a Foreign Mission, 52 Fed. Reg. 37,035 (Oct.
2, 1987) (executive decision to close Palestinian office to forestall enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1001-1005, 101 Stat. 1331, 1406-07); see also N.Y. Times, Sept.
17, 1985, at Al, col. I (Reagan Administration hostility toward United Nations in part reflects pres-
sure imposed by enactment of Kassebaum Amendment, Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 143, 99 Stat. 405, 424
(1985) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 287e note (Supp. 1985), which imposes preconditions upon U.S.
payment of assessed contributions to United Nations and specialized agencies).
182. See T. Low, supra note 110, at 173 ("Mass pressure on plebiscitary presidents requires
results, or the appearance of results, regardless of the danger.").
183. See supra text accompanying notes 17-30. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State File No. P85 0189-
0461, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985) (terminating U.S. acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
of International Court of Justice); Science and Technology, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 336, 338
(Mar. 20, 1985) (announcing U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO). See generally Malawer, Reagan's
Law and Foreign Policy, 1981-1987: The "Reagan Corollary" of International Law, 29 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 85 (1988) (enumerating Reagan Administration foreign policy decisions that have modi-
fied or deviated from preexisting international legal rules). But cf supra note 181 (enumerating cases
in which Congress has provoked the President's actions).
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restraint.' During the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-80, for example,
President Carter reacted to both international and domestic pressures by
conducting one of the most dramatic exercises of the President's peacetime
foreign affairs power in United States history. 85 But when he left office,
he was widely viewed not as an "Imperial President," but as the weakest,
most reactive President in recent memory.1 86
In the end, an unholy synergy between the executive branch's interna-
tional incentives and domestic ability to act drove it toward the Iran-Con-
tra Affair. A President dependent upon public opinion and sensitive to
congressional pressure sought to respond to two perceived external
threats-the taking of American hostages in Lebanon and the rise of a
communist regime in Nicaragua-at the expense of compliance with the
law. 8 ' Like earlier presidents, his commitment to action led him to con-
done an errant flow of decisionmaking power not just from Congress to
the executive branch, but also within the Executive: away from the larger,
more accountable, and more cumbersome foreign affairs bureaucracies,
such as the State and Defense Departments, toward institutions such as
the CIA and the NSC, which are closer to the Oval Office and more
capable of swift, secret, and flexible action. 88 Although the resulting cov-
ert transfer of power to sub-executive entities facilitated swift and secret
action, it inevitably sacrificed the technical expertise, institutional judg-
ment, bureaucratic support, and bipartisan political approval that comes
184. This is what I understand to have been Oliver North's defense of the Iran-Contra Affair. See
0. NORTH, supra note 88, at 12, 256 ("[T]his nation is at risk in a dangerous world. . . . [W]e all
had to weigh . . . the difference between lives and lies."
185. During the 444 days that the U.S. hostages were held captive, President Carter declared a
national emergency under IEEPA, imposed a trade embargo and an extraterritorial assets freeze, cut
off lines of communication and embargoed travel to Iran, sued Iran in the International Court of
Justice, expelled Iranian diplomats, forced Iranian students to report to local immigration offices for
visa checks, made a disastrous attempt to rescue the hostages by force, and concluded an executive
agreement that suspended all private property claims against Iran, while consigning American com-
mercial claimants to arbitration before a newly established international tribunal. See Koh, supra note
33, at 1229 n.112; 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 71-333 (1980).
186. See G. SMrrH, MORALITY, REASON & POWER (1986) (recounting Carter's foreign policy
failures); T. LowI, supra note 110, at 173 (describing Carter's failed attempt to rescue Iranian hos-
tages) ("Public opinion had forced upon the president an act of the sheerest adventurism.").
187. See NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 1987, at 16 (statement of Secretary of State Shultz, quoting Presi-
dent Reagan) ("[Tihe American people will never forgive me if I fail to get these hostages out over
this legal question.").
188. See, e.g., D. WARWICK, A THEORY OF PUBLIC BUREACRACY (1975); Clarke, Why State
Can't Lead, 66 FOREIGN POL'Y 128 (1987) (decrying excessive bureaucratization of State Depart-
ment). President Nixon's distrust of the State Department similarly spurred the NSC's dramatic as-
cendancy during his administration. See H. KISSINGER, supra note 42, at 806 (Because "Nixon feared
leaks ... he thus encouraged procedures unlikely to be recommended in textbooks on public adminis-
tration that, crablike, worked privily around existing structures."). When Nixon ordered the
Cambodian bombings, for example, he explicitly instructed that the "State [Department] is to be
notified only after the point of no return." Id. at 245. Kissinger's elevation to Secretary of State
abated only briefly the institutional struggle between the NSC and the State Department. The tension
between the two offices has lingered, with two of the last four Secretaries of State, Cyrus Vance and
Alexander Haig, resigning in good measure because of unsuccessful turf battles with the National
Security Assistant. See Sorensen, supra note 156, at 231-32.
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from consultative inter- and intrabranch decisionmaking in accordance
with the National Security Constitution."8 9
B. Congressional Acquiescence
If the President has such strong institutional incentives to take initia-
tives, why then, has Congress so consistently failed to check or restrain
them? The short answer is that Congress has persistently acquiesced in
what the President has done, because of legislative myopia, inadequate
drafting, ineffective legislative tools, and an institutional absence of politi-
cal will. The case in point is the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which
has failed in its intended purpose for each of these four reasons.
1. Legislative Myopia
The first reason, already illustrated, is that Congress legislates to stop
the last war.190 The War Powers Resolution was drafted to halt creeping
wars like Vietnam, not short-term military strikes or covert wars of the
kind that dominate modern warfare.191 Similarly, the covert action legisla-
tion currently under consideration would not reform the intelligence appa-
ratus, but would instead fine-tune existing statutes to prevent the Presi-
dent from indefinitely delaying reports to Congress, which any future
President mindful of the Iran-Contra Affair would already take care to
avoid.
192
The institutional roots of congressional myopia lie in each phase of the
legislative process. Like other legislation that attempts to be public-re-
garding, proposed foreign affairs legislation is not immune from undue
influence or political veto by special interest groups. 9 Thus, broader
public policy reform objectives can often become lost amid a welter of
provincial or ethnic group concerns.19 ' The need of individual Members
189. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 12, 387-92 (pointing out how Administration's
departure from democratic decisionmaking processes not only violated the constitutional framework of
foreign policymaking, but also rendered policy failure inevitable).
190. Congress legislates this way in large part because voters vote this way. See M. FIORINA,
RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981).
191. See supra notes 13-15.
192. See bills cited supra note 74.
193. See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An
Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Pub-
lic Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
194. The trade field is the most extensively studied arena for private interest group influence
upon Congress in foreign affairs. See generally R. BAUER, I. POOL & L. DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSI-
NESS AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN TRADE (1963); I. DESTLER, AMERICAN
TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STrESS (1986); R. PASTOR, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF
U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY (1980); E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURE AND THE
TARIFF (1935); Ray, Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise of Non-
Tarff Barriers, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 285 (1987) (arguing that U.S. trade policy results from
political equilibrium struck between national policy and interest group pressures). In other areas, the
defense lobby has proven highly successful in promoting the maintenance of military spending. See
Madison, supra note 42. The Jewish lobby has exercised significant influence over Middle East and
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to be viewed as addressing "this year's problem" encourages them to ad-
dress last year's problems by tinkering with existing statutes rather than
by investing energy into introducing and passing large-scale reform pro-
grams.1 95 The Members' desire to choose legislative devices that can be
easily explained to constituents leads to a "congressional penchant for the
blunt, simple action," which may be insufficiently sensitive to the com-
plexities of the underlying problem."96 Even when sweeping legislative re-
forms are introduced, the competing objectives of the committees sharing
jurisdiction over the omnibus bill may impede the coalition formation nec-
essary to bring that bill to the floor. 197 And even when such bills are
reported out of committee and floor majorities can be mustered, the
supermajorities necessary to overcome filibusters often coalesce around
only those specific incremental changes that would correct known policy
defects. 9
arms sale policy. See T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 31, at 200-09 (discussing role of
Jewish lobby in the enactment of Arab antiboycott legislation); see also Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1001-1005, 101 Stat. 1331, 1406-07 (1988) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-
5203) (Grassley Amendment to Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1988 ordering closure of the
Palestine Liberation Organization offices in the United States). The international human rights lob-
bies have successfully pressed for legislative action. Recent examples include the ratification of the
Genocide Convention and the proposed ratification of the International Torture Convention, see
supra note 28, and the enactment of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986); see also R. PASTOR, supra at 301-21 (describing interest group influence
on U.S. human rights policy).
195. See generally D. MAYHEW, supra note 94, at 126-40 (net result of various institutional
influences is that Congress lags behind public opinion in enacting major legislation and tends to wrap
its policies in packages with largely symbolic value that offer particularized benefits to organized
interest groups). In 1973, for example, Senator Eagleton attempted to modify the War Powers Reso-
lution to reach paramilitary forces under civilian command, but his efforts failed because his col-
leagues did not wish to legislate against speculative problems. See 119 CONG. REc. 25,079-86 (1973).
196. D. MAYHEW, supra note 94, at 138. Thus, it hardly surprises that Congress embodied a
"60-day withdrawal" provision into the War Powers Resolution, see supra note 16 and accompanying
text, and has considered automatic phased numerical approaches to reduction of both the external and
internal deficits. Compare Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 31, and 42 U.S.C.)
(Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), discussed in Stith, supra note 133 (numerical approach to domestic
deficit reduction) with Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 3, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 126, 133 CONG. REc. 2,755-57 (1987) (Gephardt Amendment to Trade Reform
Act, subsequently dropped in conference) (requiring President to retaliate against countries running
excessive and unwarranted trade surpluses with U.S. by forcing those countries to reduce their sur-
pluses by 10% annually). This phenomenon also explains why only one legislative proposal arising
out of the Iran-Contra Affair currently has any real prospect of enactment: the intelligence oversight
legislation described in supra notes 74-77, which declares a simple, mandatory "48-hour notice rule"
for all covert operations. See Madison, It's Congress's Move, 19 NAT'L J. 2014, 2017-18 (1987).
197. See Weingast & Marshall, supra note 92, at 146-47. One obvious example is the current
intelligence oversight legislation, which was referred jointly to both the House Intelligence and For-
eign Affairs committees, and thereby became subject to two separate markups. See supra note 77.
198. Under the Senate's modern filibuster rule, only 41 votes are required to sustain a filibuster
and defeat legislation. See Standing Rules of the Senate Revised to June 1, 1988, S. Doc. No. 33,
100th Cong., 2d Sess., Rule XXII(2), at 15 (1988); see also N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1988, at A26, col. I
(describing Republicans' use of that rule, along with the quorum requirement, to defeat Democrat-
supported campaign reform bill). See generally Watson, Legal Evolution and Legislation, 1987
B.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 375-79 (explaining why legislatures often reject revolutionary proposals).
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2. Bad Drafting
Even when enacted, legislation expressly designed to check executive
adventurism has often failed because of faulty draftsmanship. The War
Powers Resolution, the most ambitious piece of foreign affairs "frame-
work legislation" enacted in the post-Vietnam era, offers three particu-
larly glaring examples. First, the Resolution's consultation requirements
oblige the President to consult "in every possible instance," but then allow
the President to decide what that term should mean."9' Second, the Reso-
lution requires the President to consult with "Congress" before he sends
troops abroad, but does not specify how many Members must be consulted
or how far in advance.200 Third and most seriously, the Resolution per-
mits the President to file three different types of reports to Congress upon
committing armed forces abroad, but only requires the removal of troops
within sixty days when one of those three types has been filed.2 1 Thus,
simply by his choice of report, the President can satisfy the Resolution's
procedural reporting obligation, while evading the Resolution's substan-
tive obligation to remove those troops within sixty days.
Some of these drafting errors were simply inadvertent. 02 Others re-
sulted from the legislative tendency to draft new laws by inserting boiler-
plate language from other post-Vietnam era statutes.20  Some more strin-
gent procedural provisions were substantially watered down in conference
in a futile effort to avoid a presidential veto. 04 But whatever the cause,
199. 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1982). For example, although in both cases, prior consultation was clearly
"possible," neither Presidents Carter nor Reagan consulted with Congress before sending troops to
Iran and Grenada, respectively. See J. CARTER, KEEPING FAITH 518 (1982) (quoting from President
Carter's diary) ("I had planned on calling in a few members of the House and Senate ... before the
rescue team began its move into Tehran .... But I never got around to that.") (emphasis omitted);
see also Note, supra note 14, at 1041.
200. See 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1982). When President Reagan sent warplanes to bomb Libya in
April 1986, for example, he consulted only fifteen congressional leaders, and even then only after the
planes were already in the air. See Torricelli, The War Powers Resolution After the Libya Crisis, 7
PACE L. REv. 661, 666 (1987).
201. The Resolution requires reports whenever U.S. Armed Forces are introduced "into hostili-
ties" or imminent hostilities, 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1) (1982); into foreign territory, airspace, or waters
equipped for combat, id. § 1543(a)(2); or in numbers that substantially enlarge a preexisting combat
unit, id. § 1543(a)(3). Yet the statute's sixty-day clock for removal of those troops runs automatically
only from the date when a "hostilities" report is submitted or "required to be submitted" under 50
U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1). See id. § 1544(a).
202. See Glennon, The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later: More Politics Than Law, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 571, 571 (1984) (drafting error described in supra note 201 was simply "unnoticed
at the time the resolution was enacted"). Such inadvertence may also have institutional roots. See D.
MAYHEW, supra note 94, at 122 (once Members decide to vote for bill, and exhaust its credit-claim-
ing possibilities, they "display only a modest interest in what goes into bills or what their passage
accomplishes.").
203. The "in every possible instance" language, for example, appears verbatim in IEEPA, 50
U.S.C. § 1703(a) (1982), and numerous other statutory consultation provisions found in foreign af-
fairs statutes enacted during this period. For a discussion of how and why such "legal transplants"
occur, see generally A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 21-30 (1974) (explaining cross-cultural
transplants of law).
204. This phenomenon, known on the Hill as "being pecked to death by ducks," largely accounts
for the numerous loopholes contained in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
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the net effect of these drafting mistakes has been to prevent the War Pow-
ers Resolution from being self-executing. Rather than putting the pressure
where it should be-on the President to start thinking about removing
armed forces sixty days after he has committed them to a hostile situa-
tion-the War Powers Resolution now puts pressure on Congress to de-
clare that United States forces are "in hostilities," just to trigger the sixty-
day clock for troop removal. The ironic result is that even though Con-
gress designed the War Powers Resolution to stop the last war-creeping
wars like Vietnam-in recent years, the Resolution's drafting flaws have
undercut its effectiveness in restraining just such creeping escalation in
Lebanon, Central America, and the Persian Gulf.20 5
3. Ineffective Tools
Why haven't Congress' legislative solutions worked even when it has
both foreseen a problem and properly drafted provisions to address it? As
we have seen, the post-Vietnam era statutes applied an array of innovative
procedural devices to bring executive action under control, including statu-
tory sunsetting, reporting and consultation requirements, committee over-
sight procedures, legislative vetoes, and appropriations limitations.2 06 Each
of the statutes whose enactment has been described above-the War Pow-
ers Resolution, the Case-Zablocki Act, IEEPA, the Arms Export Control
Act, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, and the Intelligence Oversight
Act-was designed not only to restrain executive discretion, but also to
increase congressional input into key foreign policy decisions. But if the
Iran-Contra Affair teaches anything, it is that most of these provisions
simply have not worked, particularly when executive officials are intent
upon evading them and courts are unwilling to enforce them.
Each of these devices has its defects. As Dean Calabresi has recognized,
mechanical sunset laws force Congress to redo its work every few years
and "gives a tremendous weapon to those who oppose regulation itself; the
99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986), which passed into law over presidential veto. See Remarks of Richard
Messick, former Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Panel on Sustaining an Interna-
tional Human Rights Campaign in the United States: Passage of the Anti-Apartheid Act in Perspec-
tive, Symposium on Human Rights Advocacy and the U.S. Political Process, Yale Law School, April
9, 1988 (on file with author). For a description of these loopholes, see generally Paretzky, The United
States Arms Embargo Against South Africa: An Analysis of the Laws, Regulations, and Loopholes,
12 YALE J. INT'L L. 133 (1987). Similarly, the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act, which was originally
drafted to require prior notice in all cases, was ultimately modified to require only "timely" notice,
language which lent itself to twisting during the Iran-Contra Affair. See supra notes 50, 68-69, 160
and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987), appealfiled, No. 87-5426
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (suit brought by more than 100 Members of Congress to compel President to com-
ply with War Powers Resolution's reporting requirement with regard to U.S. military activities in
Persian Gulf); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251
(1984) (similar suit with regard to U.S. military activities in El Salvador); see also supra note 15
(describing War Powers Resolution's ineffectiveness in Lebanon).
206. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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force of inertia shifts to their side."20 7 Reporting and consultation require-
ments lack teeth, and are all too easily evaded. 20 8  Committee oversight
invites committee capture and is usually conducted only after the executive
action has been completed.20 9 The only supervisory methods with proven
"bite" in foreign affairs have been the legislative veto and the appropria-
tions cutoff.2 10 Yet INS v. Chadha2l denied legal effect to legislative ve-
toes-one or two-House (simple or concurrent) resolutions that have not
been presented to the President-thereby barring Congress from vetoing
presidential foreign affairs actions of which it disapproves. 12 Moreover,
the Court has embroidered Chadha with a series of formalistic rulings
whose broad language, read literally, would limit any congressional at-
tempts to regulate executive exercises of delegated power by means other
than legislation.2 "3 Thus, Chadha not only apparently killed the legisla-
tive veto, but also announced sweeping separation-of-powers principles
that could be read to restrict Congress' authority to use functionally simi-
lar methods to check presidential discretion in foreign affairs.214
207. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 61 (1982). Not only does
time serve as an inadequate measure of the obsolescence of a statute, id. at 62, but complex legislative
compromises will inevitably be difficult to replicate.
208. See supra notes 10-16, 31-40, 199-200 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 79; Franck & Bob, supra note 33, at 934.
210. For accounts of the use or threatened use of the legislative veto in the areas of arms control
and transfer of nuclear materials, see Pomerance, United States Foreign Relations Law After
Chadha, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 201, 262-80 (1985). For descriptions of Congress' efforts to use
appropriations cutoffs in foreign affairs, see L. FISHER, CONSTITrTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 221-51, 318-23 (1985); G. TREVERTON, supra note 54, at 156-60
(describing legislative cutoff of funds for covert activities in Angola under Clark Amendment); Franck
& Bob, supra note 33, at 944-48; Glennon, supra note 53.
211. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
212. The Court's opinion apparently invalidated all uses of the legislative veto, although some
commentators have suggested that some vetoes survived. See, e.g., Carter, The Constitutionality of the
War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REv. 101, 129-33 (1984) (discussing § 5(c) of War Powers Reso-
lution). But see Koh, supra note 33, at 1209 n.53.
213. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Chadha declared flatly that
any congressional action which is "legislative in purpose and effect," in the sense of having the "pur-
pose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons ... outside the Legislative
Branch," 462 U.S. at 952, must be effected "in conformity with the express procedures of the Consti-
tution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to
the President." Id. at 958. Read broadly, Chadha and its progeny sketch a formalistic theory of
separation of powers, which rests on four basic premises: first, that constitutional powers are function-
ally definable as inherently executive, judicial, or legislative in nature; second, that the Constitution
allocates certain powers exclusively to the executive branch, thereby denying them to the other two
branches; third, that Congress has limited constitutional discretion to regulate executive action by
means other than formal legislation; and fourth, that these separation of powers concerns require that
specific constitutional provisions-such as the appointments or presentment clauses-be construed to
invalidate even those legislative control devices that plainly promote administrative efficiency or politi-
cal compromise. See generally Sunstein, supra note 151, at 493-500 (criticizing Chadha's constitu-
tional formalism).
214. In Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988), the Court recently declined to extend the
formalistic separation-of-powers theory of Chadha and Bowsher to invalidate the independent counsel
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for a nearly unani-
mous Court eschewed Chadha's formalistic approach in favor of a functional separation-of-powers
analysis. Under that analysis, the relevant question was whether the challenged legislation had ag-
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Nor, as the saga of the Boland Amendments has revealed, does the al-
ternative technique of appropriations cutoff necessarily ensure good execu-
tive behavior. When tacked to massive continuing appropriations mea-
sures, such limitations carry the political advantage of being nearly veto-
proof,"x5 but also the disadvantage of being subject to yearly reconsidera-
tion. When, as in the case of the Boland Amendments, the language of the
restriction becomes more and less inclusive over time, executive officials
can claim that the provision's vagueness impairs their ability to determine
whether particular activities are proscribed.2"' Even before the Iran-Con-
tra Affair broke, the Reagan Administration had shown how to sustain
the Central American conflict by exploiting spending loopholes in the ap-
propriations process, such as drawdown, special funds, contingency funds,
transfer, or reprogramming authorities.21 The more explicitly an appro-
priations limit is worded, the greater the force of the President's argument
that Congress has unconstitutionally exercised its appropriations power to
grandized Congress' powers by means that impeded the President's ability to perform duties "central
to the functioning of the Executive Branch." Id. at 2619. But see id. at 2622 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(applying formalistic approach to argue for invalidation of statute). Two pending separation-of-pow-
ers cases will shortly determine whether Morrison will be confined to its factual context, or will signal
the Court's broader retreat from Chadha's formalism. See United States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp.
1033 (W.D. Mo.), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Mistretta, 108 S. Ct. 2818 (1988) (chal-
lenging constitutionality of sentencing guideliness issued by U.S. Sentencing Commission); Ameron,
Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
1218 (1988) (challenging constitutionality of Competition in Contracting Act).
The recent elevation of Justice Anthony Kennedy-who did not sit in Morrison but authored the
Ninth Circuit opinion affirmed in Chadha-may increase the likelihood that Chadha will be ex-
tended beyond its holding to enhance executive discretion in foreign policymaking. For several rea-
sons, however, Chadha's formalism could ultimately prove to be a double-edged sword cutting against
executive authority. After all, it is the President, not Congress, who more frequently engages in for-
eign affairs activities that are not authorized by the Constitution's text. See Franck & Bob, supra note
33, at 951 n.274. Moreover, the lack of a device such as the legislative veto may simply lead Congress
to take back foreign affairs powers it has previously delegated to the President. And, ironically
enough, a strict application of Chadha's formalistic reasoning may permit Congress to employ con-
gressional control devices that arefunctionally as intrusive as the legislative veto, but which do not
run afoul of Chadha's literal holding. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 33, at 1200-03, 1216-17 (describing
fast-track regulatory device used in international trade statutes).
215. See C. RossITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 157 (1956) ("The President often feels com-
pelled to sign bills that are full of dubious grants and subsidies rather than risk a breakdown in the
work of whole departments.").
216. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1987, at A12, col. 1 (describing claimed loopholes in Boland
Amendments).
217. When Congress grants the President statutory "drawdown" authority, he may withdraw
certain Defense Department funds simply by determining that such withdrawals are vital to the se-
curity of the United States. Similar statutory provisions allow the President access to "special" or
"contingency" funds based upon nebulous findings that the use of those funds is "important to the
security of the United States" or "to the national interest." See Meyer, supra note 50, at 74-75. When
given statutory "transfer" authority, the President may apply to one appropriations account funds that
were initially appropriated for another. Reprogramming, by contrast, constitutes executive shifting of
appropriated funds within a single appropriation account, often without specific statutory mandate.
See L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POLICY 110-32 (1972). Used in combina-
tion, these various authorities dramatically expand the Executive's discretion to spend appropriated
funds. In the early 1980's, for example, the Reagan Administration used drawdown authority over
special funds to increase military aid to El Salvador by nearly five times the amount actually appro-
priated in a given year, and routinely used reprogramming authority to fund Central American
projects that Congress had not approved. Sharpe, supra note 62, at 33-34.
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constrain his enumerated and unenumerated foreign affairs authorities.218
The uncertain constitutional status of the General Accounting Office hin-
ders Congress' ability to direct the Comptroller General to ensure execu-
tive compliance with spending legislation.21 And finally, when the execu-
tive branch solicits private entities to act with wholly private monies that
are neither receivable by the United States government nor subject to its
control and expenditure, one could argue-as Oliver North has
done-that its actions wholly escape Congress' power of the purse.220
Thus, if Congress wishes to restrict presidential initiatives directly, it
can no longer simply impose procedural requirements upon the President
or try to restrain his discretion by legislative veto. For purposes of Justice
Jackson's Category Three, Congress retains only two meaningful ways to
express its opposition to a presidential initiative: by disapproving the
President's action by joint resolution or by voting an unambiguous and
complete denial of appropriated funds for the disfavored program.22 1 But
in either case Congress would then need to override the President's inevi-
table veto by a two-thirds vote in each house. In the end, both "solutions"
only trade one problem for another, for each requires Congress to exercise
218. Cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (Congress cannot use power of purse to
effect bill of attainder). Reagan Administration supporters have argued by analogy to Lovett that the
Boland Amendments place strict conditions upon the expenditure of authorized funds, and thereby
encroach unconstitutionally upon the Executive's "inherent" authority to conduct foreign affairs. See,
e.g., Crovitz, Crime, the Constitution, And the Iran-Contra Affair, COMMENTARY, Oct. 1987, at 23,
28; Quade, The President Is His Only Client, BARRISTER, Winter/Spring 1988, at 5, 7 (Interview
with A.B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to President) [hereinafter Culvahouse Interview] ("[I]t was clear
in our mind and remains clear that the Boland Amendment could not circumscribe the efforts of the
President to speak with foreign leaders about supporting the Nicaraguan freedom fighters."). Profes-
sor Stith has argued that Congress would violate the Constitution if it refused to appropriate funds for
the President to execute his enumerated foreign affairs authorities. See Stith, supra note 127, at 1351
& n.32. It remains less clear, however, under what circumstances Congress would be deemed to have
unconstitutionally impinged upon the President's ill-defined unenumerated foreign affairs authority,
as described in the Curtiss-Wright case. See infra text accompanying notes 234-41 (discussing Cur-
tiss-Wright). Cf Mendelsohn v. Meese, 690 F. Supp. 1226, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("We are aware of
no case striking down federal legislation as an encroachment of the executive's authority to conduct
foreign affairs . . ").
219. See Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, Inc., 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1218 (1988) (challenging constitutionality of Comptroller General's author-
ity under Competition in Contracting Act to stay awards of government contracts following bid pro-
tests); Stith, supra note 127, at 1390-92 & nn. 232-47 (describing constitutional difficulties of using
Comptroller General to enforce appropriations requirements against the Executive); Note, The Role
of the Comptroller General in Light of Bowsher v. Synar, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1539 (1987).
220. Compare 0. NORTH, supra note 88, at 473 ("We lived within the constraints of Boland,
which limited the use of appropriated funds.") with IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 16
("The Constitutional plan does not prohibit a President from asking a foreign state, or anyone else, to
contribute funds to a third party. But it does prohibit such solicitation where the United States exer-
cises control over their receipt and expenditure."). The difficult problem, of course, arises in deter-
mining when private monies solicited by government officials have become part of "public fisc"-i.e.,
monies receivable by the U.S. government and subject to its control and expenditure-and hence
subject to Congress' appropriations power. See Stith, supra note 127, at 1358.
221. See provisions cited in supra notes 51 & 54; Stith, supra note 127, at 1361-62 (describing
power of such categorical appropriations denials). See also infra notes 250-57 (demonstrating how
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), permits courts to construe any congressional mea-
sure short of these two as de facto acquiescence in President's initiative).
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a measure of political will that historically, it has only rarely been able to
muster.
4. Political Will
Congress could regularly block executive decisions by joint resolution or
appropriations cutoff, so long as it could override a presidential veto by a
two-thirds vote. Why hasn't Congress done this regularly?2 22 In many
cases, a critical mass of Members has simply been unwilling to take re-
sponsibility for setting foreign policy, preferring to leave the deci-
sion-and the blame-with the President.223 But even in those cases in
which a majority in both houses is willing to take a stand against the
President, Congress often falls victim to simple numbers. If Congress must
muster a two-thirds vote in both houses to override a veto, only 34 Sena-
tors can undercut its efforts, and it is a crippled President indeed who
cannot muster at least 34 votes for something he really wants.224 Professor
Black has calculated that, assuming equal defections across party lines, a
House of Representatives would need 308 Democrats and 127 Republi-
cans to be "veto-proofed" against a Republican President.2 5 Although the
Members could theoretically enforce an alternative solution-a binding
political agreement to override any presidential veto regardless of its sub-
stance22 6-in a repeat-player game, such an accord would likely break
down, for those Members who favored the President's position on a par-
ticular bill would always have an incentive to defect and support the Pres-
ident, notwithstanding Congress' longer-term institutional interests.227
222. Congress has overridden only seven percent (103 of 1417) of the presidential vetoes (exclud-
ing pocket vetoes) exercised between 1789 and 1988. See U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, PRESIDEN-
TIAL VErOES, 1977,1984, at ix (1985); 43 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 6 (1987).
223. See Fulbright, Congress and Foreign Policy, in Appendices to U.S. COMMISSION ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 58, 59 (1975) [here-
inafter MURPHY COMMISSION REPORT] ("A majority [of Congress] may have wished to end the war
[in Indochina], but less than a majority of the two Houses were willing to take the responsibility for
ending it."). The size of the critical mass varies from bill to bill. In committee, sometimes even a
single Member can prevent a bill from reaching the floor, and in the Senate, forty-one votes (less than
a majority) can defeat cloture. See supra note 198.
224. Even in his current weakened state, for example, President Reagan was able to get forty-two
votes for the confirmation of Judge Bork as a Supreme Court Justice. See 133 CONG. REC. S15,011
(daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987). More recently, the President defeated Congress' effort to override his veto of
the 1988 trade reform legislation, even though the House had voted overwhelmingly for an override.
See Trade Policy: New Trade Legislation Expected in Congress As Senate Sustains Reagan's Veto of
HR 3, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 879 (June 15, 1988) [hereinafter New Trade Legislation]. The
President won because the Senate failed to gain the unanimous consent necessary to bring to a vote a
concurrent resolution stripping from the bill an Alaskan oil export limitation. By retaining that single
provision in its 1000-page bill, Congress lost the critical override votes of both Alaskan senators. See
Trade Policy: Trade Bill Goes to Reagan This Week For Certain Veto; Override Unlikely, 5 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 678 (May 11, 1988).
225. See Black, Some Thoughts on the Veto, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 87, 93.
226. Cf B. ECKHARDT & C. BLACK, THE TIDES OF POWER 62-65 (1976) (statement of Professor
Black) (proposing that Congress simply follow convention of overriding all presidential vetoes, regard-
less of substance).
227. For precisely the same reason, Congress has been unable to circumvent the Supreme Court's
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Collective action problems aside, individual Members face voting dilem-
mas when the President violates congressionally imposed procedural con-
straints in pursuit of substantive policies that they favor.228 Parliamentary
manipulation by the President's congressional allies may force objecting
legislators into untenable voting positions.229 Appropriations cutoffs leave
legislators politically responsible for having stranded soldiers in the
field.230 And even when Congress has successfully used its voting power to
force the President to the bargaining table on foreign affairs questions, the
President has usually been able to demand concessions or future support
in exchange for agreeing to modify his conduct.2 1 Thus, once again, the
President remains largely free to execute initiatives without congressional
check, except in those rare cases where he is politically weak and Con-
gress's political will is unusually unified.
C. Judicial Tolerance
Neither the Executive's lack of self-restraint nor Congress' failure to
enforce its will on the President directly preclude third parties from en-
forcing that will through the federal courts. But however attractive this
strategy may be in theory, it fades in the face of a lengthy string of execu-
tive branch victories before the Supreme Court on foreign affairs ques-
tions.232 Whether on the merits or on justiciability grounds, the courts
have held for the President in these cases with astonishing regularity.
decision in Chadha by entering a political compact to enact all legislative vetoes by joint resolution,
regardless of their content. See Spann, Spinning the Legislative Veto, 72 GEo. L.J. 813 (1984).
228. Members faced these dilemmas, for example, when the Reagan Administration sent troops to
Grenada and bombers to Libya without complying with the War Powers Resolution's terms. See
Note, supra note 14, at 1008-14; supra note 200.
229. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1987, at A3, col. 4 (Senator Lowell Weicker initially voted
against War Powers Act Compliance Resolution, supra note 16, because it implied that War Powers
Resolution was not self-enforcing, but ultimately voted for it to ensure that Congress would register
some objection to President's noncompliance with War Powers Resolution in Persian Gulf); New
Trade Legislation, supra note 224, at 880 (Senate majority leader, who led drive to override Presi-
dent's veto of trade bill, later voted to sustain veto in order to preserve his right to call for bill's
reconsideration.).
230. "In Indochina, Congress had constitutional authority... through the appropriations process,
to terminate, confine or otherwise limit our participation. But a large majority of Congress felt it
could not break with the President without jeopardizing the lives of American troops .... ." Henkin,
"A More Effective System"for Foreign Relations: The Constitutional Framework, in Appendices to
MURPHY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 223, at 9, 16; accord T. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESI-
DENTIAL POWER 146 (1974).
231. See, e.g., supra note 15 (war powers negotiation regarding commitment of U.S. forces in
Lebanon).
232. Since Youngstown, the Supreme Court has intervened consistently across the spectrum of
U.S. foreign policy interests to tip the balance of foreign policymaking power in favor of the Presi-
dent. The Supreme Court's decision in Chadha gutted the legislative veto provisions in the War
Powers Resolution, the Arms Export Control Act, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, the National
Emergencies Act, and IEEPA. See generally Pomerance, supra note 210. United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937), U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), and Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996
(1979), all served to consolidate the President's authority over treatymaking and treaty-breaking. See
supra notes 18, 25-30 and accompanying text. More recently, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981), Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), and Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean
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1. The Merits
Given the relatively few presidential powers specifically enumerated in
article II of the Constitution,"' one might have expected the President to
encounter less success in the courts. Yet examination of the President's
judicial victories reveals that he owes that success to two other sources of
constitutional authority that have proven historically more important than
the President's enumerated constitutional powers: his broad unenumerated
powers as "the sole organ of the nation in its external affairs," identified
in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. ,24 and the various for-
eign affairs powers that Congress has delegated to him by statute.235
That these two sources of presidential authority now overshadow the
President's enumerated constitutional powers demonstrates that this is a
tale of three branches, not two. For the player whose role in the foreign
policy drama has most frequently been overlooked has not been Congress
or the President, but the federal judiciary. Through both action and inac-
tion, the federal courts have consistently upheld the President's authority
to dominate the foreign affairs arena, over time working a net transfer of
foreign affairs policymaking power from Congress to the President.
Equally important, the net effect of the federal courts' actions has been to
all but dismantle the Youngstown vision of the National Security Consti-
tution described above. In its place the courts have begun to impress upon
the foreign policy process a Curtiss-Wright vision that tips the scales dra-
matically in favor of executive power.
Bruce Ackerman has spoken of 1937 as an American "constitutional
moment," when the New Deal legitimated the activist state and funda-
mentally altered America's constitutional politics. 36 Yet the same era also
redefined the constitutional politics of American foreign affairs, for it was
during Franklin Roosevelt's four terms in office that the President became
the world's leader as well as America's. As much as any other event, Cur-
tiss-Wright, a 1936 Supreme Court decision, consolidated Roosevelt's
transformation of the President's foreign affairs authority. 37 Writing for
Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986), have provided the lower courts with a theory of statutory construction
that has legitimated broad exercises of emergency economic powers under claims of delegated author-
ity. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40; infra text accompanying notes 250-63.
233. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II (enumerating President's commander-in-chief power, power to make
treaties, power to appoint and to receive ambassadors, and general grant of "executive Power").
234. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
235. See, e.g., provisions cited supra note 32.
236. Ackerman identifies the signing of the Constitution and the Reconstruction era as two other
constitutional moments. See B. ACKERMAN, DISCOVERING THE CONSTsTtrrION (1988) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
237. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), which was decided one year after Curtiss-
Wright, and executive practice during the years leading to World War II proved decisive in helping
FDR to consolidate his foreign affairs supremacy. In Belmont, Curtiss-Wright's author, Justice Suth-
erland upheld the constitutional validity of a sole executive agreement with the Soviet Union. See
supra note 18. Three years later, President Roosevelt concluded the notorious Destroyers-for-Bases
deal with Great Britain, thereby legitimizing a broader use of the executive agreement instead of the
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the Court, Justice Sutherland validated the President's unenumerated con-
stitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs in the most sweeping terms,
claiming that the President's "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power.
. . as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations ... does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress
... ,,28 As Curtiss-Wright's numerous critics have recognized, this lan-
guage was mere dicta, for Congress had passed a joint resolution in that
case expressly authorizing the President to take the action under chal-
lenge. Moreover, Justice Sutherland's historically flawed theory of how
the President had come to possess such plenary power represented "the
farthest departure from the theory that the United States is a constitution-
ally limited democracy. '229 Nevertheless, later Presidents have sought to
treat Curtiss-Wright as what Ackerman would call an "amendment-ana-
logue"-an effective judicial amendment of article II of the Constitution
to add to the powers enumerated there an indeterminate reservoir of exec-
utive foreign affairs authority. 40
Curtiss-Wright painted a dramatically different vision of the National
Security Constitution from that found in Youngstown. Youngstown envi-
sioned a narrowly limited realm of exclusive presidential power in foreign
affairs. Outside that realm, most foreign affairs decisions would occur in a
treaty as a method of entering foreign alliances. See generally T. FRANCK & M. GLENNON, FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 379-86 (1987). In concluding that deal, Roosevelt ex-
pressly relied upon a controversial opinion by then-Attorney General Robert Jackson, which found
the transfer supported not only by the President's Commander-in-Chief power and Curtiss-Wright
authority, but also by two statutes. Compare 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 484 (1940) with Borchard, The
Attorney General's Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers For Naval Bases, 34 AM. J. INT'L L.
690, 690 (1940) ("[T]he transaction was sustained under statutes which hardly bear the construction
placed upon them."). In early 1941, Roosevelt employed executive agreements to send American
troops to Greenland and Iceland, declared a state of "unlimited national emergency," and ordered the
Navy to convoy American ships and shoot Nazi U-boats on sight, all without express congressional
consent. See A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 110-13 (1973). After Pearl Harbor, Con-
gress' declaration of war authorized FDR to lead the nation into all-out war. By the close of the
Truman Administration, the President had dropped the atomic bomb without consulting Congress,
conducted the Korean conflict without a declaration of war, and molded the institutional presidency
into its modem shape. See supra note 112; Hamby, Harry S. Truman: Insecurity and Responsibility,
in F. GREENSTEIN, supra note 111, at 41.
238.
[W]e are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of
legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but
which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to
the applicable provisions of the Constitution.
299 U.S. at 319-20.
239. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55
YALE L.J. 467, 493 (1946). See also Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71
MICH. L. REV. 1, 26-33 (1972); Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v.
Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5, 12 (1988); LaFeber, The Constitution and
United States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, 74 J. AM. HIST. 695, 710-14 (1987); Lofgren,
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1
(1973).
240. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 236, ch. 12, at 77.
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sphere of concurrent authority: under presidential management, bounded
by the checks provided by congressional consultation and judicial review.
Within that sphere, the courts would closely examine congressional enact-
ments to determine whether they implicitly or explicitly empowered the
President to undertake particular actions. Curtiss-Wright, by contrast,
viewed the entire field of foreign affairs as falling under the President's
inherent authority. While accepting the norm of presidential management
of foreign policy that Youngstown would later embrace, it rejected the at-
tendant conditions of congressional consultation and participation. Fur-
thermore, over time the Curtiss-Wright vision also came to embrace the
notion that courts should wholly defer to executive branch judgments,
once they have made an initial determination that foreign affairs are at
stake.241
In Youngstown itself, both the Court's opinion and Justice Jackson's
concurrence read Curtiss-Wright as resting not on inherent presidential
power, but on whether Congress had authorized the executive action
under challenge.142 During the Warren Court years, the Youngstown the-
ory appeared to take hold, as the Court carefully scrutinized statutes cited
by the Executive to determine whether they had specifically empowered
the President's actions, and if so, whether Congress and the President act-
ing together had entrenched upon protected constitutional rights.2 43 In
Kent v. Dulles,2 4 the Warren Court demanded a clear statutory state-
ment that Congress had authorized the executive act in question before
condoning a direct infringement upon an individual's constitutional right
to travel. By so requiring, the Court ensured that rules regulating rights
will "reflect the political consent and public participation embodied in leg-
islation, rather than the self-interested bureaucratic discretion that is
likely to be the character of executive action" when claimed national se-
curity interests are at stake.245
241. Significantly, nothing in Curtiss-Wright itself suggested that executive actions in foreign af-
fairs should be immune from judicial review. To the contrary, in Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland
reviewed the President's action and upheld it on the merits as authorized by Congress. Yet twelve
years later, in Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Co., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), the
Court declared that "the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.
... They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsi-
bility and which ha[ve] long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to
judicial intrusion or inquiry." Id. at 111 (citing, inter alia, Curtiss-Wright).
242. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585 (Black, J., for the Court) ("The President's power, if any,
to issue the order [under challenge] must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution
itself."); id. at 635-36 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring) (Curtiss-Wright involved not "the question of the
President's power to act without congressional authorization, but the question of his right to act under
and in accord with an Act of Congress.").
243. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967) (refusing to accept executive
invocation of congressional war power as "talismanic incantation" to support violation of constitu-
tional rights).
244. 357 U.S. 116 (1958); accord Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507-08 (1959).
245. Edgar & Schmidt, Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and National Security
Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 351, 355-56 (1986).
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Yet Youngstown's vision assumed the existence of both a genuine dia-
logue and a general consensus between Congress and the President about
substantive foreign policy ends. Vietnam largely unraveled both assump-
tions. When Congress responded to Vietnam in the early 1970's by at-
tempting to impose the Youngstown vision upon the President by statute,
the Court threw its weight toward Curtiss-Wright, which has now
reemerged as the touchstone of the Court's foreign affairs jurisprudence.
This pattern first appeared in 1971, when the Burger Court rejected the
Nixon Administration's efforts to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Pa-
pers without statutory authorization.24 Although the votes of the First
Amendment absolutists then sitting on the Court sealed a rare presidential
defeat, the separate opinions in the Pentagon Papers Case unveiled a
strong undercurrent favoring Curtiss-Wright's vision of executive
supremacy in foreign affairs.
24 7
Since the Pentagon Papers case, that undercurrent has come to the sur-
face, as the Court has newly invoked Curtiss-Wright, not so much in con-
stitutional interpretation as in the realm of statutory construction. Lan-
guage in Curtiss-Wright suggested that courts should read foreign affairs
statutes with a presumption that they permit executive conduct.24 Execu-
tive branch attorneys have read that language as defining a canon of def-
erential statutory construction for courts construing foreign affairs stat-
utes. Thus, even when Congress has enacted statutes which apparently
246. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Pentagon Papers Case). One
year later, in United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972), the Court
similarly ruled against the President by invalidating warrantless wiretaps for domestic intelligence-
gathering that had been authorized only by the Attorney General. Like the Pentagon Papers Case,
however, the Keith decision did not represent an unmitigated defeat for the Executive because the
Court carefully declined "judgment on the scope of the President's surveillance power with respect to
the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country." Id. at 308; see also id. at 322 (reiter-
ating that case did not involve issues "with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents").
247. As Professors Edgar and Schmidt have recently recognized, "in the Pentagon Papers case,..
the Supreme Court was caught in a state of tension between the precepts of Steel Seizure and
Curtiss-Wright." See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 245, at 359. Three Justices rejected the Presi-
dent's claim based primarily on the First Amendment, one relied principally upon the absence of
congressional authorization, and the three dissenters rested heavily on Curtiss-Wright. See id. at 362-
64 (discussing opinions). Justices Stewart and White, the two swing Justices, not only acknowledged
the need for executive supremacy in foreign affairs, but openly contemplated other situations in which
they might be willing to approve a prior restraint against publication based on national security
claims. See Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. at 728-29 (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concurring)
("If the Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of unshared power in the conduct of foreign
affairs and the maintenance of our national defense, then under the Constitution the Executive must
have the largely unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to
exercise that power successfully."). Cf. United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.
1979) (relying on standard set forth in Stewart opinion to uphold government effort to enjoin publica-
tion of magazine article).
248. "It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrass-
ment-perhaps serious embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congres-
sional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the interna-
tional field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved." Curtiss-Wright, 299
U.S. at 320 (emphasis added).
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limit executive power in foreign affairs, executive branch attorneys have
liberally construed loopholes in those statutes to permit or authorize exec-
utive initiatives that Congress never anticipated.249
The Burger Court had several opportunities to read Curtiss-Wright
strictly, and thereby to rein in this executive practice. On each occasion,
however, it ruled in the President's favor, approving rather than rejecting
his self-serving construction of the statute in question. In the most famous
of these, Dames & Moore v. Regan,2 50 the Supreme Court construed
IEEPA in light of the President's unenumerated constitutional powers in
order to uphold President Carter's authority to conclude the Iranian hos-
tages deal. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist introduced a three-
part technique of statutory construction that the Supreme Court has sub-
sequently applied to most foreign affairs statutes that have come before
it.251 First, he ignored the statute's legislative history, which clearly
evinced congressional intent to restrict presidential power, in favor of the
statutory language, which he read unambiguously to authorize the execu-
tive action under challenge. Second, notwithstanding Kent v. Dulles'
"clear statement" principle, Justice Rehnquist broadly construed the dele-
gated grant of executive authority, despite the impact of that construction
upon individual rights.2 2 Third, he relied on the absence of express con-
gressional disapproval of the President's action, the existence of general
legislation in the area, and a history of unchecked executive practice to
conclude that Congress had endorsed the President's initiative, thereby
elevating the President's power from the "twilight zone," Jackson Cate-
gory Two, to its height in Jackson Category One.
253
Read together with the Court's later decision in INS v. Chadha, Dames
& Moore dramatically alters the application of Youngstown's constitu-
249. See supra notes 50, 160; infra note 324 (recounting examples of this practice during Iran-
Contra Affair).
250. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
251. For further criticism of the Court's technique of statutory construction in Dames & Moore,
see W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
317-21 (1987); L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 38-39 (1985).
252. In Dames & Moore, the plaintiffs argued that the executive branch, by entering a hostage
accord with Iran, had taken their private property interests in attachments against Iranian assets and
claims against Iran in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Rehnquist found that the nullifica-
tion of the attachments did not constitute a taking and held the remaining takings claims to be
nonripe. Compare 453 U.S. at 674 n.6 & 688-90 with id. at 690-91 (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (dissenting from Court's decision with respect to attachments). In Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), a case decided almost contemporaneously with Dames & Moore, Chief
Justice Burger gave similar short shrift to the individual rights being infringed by executive action.
See id. at 309 (upholding Secretary of State's content-based revocation of Agee's passport as "'an
inhibition of action,' rather than of speech.") (citation omitted). But see supra notes 244-45 and
accompanying text.
253. See supra note 132. On its face, IEEPA was silent as to whether the President could sus-
pend private claims against Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages. But rather than
construing IEEPA's silence to reflect Congress' intent to preempt the President's claim of inherent
power to take such action, Justice Rehnquist construed the fact of the statute's existence as implied
authorization for such an act. He thereby delegated to the President authority which Congress itself
had arguably withheld. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675-79.
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tional analysis in foreign affairs cases. For under Justice Rehnquist's
Dames & Moore reasoning, a court may construe congressional inaction
or legislation in a related area as implicit approval for a challenged execu-
tive action. Yet under Chadha, Congress may definitively disapprove an
executive act only by passing a joint resolution by a supermajority in both
houses that is sufficient to override a subsequent presidential veto.
2 "5
These rulings create a one-way "ratchet effect" that effectively redraws
the categories described in Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence. For
by treating all manner of ambiguous congressional action as "approval"
for a challenged presidential act, a court can manipulate almost any act
out of the lower two Jackson categories, where it would be subject to
challenge, into Jackson Category One, where the President's legal author-
ity would be unassailable. Yet because Chadha demands an extraordinary
display of political will to disapprove a presidential act, Congress could
only rarely return those acts to Jackson Category Three, where they
might be declared invalid2 55 These decisions have the net effect of dra-
matically narrowing Jackson Category Three to those very few foreign
affairs cases in which the President both lacks inherent constitutional
powers and is foolish enough to act contrary to congressional intent clearly
expressed on the face of a statute.256
Coupled with Chadha, Justice Rehnquist's statutory interpretation in
Dames & Moore radically undercuts Youngstown's vision of a balanced
national security process. The decisions enhance the President's power
against Congress by making it both easier to find congressional "ap-
proval" and more difficult for Congress to express institutional opposition
to particular executive acts. The decisions simultaneously strengthen the
President vis-A-vis the judiciary by encouraging the courts to apply a spe-
cial measure of deference to executive acts in foreign affairs, a require-
ment that Justice Jackson had soundly rejected in Youngstown itself.
5'7
In subsequent cases, the Court has built on Dames & Moore to con-
struct a Curtiss-Wright orientation toward statutory construction that now
challenges Youngstown's vision of institutional and constitutional balance.
In Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project,"'
Justice Rehnquist accepted at face value the government's claim of a na-
tional security interest, without considering statutory provisions mandat-
ing close judicial scrutiny of the Executive's acts.259 Three years later, in
254. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text (Chadha holds that only measures passed by
both houses and signed by the President may be given legal effect outside the legislative branch).
255. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., United States v. Guy Capps, 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affid on other grounds,
348 U.S. 296 (1955) (refusing to give effect to sole executive agreement regulating trade because
agreement was inconsistent with statute enacted under Congress' foreign commerce power regulating
same subject matter).
257. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
258. 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
259. The Court accepted at face value the Navy's refusal to confirm or deny that it had stored
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Regan v. Wald, 6 ' the Court applied the Dames & Moore technique of
statutory construction to uphold President Reagan's power to regulate
travel to Cuba under IEEPA's "grandfather clause," despite unambiguous
statutory language and legislative history to the contrary." 1 More re-
cently, in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society,2"'
the Court construed yet another statute that appeared to constrain execu-
tive discretion as permitting the executive branch to conclude a whaling
agreement with Japan that undercut a pre-existing international treaty. 3
Significantly, Congress had designed none of these statutes to shift the
balance of foreign affairs decisionmaking power from Congress toward the
President; all were enacted for precisely the opposite purpose. But the
Supreme Court's reading of these statutes has enhanced presidential
power by encouraging lawyers throughout the executive branch to con-
strue their agency's authorizing statutes generously.
In reaching these decisions, the Court has rejected virtually every doc-
trinal technique offered it to narrow the substantive scope of executive
power.264 When urged to apply the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a
nuclear weapons at a Hawaiian facility because the information was classified, even though the 1974
Freedom of Information Act amendments required the courts to make a de novo determination
whether such a classification was proper. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982); Halperin, The Na-
tional Security State: Never Question the President, in THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS
IN THE SUPREME COURT 1969-1986, at 50, 54 (H. Schwartz ed. 1987).
260. 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
261. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 245, at 385-86 ("The majority opinion by Justice Rehn-
quist simply overrode the intent of Congress in order to permit the Executive to impose general
restrictions on travel to Cuba without going through the congressional notice and consultation require-
ment imposed by [IEEPA] for new peacetime emergencies."). Wald went beyond Dames & Moore by
construing IEEPA to override not simply property rights, see supra note 252, but the right to interna-
tional travel guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although the Court of
Appeals had concluded that that right required the application to IEEPA of the Kent v. Dulles "clear
statement" principle, see Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794, 800 (1st Cir. 1983), Justice Rehnquist cited
Curtiss-Wright to mandate "traditional deference to executive judgment '[in this vast external
realm.'" 468 U.S. at 242 (citation omitted).
262. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
263. The Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1)
(1982), and the Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act,
16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1982), imposed a mandatory duty on the Secretary of Commerce to certify to
the President any determination that foreign nationals were conducting fishing operations which "di-
minish the effectiveness" of an international fishery conservation program. Although the International
Whaling Commission established a "zero quota" against the taking of whales in accordance with the
International Whaling Convention, the Court upheld the Commerce Secretary's decision not to certify
Japan, based upon an executive agreement under which the United States had agreed that Japan
could continue whaling at certain harvest levels for a fixed period of years. 478 U.S. at 227-29. In a
dissent joined, extraordinarily enough, by Justice Rehnquist, Justice Marshall concluded that the
Secretary had "substitute[d] . .. his judgment for Congress' on the issue of how best to respond to a
foreign nation's intentional past violation of quotas . .. [and had] flouted the express will of Congress
and exceeded his own authority." See id. at 241, 246 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
264. Although the Court has recently twice ruled against the Executive in cases bearing on for-
eign affairs, in neither case did it deny the Executive's claim of substantive power. In Reagan v.
Abourezk, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd by an equally divided Court, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987),
an equally divided six-Justice Court affirmed without opinion a decision remanding for clarification
the INS' construction of § 212(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27)
(1982). In Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988), the Court held that Congress did not enact the
National Security Act of 1947 with the intent to preclude judicial review of a constitutional challenge
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grant of power to the President, the Court held that that doctrine did not
apply equally to foreign affairs.26 When asked to construe the existence
of a statute in the field to preempt a claim of inherent presidential power
to make foreign policy, the Court declined.266 When asked to read nar-
rowly a statute that impinged on constitutional rights, the Court refused
to apply the "clear statement" rule.26 7 When urged to uphold the constitu-
tionality of a congressional control device, the Court invalidated it.
266
In short, far from maintaining a rough balance in the congressional-
executive tug-of-war, the Court's decisions on the merits of foreign affairs
claims have encouraged a steady flow of policymaking power from Con-
gress to the Executive. Through unjustifiably deferential techniques of
statutory construction, the courts have read Curtiss-Wright and its prog-
eny virtually to supplant Youngstown's constitutional vision. As a result,
the courts have become the President's accomplices in an extraordinary
process of statutory inversion. It hardly surprises, then, that Oliver North
should have cited Curtiss-Wright to Congress as the legal basis justifying
all of his actions during the Iran-Contra Affair.269
2. Justiciability
Perhaps even more important than these scattered rulings on the merits
have been the many cases in which the Court has condoned executive ini-
tiatives in foreign affairs by refusing to hear challenges to the President's
authority. In Goldwater v. Carter270 and Burke v. Barnes7 1, the Court
dismissed congressional challenges to presidential authority, with various
Justices finding the challenges not ripe, moot, or presenting nonjusticiable
to a CIA employment termination decision. The Court did not, however, pass on the merits of the
employee's constitutional claim. Id. at 2054 n.9. Both Webster's construction of the National Security
Act and its attitude toward judicial review of executive action in national security affairs seem wholly
consonant with the Youngstown vision I have described. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43.
Nevertheless, two Justices dissented from Webster's finding of reviewability, not surprisingly citing
Curtiss-~right. See 108 S. Ct. at 2055 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part); id. at 2060 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
265. In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland rejected a claim that the statute under challenge con-
stituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the Executive. See supra note 248; see also
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("Congress-in giving the President authority over matters of
foreign affairs-must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in do-
mestic affairs.").
266. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 684-86; supra note 253. In Youngstown, Justice Jackson
had taken the opposite position on this issue. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
267. On three recent occasions, the Court has avoided applying the clear statement principle of
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text. See Regan v.
Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 240-42 (1984), supra note 261; Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (upholding
Secretary of State's authority to remove Philip Agee's passport on ground that his foreign travel was
likely to damage U.S. national security); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (imposing
constructive trust upon former CIA operative for publishing book without previously clearing his
manuscript).
268. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
269. See 0. NoRTH, supra note 88, at 523-25, 527.
270. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
271. 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 1255
political questions.27  These Supreme Court decisions stand atop much
larger congeries of lower federal court cases that, over the years, have
refused to hear challenges to the legality of the Vietnam War2 73 and to
various aspects of the Reagan Administration's support for the contras.274
Even when the courts have not relied on abstention doctrines tied to the
nature, ripeness, or mootness of the question presented, they have invoked
the identity of the plaintiff, the defendant, the cause of action, and the
requested relief as grounds for dismissing the case. Recent decisions have
erected standing bars to foreign affairs suits by aliens,27 citizens,278 tax-
payers,277 and Members of Congress.27  Courts have held government of-
ficials immune from suits by citizens for monetary damages,279 and the
United States government immune from suits by servicemen for all man-
ner of injtiries.2"0 They have dismissed state, federal, and international
272. In Barnes, the Court dismissed as moot a congressional challenge to President Reagan's
pocket veto of a foreign aid bill that would have required him to certify El Salvador's progress in
protecting human rights. In Goldwater, supra note 25, the Justices voted to reject Senator Goldwa-
ter's challenge to the President's treaty termination on a variety of grounds: ripeness, 444 U.S. at 997-
98 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); the political question doctrine, id. at 1002-03 (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring in the judgment); and the merits, id. at 1006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Had
the case been heard today, Justice Scalia would almost certainly have voted to deny Goldwater's claim
for lack of congressional standing. See Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d
946, 960-61 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring in the result), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106
(1985).
273. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936
(1974); DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Orlando
v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). See generally Sugarman,Judi-
cial Decisions Concerning the Constitutionality of United States Military Activity in Indo-China: A
Bibliography of Court Decisions, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 470 (1974) (collecting cases).
274. See, e.g., Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770
F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
bane), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of subsequent legislation, 471 U.S. 1113
(1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See generally Cole, Challenging Covert
War: The Politics of the Political Question Doctrine, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 155 (1985); Note, Covert
Wars and Presidential Power: Judicial Complicity in a Realignment of Constitutional Power, 14
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 683 (1987) (reviewing decisions).
275. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972), the Supreme Court ruled that because
an excluded foreigner seeking entry into the United States has no right to enter, he lacks standing to
challenge his exclusion. Consequently, challenges to ideological exclusions of aliens have generally
been raised not by the excluded foreign speaker, but by American citizens who want to hear her
message. See, e.g., Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1050-51 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd by an
equally divided Court, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987); Harvard Law School Forum v. Shultz, 633 F. Supp.
525 (D. Mass.), vacated, No. 86-1371 (1st Cir. June 18, 1986).
276. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1969).
277. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Phelps v. Reagan, 812 F.2d 1293 (10th
Cir. 1987).
278. United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). The Supreme Court considered, but did not decide, the
constitutionality of congressional standing in Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). See supra notes
271-72 and accompanying text. See generally Note, The Justiciability of Congressional-Plaintiff
Suits, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 526 (1982) (reviewing cases).
279. See Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511
(1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
280. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
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law claims against federal defendants for want of a cause of action,2"' and
they have denied claims for both monetary and equitable relief on fuzzy
"equitable discretion" grounds.18 2 In recent years, lower courts have dis-
missed so many challenges to executive conduct by so many carefully se-
lected plaintiff groups that their opinions now seem to pick and choose
almost randomly from among the available abstention rationales.2 3 By
contrast, when Congress has raised similar defenses to suits brought by
the executive branch, the Court has uniformly rejected them.'
The question why the courts have deferred so broadly to the Executive
in foreign affairs cases deserves far broader treatment than it can be given
here.2 5 Suffice it to say that this deference stems from a complex admix-
135 (1950); see also Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA
Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1099 (1979). Cf United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987)
(barring former serviceman from maintaining Bivens action against military officers and civilians who
administered experimental drug to him without his consent). Cf. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,
108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988) (creating federal common-law immunity barring serviceman's estate from
suing independent contractor who had allegedly supplied defective military helicopter to United
States).
281. See, e.g., Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1988); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770
F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
282. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 207-09; Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893,
902-03 (D.D.C. 1982), affld, 720 F. 2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1251 (1984). See generally T. FRANCK & M. GLENNON, supra note 237, at 824-27 (discussing
equitable discretion doctrine).
283. See, e.g., Johnson v. Weinberger, 851 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissing on standing
grounds private challenge to implementation of U.S. strategic defense policy, after district court had
previously dismissed on political question grounds); Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1988)
(dismissing suit under Hostage Act as political question and for want of cause of action); Americans
United for Separation of Church & State v. Reagan, 786 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.) (dismissing establishment
clause challenge to dispatch of ambassador to Vatican on mixed standing and political question
grounds), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 314 (1986); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (dismissing suit on grounds of sovereign immunity, equitable discretion, absence of Bivens rem-
edy and implied statutory causes of action, mootness, and as nonjusticiable political question); Crock-
ett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (rejecting congressional suit for declaratory judgment
requiring President to remove U.S. armed forces from El Salvador, reasoning that whether War Pow-
ers Resolution's 60-day cutoff provision had been triggered was political question), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1251 (1984); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987) (dismissing suit brought by
Members of Congress to compel President to report on U.S. military activities in Persian Gulf on
mixed political question and equitable discretion grounds); Chaser Shipping Corp. v. United States,
649 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd mem., 819 F.2d 1129 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 695 (1988) (dismissing as political question suit by shipowner whose vessels were damaged by
U.S. mines in Nicaraguan port); Cranston v. Reagan, 611 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1985) (dismissing
suit brought by Members of Congress seeking determination that bilateral treaties violate Atomic
Energy Act as nonjusticiable political question and, alternatively, on grounds of remedial discretion).
284. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (ruling for President on merits after rejecting
intervenor House and Senate's claim that President's challenge to constitutionality of legislative veto
raised political question). See Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the
Burger Court's Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (1987)
("[T]he Burger Court was totally deferential in reviewing challenges to executive conduct, but was
very willing to declare unconstitutional congressional statutes as violating separation of powers.").
285. I plan to address this question at greater length in a forthcoming article, which describes a
phenomenon I call "transnational public law litigation." See generally Koh, Civil Remedies for Un-
civil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism Through Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 TFx. Irr'L
L.J. 169, 193-201 (1987) (describing this phenomenon). Transnational public law litigation melds
two modes of litigation that traditionally have been viewed as distinct: domestic litigation, in which
private individuals bring private domestic law claims against one another in municipal courts seeking
retrospective judgments; and international litigation, in which state parties bring public international
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ture of judicial attitudes stemming in equal parts from confusion, coward-
ice, and concerns about judicial competence and the Constitution. In good
measure, the courts' deference reflects the generally relaxed attitude to-
ward judicial review of executive action that has dominated domestic ad-
ministrative law after Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.2"" Additional impetus to defer derives from legitimate judicial
concerns about the separation of powers and judicial incompetence to de-
cide particular foreign affairs cases.187 In certain contexts, particularly im-
migration cases, concerns about national sovereignty may enhance the ju-
dicial drive to abstain.28 8 Nor can one wholly discount the possibility that
federal judges and justices demonstrate a pro-executive bias because of
past service in the executive branch.289
Yet however powerful these concerns may be, they provide no intellec-
tual support for the sweeping statements of judicial abdication that have
recently begun to appear in the Federal Reporters.290 Nor do they explain
the troubling confusion that judges have exhibited in attempting to distin-
guish cases where they find the President's conduct unreviewable from
those in which they review his conduct and find it authorized." 1 Finally,
they do not explain the courts' persistent reluctance to look behind talis-
manic executive assertions of "national security," '292 "military neces-
law claims against one another before international tribunals, seeking enunciation of public norms
that will stimulate negotiated political settlements. In transnational public law litigation, private indi-
viduals, government officials, and nations sue one another in domestic courts, making "transnational"
legal claims that blend private and public, domestic and international law. As in domestic litigation,
the transnational public lawsuit seeks redress for individual victims, but as in international litigation,
the transnational plaintiff's underlying aim is to prompt judicial enunciation of a legal norm that can
be used to provoke a political settlement. My forthcoming article suggests that many of the recent
federal court decisions abstaining in suits challenging United States foreign policy decisions result
from judicial unwillingness or inability to cope with this new type of litigation.
286. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See generally Starr, Judicial Review in the Post- Chevron Era, 3 YALE
J. ON REG. 283 (1986). But see Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLuM. L.
REv. 1, 15 (1984) ("Such talk is a venerable aspect of the courts' protective coloration, and should not
necessarily be taken too seriously.").
287. See Koh, supra note 285, at 185-89. For a recent statement of this view, see Abourezk v.
Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1063-64 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dissenting); see also Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
288. See Schuck, supra note 286, at 17.
289. No fewer than four members of the current Supreme Court-Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Marshall, and Scalia-previously held high executive branch positions.
290. See, e.g., Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Robb, J.) ("Certainly in
a case such as the one presented here it is not the business of courts to pass judgment on the decisions
of the President in the field of foreign policy."), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
291. See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Phelps v. Rea-
gan, 812 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1987); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987); Chaser Shipping
v. United States, 649 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd mem., 819 F.2d 1129 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988). See generally Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85
YALE L.J. 597 (1976) (arguing that cases allegedly decided under political question doctrine actually
involved judicial determinations that executive decisions were authorized).
292. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
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sity,"293 or the need for judicial deference to the political branches in mat-
ters of "military discipline" ' 4 and "military affairs." '95
This trend toward executive insulation in foreign affairs from judicial
review is neither salutary policy nor hornbook law. As described by Jus-
tice Jackson's opinion in Youngstown, the National Security Constitution
envisions an important role for the courts in maintaining the constitu-
tional equilibrium of the national security system.2 "6 That role requires
judges to look skeptically upon broad claims of inherent presidential au-
thority and to reject assertions that the President should prevail simply
because foreign affairs are involved. Even under existing doctrine, execu-
tive action that relies upon unenumerated presidential powers shared with
Congress, 2 7 that infringes directly upon individual rights,29 8 or that is
directly contested by Congress acting as a whole"' remain subject to judi-
cial review. Nor is judicial deference to presidential action warranted
when the executive branch claims to derive its authority from a carefully
drafted foreign affairs statute.300 Thus, recent cases in which courts have
abstained from making these decisions ultimately betray not doctrinal fi-
delity, but reflexive timidity of a sort that affronts Youngstown's vision of
the National Security Constitution.
D. The Road to the Iran-Contra Affair
The broader lesson that emerges from this study of executive initiative,
congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance is that under virtually
293. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
294. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2069 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462
U.S. 296, 301-02 (1983); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-57 (1980); Schlesinger v. Councilman,
420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975).
295. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,
64-68 & n.6 (1981); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 756-57 (1974).
296. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
297. See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
298. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958).
299. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Although greater judicial deference to the
Executive may be warranted in cases where there is no interbranch dispute, see Schuck, supra note
286, at 18, no such rationale applies when a constitutional impasse arises between the two political
branches. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v.
Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
300. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1221 (1987) (holding that "judiciary is final
authority on issues of statutory construction") (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean
Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (political question doctrine does not apply to foreign affairs cases
which involve straightforward statutory interpretation). Even in Curtiss-Wright, the Court reviewed
the challenged executive action to determine whether Congress had authorized it. See supra note 241.
In cases where the statutory mandate for the executive act has been unclear, the courts have remanded
for clarification of executive agency practice. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1986), affd by equally divided Court, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987) (remanding for further evidence that
INS had previously construed statute to deny visas to aliens on ground that their entry would
prejudice foreign policy); see also Abourezk v. Reagan, Civ. No. 83-3739, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5203 (D.D.C. June 7, 1988) (decision on remand ordering INS to issue visas).
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every scenario, the President wins. If the executive branch possesses statu-
tory or constitutional authority to act and Congress acquiesces, the Presi-
dent wins. If Congress does not acquiesce in the President's act, but lacks
the political will either to cut off appropriations or to pass an objecting
statute, and then to override a veto, the President again wins. If a Mem-
ber of Congress or a private individual sues to challenge the President's
action, the judiciary will likely refuse to hear that challenge on grounds
that the plaintiff lacks standing; the defendant is immune; the question is
nonjusticiable, not ripe, or moot; or that relief is inappropriate. And even
if the plaintiffs somehow surmount each of these obstacles and persuade
the courts to hear their challenge on the merits, the courts will usually
rule in the President's favor. In sum, whatever the scenario, the bottom
line stays the same: the President almost always seems to win in foreign
affairs.
One need not be a cynic to recognize that this doctrinal tangle affords
presidential judgment extraordinary insulation from external scrutiny.
Thus, it should not surprise us when an institutional presidency so rarely
held accountable for its acts stops trying to keep account. During the Iran-
Contra Affair, several interrogators expressed disbelief that the President's
subordinates thought they could get away with what they were doing.3'1
But their arrogance was not born of ignorance, but of habit. NSC secre-
tary Fawn Hall's suggestion that "sometimes [the Executive has] to go
above the written law"30' 2 was not a new thought. Ten years earlier, an
unchastened Richard Nixon had told an interviewer, "When the President
does it, that means that it is not illegal."303
III. LEARNING THE LESSONS OF THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
Even with all of these advantages, the President does not invariably win
in foreign affairs. As the Iran-Contra Affair demonstrates, sometimes the
President loses. Furthermore, upon examination, even many of the Presi-
dent's recent foreign affairs "victories" prove to have been either illusory
or short-lived. The President's victories in court have cumulatively occu-
pied only a small corner of the foreign policy spectrum. Presidential ve-
toes, even when sustained, have rarely directed affirmative policies.304
301. See 0. NORTH, supra note 88, at 555 (remarks of Rep. Fascell); id. at 358-62 (remarks of
Arthur Liman).
302. Testimony of Fawn Hall: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military
Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Comm. to Investigate Cov-
ert Arms Transactions With Iran, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, at 552 (1987).
303. Interview with David Frost (May 19, 1977), quoted in Glennon, Can the President Do No
Wrong?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 923, 923 (1986).
304. For example, during the summer of 1988 the President vetoed omnibus trade reform legisla-
tion, citing his opposition to a provision requiring certain employers to give mandatory sixty-day
notice of plant closings. Although Congress narrowly failed to muster the votes necessary to override
that veto, see supra note 224, it quickly repassed only slightly modified versions of both the plant-
closing legislation and the omnibus trade package. Under severe pressure from members of his own
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Some "initiatives" ostensibly taken by the President have in fact been
driven by congressional pressure or external events." 5 Apparently success-
ful executive end-runs around Congress have been answered, months or
years later, with new congressional restraints.306 Presidential decisions to
act without consulting our allies have won short-term freedom, but at
long-term costs.
307
These outcomes bear witness to the false promise of a foreign poli-
cymaking system overdominated by the Executive. As the Iran-Contra Af-
fair revealed, secretive unilateral executive decisionmaking guarantees
neither wise nor efficient foreign policymaking. In the long run, a foreign
policy system domineered by the Executive and beset by chronic conflict
among the branches serves neither the interests of the executive branch
nor of the nation as a whole. For all of the expansion of executive power
that occurred during their administrations, the Johnson, Nixon, Carter,
and now the Reagan presidencies have all ultimately foundered on the
rock of foreign policy. And as Alton Frye has recognized, the familar
description of the Constitution as an invitation for Congress and the Pres-
ident to struggle for control of foreign policy misses the reality that "[t]he
objective of the struggle is not control but wise policies acceptable to the
American people."308 American foreign policy grows out of a long-term
political process in which "wins" and "losses" are often incremental, an-
ticipated rather than imposed, and traded in intricate, low-visibility ways.
One branch of government should not-and ultimately can-
not-permanently "defeat" another in a constitutional system where sepa-
party, the President then signed the trade bill and allowed the plant-closing bill to become law with-
out signing it. See Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1988, at 40, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
Thus, as the President's own Trade Representative conceded, the Administration's initial veto served
little purpose. See Nothing Was Gained By Administration Veto of Original Omnibus Trade Bill,
Yeutter Says, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1161, 1161 (Aug. 17, 1988) (remarks of U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Clayton Yeutter).
305. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
306. For example, after the President unilaterally "reinterpreted" the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty to take a broad view of its terms, see supra note 24 and accompanying text, several Senate
committees conducted hearings and subsequently reported a resolution reaffirming the pre-existing
"narrow" interpretation. See S. Res. 167, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S12,498 (daily ed.
Sept. 22, 1987); THE ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION RSOLUTrrION, S. REP. No. 164, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987). The Senate then attached a condition to its resolution of ratification of the Intermedi-
ate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty. That condition declared that the United States shall not adopt an
interpretation of a treaty that differs from the common understanding of that treaty shared by the
Executive and the Senate at the time of Senate advice and consent, unless the Senate has consented to
the new interpretation by protocol or legislative enactment. See N.Y. Times, May 28, 1988, at A4,
col. 5-6. The President has now challenged that condition as infringing upon his constitutional powers
to interpret treaties. See Message to the Senate on the Soviet-United States Intermediate-Range Nu-
clear Force Treaty, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doe. 779, 780 (June 10, 1988); see also Koh, Remarks
on the Treaty Power (forthcoming in 42 U. MIAMI L. REv., 1988)) (enumerating other ways in
which ABM Treaty reinterpretation battle with Congress has proven counterproductive for Executive
in areas of executive privilege, defense appropriations, and negotiating flexibility).
307. See Koh, supra note 306 (arguing that unilateral presidential treaty-breaking and bending
have impaired U.S. ability to mobilize international institutions to deal with other global problems).
308. Frye, Congress and President: The Balance Wheels of American Foreign Policy, 49 YALE
REV. 1, 2 (1979).
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rated institutions share foreign policy powers and interbranch disputes ul-
timately determine critical national positions in the international realm."0 9
In recent months, two competing conventional wisdoms about the Iran-
Contra Affair have taken hold among Members of Congress and the
American public. On one hand, presidential critics have treated the Affair
as a lesson in hubris. Like Watergate, they argue, the Iran-Contra Affair
shows that second-term Presidents riding high on landslide political victo-
ries begin to believe that the President always wins. Their confidence
leads them to overreach, at which point the checks and balances within
our constitutional system bring them into line. Thus, Contragate, like
Watergate, is ultimately a cause for celebration, because in the end, the
"system worked."3 10
The opposing view holds that the President "lost" the Iran-Contra Af-
fair not on November 3, 1986 (the day that Al-Shiraa, a Lebanese
weekly, reported that the United States had secretly sold arms to Iran),
but one day later, when the Republicans lost control of the United States
Senate. Under this view, the committee hearings were not about the rule
of law, but rather, a cynical attempt by a Congress now controlled by
presidential opponents to "micromanage" foreign policy. 1 '
Both perspectives, in my view, are fundamentally misguided. The first
suggests that our foreign policy system is self-regulating; the second avers
that it is overregulated. Both camps would consider further structural
change unnecessary. But if, as I have argued, the Iran-Contra Affair rep-
resented a nearly successful assault upon our postwar national security
system, we must ask whether the existing legal structure affords that sys-
tem sufficient protection. In my view, what the Iran-Contra Affair reveals
is that our national security system is inadequately regulated. Congress
has been effectively unable to force the President to keep his bargains in
foreign affairs. Moreover, this problem will not soon abate, nor will it be
cured simply by a change in executive branch personnel. As America con-
tinues to lose hegemony internationally, the occasions for executive initia-
tive will likely increase. The current likelihood that Congress will acqui-
esce and that the courts will tolerate such initiatives will impose few costs
on any President who stretches bargains in a haste to act.
In my judgment, many of the legislative proposals contained in the
309. See, e.g., 0. NORTH, supra note 88, at 745 (remarks of Rep. Lee H. Hamiliton to Oliver
North) ("You said.., the Congress would declare itself the winner [in the Iran-Contra Affair] ...
[B]ut may I suggest ... [wle all lost. The interests of the United States have been damaged by what
happened.").
310. See, e.g., Liman, supra note 96, at 72 ("I saw these hearings, in a way, as a birthday present
for the Constitution .... [T]he Constitution has built into it a kind of immune system like that of the
human body. When an alien concept enters, we expel it. The Iran-contra hearings were part of the
process of disgorging this alien concept.").
311. See, e.g., IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 665 (supplemental views of Senator Or-
rin G. Hatch).
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Iran-Contra committees' majority report are worthwhile.312 But the report
presents that grabbag of proposals without coherent explanation of the
relationship among them or analysis of how those suggestions comprise a
legislative strategy for attacking the deeper institutional causes of the Af-
fair. Without such a regulatory strategy, interstitial efforts to amend par-
ticular foreign affairs law will inevitably fail, serving only to push execu-
tive conduct toward new statutory lacunae and pockets of unregulated
activity.
The momentum of the Iran-Contra Affair, coupled with the Demo-
crats' control of Congress for the last months of the Reagan Administra-
tion, presented Congress with a rare window of opportunity to reassert
itself in the foreign policymaking process. In the late 1970's, Congress
exploited a similar opportunity by legislating a broader ongoing role for
itself across the realms of foreign policy, a role which the executive branch
has since sought systematically to undercut. The Iran-Contra watershed
offered the legislators yet another legislative opening, which Congress has
thus far largely squandered. If Members of Congress wish to learn the
lessons of the last war, they should now consider new omnibus legislation,
designed broadly to redefine the roles of Congress, the President, and the
courts in national security matters.
What the Iran-Contra Affair underscores is the need for a new national
security "charter"-an omnibus statutory "amendment" to the National
Security Constitution-in the form of new framework legislation designed
to regulate and protect many aspects of the foreign policymaking pro-
cess. 13 Unlike the current patchwork of laws, executive orders, national
security directives, and informal accords that govern covert and overt
warmaking, emergency economic power, foreign intelligence and arms
sales, such a statute would act as a statutory successor to the National
Security Act of 1947. An ideal statute would reenact, in five separate ti-
tles: the War Powers Resolution; IEEPA;3 1' the arms export control
312. See supra note 84 (describing recommendations). I suggest below how some of those recom-
mendations may be incorporated into the legislative package that I would propose. See infra notes
316-17, 326, 330, 333-34, 371 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 127 (defining framework legislation).
314. In my view, a sensible revision of IEEPA would require the President to make a more
detailed showing of the nature of the "national emergency," and strengthen the consultation require-
ment by requiring the President to consult with a core group of congressional leaders before declaring
such an emergency. See infra notes 338-39 and accompanying text. The bill could further state that
any declared national emergency would automatically expire within a fixed period, for example, one
year, and require face-to-face consultation between executive and congressional officials before the
emergency was extended. The bill could also provide that a joint resolution affirming the existence of
the emergency and approving any executive orders issued under it be given fast-track legislative treat-
ment, to ensure express congressional approval or disapproval of the President's emergency actions
before the emergency expired. See infra notes 358-60 and accompanying text (describing "fast-track"
approval mechanism). Any such joint resolution could also contain a mandatory sunset provision, of
perhaps two years. This revision would allow the President to conduct his emergency actions pursuant
to express congressional approval at all times, but require him to return to Congress for extension of
his emergency authority. Ideally, IEEPA would also be integrated with the other statutory trade
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laws; 15 the Intelligence Oversight Act;31 and the NSC provisions of the
1947 Act. At the same time, the charter would repeal other lingering stat-
utes that have fallen into desuetude. 1' Accompanying procedural titles
would address modes of congressional-executive consultation in interna-
tional agreement-making, 8 internal and external agency control proce-
dures,"1 9 and provisions for judicial review of executive action. Perhaps
most important, the legislation would create new congressional structures
and effect certain modest, but important, revisions in internal House and
Senate rules.
sanctions that are currently available. For a recent comprehensive recommendation for restructuring
the current U.S. statutory -regime governing international economic sanctions, see Carter, Interna-
tional Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1159,
1254 (1987).
315. One such proposal is the Biden-Levine bill, supra note 49. For criticisms of that bill, and
discussion of other reform proposals in the arms export control area, see generally Note, Congress
and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure, 97 YALE L. J.
1439, 1448, 1453-57 (1988).
316. Intelligence reform should focus primarily upon strengthening both the internal and external
institutional mechanisms for oversight of intelligence activities. The Iran-Contra committees suggested
two structural reforms to promote internal oversight: the creation of an independent CIA Inspector
General and Senate confirmation of the CIA's general counsel. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra
note 2, at 425. Senator Specter has recently proposed two bills that would implement those recommen-
dations, as well as create a politically appointed director of national intelligence and reform the con-
gressional intelligence committees. See S. 1818, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S15,190
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1987); S. 1820, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S15,193 (daily ed. Oct. 27,
1987). To enhance external oversight, the Iran-Contra committees suggested that the President's In-
telligence Oversight Board "be revitalized and strengthened." See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note
2, at 426. An expert working group on intelligence oversight has made that proposal more concrete by
suggesting that Congress create a bipartisan national intelligence board that would oversee and review
the performance of the intelligence agencies for purposes of regular reporting and recommendation to
the President. The board's membership would be drawn from outside the intelligence community,
serve on a full-time, compensated basis for periods overlapping presidential administrations, and be
granted statutory access to information under agency control as well as a sufficent budget to maintain
a qualified professional staff. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY,
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 107-09 (1985); see also
Goodman, supra note 71, at 130-36 (suggesting other structural reforms of intelligence agencies).
317. A prime candidate for legislative overhaul would be the so-called "Hostage Act of 1868," 22
U.S.C. § 1732 (1982), which Oliver North claimed provided the executive branch with "the authority
to do whatever [was] necessary" during the Iran-Contra Affair. See 0. NORTH, supra note 88, at
503-04; id. at 606 (remarks of Rep. Henry Hyde). The Iran-Contra committees lad suggested that
the statute might be amended or repealed. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 426. For an
analysis of the statute's legislative history and a convincing argument that Congress never intended it
to be a "blank check" authorizing the President to use any means to rescue hostages, see Mikva &
Neuman, The Hostage Crisis and the "Hostage Act", 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 292 (1982).
318. For possible reforms of the agreement-making process, see S. Res. 536, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
124 CONG. REC. 27,851 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1978); Rehm, Making Foreign Policy Through Interna-
tional Agreement, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 126, 133-37 (F.
Wilcox & R. Frank eds. 1976). Any reform effort would have to reconcile the Senate's desire that
every major agreement be done in treaty form with the House's preference for congressional-executive
agreements, which afford it a role in agreement ratification. Professor Henkin has suggested that
Congress form a joint committee on international agreements, perhaps drawn from the two foreign
affairs committees, which would receive prior notice of the negotiation of an agreement and advise the
Executive on whether the agreement should go to the Senate or both houses for consent. See Henkin,
supra note 230, at 19. The same joint committee could be notified of pending treaty terminations and
modifications. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
319. The statute could codify, for example, the three internal agency control principles and the




Without detailing every provision of such a charter, let me observe that
the congressional committees considering such legislation cannot focus
solely upon organizational problems within the White House. For the
sources of executive adventurism lie not only there, but also in the outside
world and the operation of the two coordinate branches of government.
32 0
Admittedly, Congress cannot legislate executive self-restraint, legislative
will or judicial courage. But Congress can and should seek to alter recur-
rent patterns of executive behavior by restructuring the institutional at-
tributes that now create incentives for executive officials to act irresponsi-
bly, but impose few costs on their lawless conduct. Any national security
reform bill should therefore target the institutional sources of executive
adventurism, congressional acquiescence, and undue judicial tolerance that
have contributed equally to recent executive excesses. Its goal should be to
restructure existing laws not only to restrain executive initiative, but also
to revitalize both Congress and the courts as institutional counterweights
to the Presidency.
A. Restraining the Executive
Since 1949, more than a dozen private and public studies have sought
to determine how best to organize the executive branch's foreign policy
apparatus. 32' The Iran-Contra Affair underscores the need to promote the
development not simply of more efficient policymaking mechanisms, but
also of more effective internal and external devices for legal oversight,
review, and accountability of executive branch decisions. Two general
principles should guide Congress' efforts to augment institutional sources
of executive self-restraint. First, the legality of proposed foreign policy
initiatives should be tested wherever possible by processes of adversarial
review both within and without the executive branch. Second, Congress
should seek to specify the content of the President's responsibility to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" in foreign affairs by making
explicit the "Due Process Principles of Foreign Policy Administration"
regarding internal executive branch accountability that are currently im-
plicit in our National Security Constitution.22
Alexander George has made the case for creating a foreign policy deci-
sionmaking system that encourages the clash of the competing views that
320. See supra Section II.
321. See, e.g., G. ALLISON & P. SZANTON, REMAKING FOREIGN POLICY (1976); MURPHY COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 223; see also Gelb, Why Not the State Department?, in DECISIONS OF
THE HIGHEST ORDER: PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 229, 240 nn.1 & 16
(K. Inderfurth & L. Johnson eds. 1988) (listing twelve other studies dating back to 1949 Hoover
Commission Report on Foreign Affairs).
322. See Brest, Congress As Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial
Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 61-65 (1986) (arguing that Congress has both the power and the
responsibility to interpret Constitution); Shane, supra note 127 (describing ways that Congress had
done so with regard to doctrine of executive privilege); supra text accompanying notes 144-52.
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may be presented to the President for final decision.82 This adversarial
approach, extended to test the legality of policy initiatives, would have
discouraged the proliferation of secret, unchallenged agency legal opinions
that allowed the Iran-Contra Affair to proceed. Executive initiatives
should not commence based upon a single agency general counsel's ques-
tionable reading of his or her agency's organic statute.324 Here, Congress
could act on two fronts. First, it might choose to require interagency re-
view of legal opinions that authorize covert actions. Such interagency re-
view would mimic the current centralized review of agency rulemaking
being conducted in the Reagan Administration by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget.325 Ideally, such review would be conducted by the Of-
fice of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department, which should be less
prone to influence by any particular agency's policy mission than either
the State Department Legal Adviser's Office or the General Counsel's Of-
fice of the CIA. 2' Alternatively, the task of obtaining and coordinating
competing legal analyses could be confided in the White House Counsel's
office or in the newly established office of the Counsel to the NSC.
3 27
Second, Congress could require that those legal opinions be submitted in
confidence to the intelligence committees so that they may be subjected to
adversarial review, not within the executive branch, but by the committee
legal staffs. 28  Far from being unprecedented, a version of this process
323. See George, The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy, 66 AM. POL. ScI.
REV. 751 (1972).
324. Two such legal opinions permitted the Iran-Contra affair to proceed: one by the CIA's gen-
eral counsel permitting a retroactive intelligence "finding," supra note 50, and another by the be-
nighted counsel to the Intelligence Oversight Board which found the Boland Amendments inapplicable
to NSC activities. See N.Y. Times, June 9, 1987, at Al, col. 2, A15, col. 4 (only executive branch
legal analysis of applicability of Boland Amendments was based on cursory review of facts by attorney
who had failed the bar examination four times).
325. Cf Sunstein, supra note 151, at 454-60 (enumerating advantages of such centralized re-
view); Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 519 (1987) (such centralized review does not
create imbalance in constitutional order).
326. But see Ehrlich, Remarks, in Appendices to MURPHY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
223, at 26-27 (urging that Legal Adviser to State Department conduct such review). A former Assis-
tant Attorney General has recently described a number of restrictions which the Reagan Administra-
tion placed upon the Attorney General's participation in the approval and review of sensitive foreign
policy and intelligence matters. The "cumulative effect [of those restrictions] ... was to minimize the
ability of the Attorney General to participate in the deliberations or to render meaningful legal advice.
He was even asked at times to render off-the-cuff oral advice on complex legal situations [so that
others could] claim that the Attorney General had given a legal seal of approval to various proposals
without permitting them to undergo real legal scrutiny." R. Willard, Remarks at a Conference on
Legal and Policy Issues in the Iran-Contra Affair: Intelligence Oversight in a Democracy 5-6, (May
12, 1988) (on file with author). To address this problem, the Iran-Contra committees proposed that
all proposed intelligence findings be transmitted to the Attorney General for legal review. See IRAN-
CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 424.
327. Apparently, neither of the legal opinions cited in supra note 324 was ever subjected to White
House review. See Culvahouse Interview, supra note 218, at 7 (statement of Counsel to the President)
("One of the real problems with the entire Iran-contra episode was that not only was it not well-
lawyered, but it was not lawyered in most respects. White House office lawyers were not consulted
about the reach of the extent of the Boland Amendment.").
328. Despite the impression that Administration witnesses sought to convey during the Iran-Con-
tra hearings, Congress' record of keeping covert actions secret has been excellent. See Goodman, supra
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recently transpired with respect to the State Department Legal Adviser's
advocacy of a broad interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.2
Congress' second objective should be to promote the President's dis-
charge of his "take Care" responsibilities by requiring his personal in-
volvement in important foreign policy decisions and encouraging the crea-
tion of clearer and more accountable lines of command within the
executive branch. To foster presidential involvement, Congress could ex-
tend amendments currently being proposed to the "presidential findings"
requirements in the intelligence laws to all forms of covert action, includ-
ing those which involve arms transfers, emergency economic powers, mili-
tary aid, or uses of armed force.330 Devising more accountable lines of
command within the executive branch is a more intractable problem,
whose ultimate solution rests more appropriately with the President than
with Congress. Although most Presidents and commentators have agreed
that the Secretary of State should be the President's principal foreign pol-
icy adviser,3 31 they have also recognized the powerful institutional pres-
sures that drive presidents to build the policymaking apparatus around
themselves, relying principally upon the NSC. 3 2 Reform proposals have
thus run in two directions: commentators have urged debureaucratization
of the State Department, as well as reformation or diminution of the
NSC's policymaking role."' So long as the current uneasy division of la-
note 71, at 132. Indeed, the executive branch has been responsible for the vast bulk of recent national
security leaks. See Morrison, Blabbermouths, 19 NAT'L J. 2002, 2002 (1987) (only nine percent of
leaked national security news stories published during first five months of 1986 originated in
Congress).
329. See supra note 24. For justiciability reasons, it seems unlikely that that opinion will ever be
tested in a court. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 24, at 1971. Accordingly, Senator Sam Nunn and
others have opted to test the Administration's interpretation adversarially, not in court, but through
extensive congressional hearings. See The ABM Treaty and the Constitution: Joint Hearings Before
the Senate Comms. on Foreign Relations and on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); see
also supra note 306 (describing legislative output of those hearings).
330. See supra note 66. In addition to the intelligence reforms currently under legislative consid-
eration, see supra notes 74, 77 & 316, the Iran-Contra Report suggested several other worthwhile
modifications of the "findings" requirements: to reach more agencies, to identify participants in covert
actions, to recertify those findings periodically, and most important, to require that all findings be in
writing, personally signed by the President, and reported to the intelligence committees. The commit-
tees also suggested that the obligation to report findings, which currently rests with agency heads, be
placed directly upon the President. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 423-24.
331. See, e.g., I. DESTLER, PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1972); Gelb,
supra note 321, at 230 ("For the last twenty years or so most public commissions, organization
experts and foreign policy commentators . . . have consistently recommended that the authority to
make policy should be clearly and firmly lodged in the Department of State.").
332. See, e.g., D. WARWICK, supra note 188; Clarke, supra note 188; Gelb, supra note 321;
Rockman, America's Departments of State: Irregular and Regular Syndromes of Policy Making, 75
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 911 (1981).
333. See, e.g., D. WARWICK, supra note 188, at 205-15 (proposing institutional reforms to
debureaucratize State Department); G. ALLISON & P. SZANTON, supra note 321, at 78-80 (urging
that NSC be abolished and its functions assumed by executive committee of cabinet); Clarke, supra
note 188, at 137-40 (urging that National Security Assistant be reduced from policy adviser to neutral
policy broker); Destler, A job That Doesn't Work, 38 FOREIGN POL'Y 80 (1980) (proposing abolition
of position of National Security Assistant). Both the Tower Commission and the Iran-Contra commit-
tees also suggested possible organizational reforms of the NSC. See supra notes 80-84 and accompa-
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bor between the NSC and State prevails, however, Congress should im-
pose express statutory requirements that the National Security Assistant
be a civilian rather than a military officer, and that he or she be subject to
Senate confirmation as well as regular appearances at oversight hearings.
The requirement of Senate confirmation would require the National Se-
curity Assistant to establish personal contact with, as well as direct ac-
countability to, the relevant congressional committees. Moreover, should
the National Security Assistant continue to play a major role in the devel-
opment of defense policy, such a statutory provision would arguably be




When Congress enacted the National Security Act of 1947, its greatest
error was its failure to address its own role in the national security sys-
tem.33 5 Although Congress partly redressed that oversight in the wave of
statutes it enacted in the decade after Vietnam, the institutional changes
that transformed Congress during those same years transferred substantial
power from the congressional leadership to the rank and file. 36 This dis-
nying text.
334. See supra note 82. Responding to the constitutional principle of civilian control over the
military, the National Security Act of 1947 placed the military departments under the civilian control
of a Secretary of Defense, who was in turn to operate under the civilian control of the President. See
supra note 150. So long as the NSC continues to exert direct supervisory control over covert warmak-
ing operations, the same principle would seem to require that its head also be a civilian. Along with
Col. Robert McFarlane and Vice Admiral John Poindexter, Lt. General Colin Powell is the third of
President Reagan's six National Security Assistants to hold military office. See Kirschten, White
House Notebook, 19 NAT'L J. 2808, 2808 (1987). Active military officers have also held important
lower political posts in the NSC, including most prominently Major Gen. Alexander Haig (later
White House Chief of Staff), supra text accompanying note 62, and Lt. Col. Oliver North. See
Bamford, Carlucci and the N.S.C., N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 26 (in fall of
1986, NSC staff included 19 active-duty officers, and numerous retired officers). During the Iran-
Contra Affair, some of these military officers managed elaborate covert transfers of military weapons
with little or no supervision by civilians, including the President.
Legislation requiring Senate confirmation of the National Security Assistant could also require the
President to make periodic confidential reports to a core congressional consultative group regarding
NSC activities. Cf IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 425 (making similar recommendation).
Even without congressional action, however, any President could enhance the political accountability
of the National Security Assistant simply by appointing his or her Vice-President to the post. Such a
decision would have numerous potential advantages: it would preserve and clarify the civilian chain of
command; it would render the National Security Assistant directly accountable to both the electorate
and the Senate (over which the Vice-President would preside); it would make the Vice-Presidency
more attractive to politicians of presidential caliber; it would make the Vice-President a more integral
part of the administration; and it would prepare that individual for possible future presidential ser-
vice. For a thoughtful response to the various constitutional and policy objections to such a proposal,
see generally Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-Presidency, 86 MxCH. L. REv. 1703,
1714-24, 1731-34 (1988).
335. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 31 & 180 and accompanying text; see also Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A
Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REv.
1567, 1628-33 (1988) (tracing history of power diffusion in Congress); Ornstein, supra note 180, at
57 (to extent that Congress has been able to reassert itself in foreign affairs, it has done so in decen-
tralized manner, which has given too much power to congressional rank and file and insufficient
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persion of decisionmaking capacity has doubly undercut Congress' ability
to create a centralized delivery system in foreign affairs: by hampering
Congress' capacity as a whole to confront the President, and by rendering
Congress less able to withstand interest-group influence.33 7 To overcome
these institutional deficiencies, Congress should now channel its reform
efforts in three directions: toward creating counter-arenas of centralized
foreign affairs expertise within Congress that may act to counter the Pres-
ident; toward building a central repository of legal expertise within Con-
gress regarding international and foreign relations law; and toward equal-
izing its access to sensitive information that otherwise lies solely within
the Executive's control.
By creating a core group of Members-perhaps the chairs of the ex-
isting foreign affairs committees, with whom the President and his staff
could regularly meet and consult on national security matters-Congress
could provide the Executive with the benefit of its deliberative judgments
without demanding unacceptable sacrifices in flexibility, secrecy, or dis-
patch. 38 Even if consultation with such a group would marginally delay
presidential responses, "[t]here are few crises short of battlefield disasters
and the instant calamity of a nuclear strike in which properly briefed
members could not play a valuable part." ' 9 Moreover, unlike a special
legislative committee, which would be susceptible to capture by the execu-
tive entity or interest group being regulated, this core group would consist
of congressional leaders who would be directly accountable to the entire
membership, and who would have the stature to express to the President
views that might not come from his own subordinates.
Second, Congress should consider creating an entity, comparable to the
Comptroller General and his or her staff, to monitor the output of the
Executive's national security apparatus. ' ° That unit would include a le-
power to leadership); T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 31, at 210-26.
337. See Fitts, supra note 336, at 1629-30; cf. supra note 194 (illustrating interest group influ-
ence in foreign affairs).
338. A bill recently introduced in the Senate by Senators Byrd, Nunn, Warner, and Mitchell to
amend the War Powers Resolution represents one promising attempt to achieve such centralization.
See S.J. Res. 323, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S6239 (daily ed. May 19, 1988) (text on
file with author). That bill would require the President, before using force, to consult with a "Gang
of Six," consisting of the majority and minority leaders of both Houses, the Speaker of the House and
the President pro tempore of the Senate. In addition, the bill would oblige the President to maintain
continuing consultations with a "permanent consultative group" composed of the Gang of Six, plus
the chairs and ranking minority members of the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence
Committees of each house. This latter group would be consulted for the purpose of designing legisla-
tive remedies regarding termination or approval of particular military involvements. This group
would have formal authority to invoke the War Powers Resolution even if the President chose not to
do so, and its legislative proposals would be accorded special "fast-track" status in the legislative
process. See infra notes 358-59 and accompanying text. Furthermore, money to pay troops that the
President had committed abroad would be automatically cut off once Congress voted to withdraw
them. See N.Y. Times, May 20, 1988, at A3, col. 3; see also Halperin, Lawful Wars, 72 FOREIGN
PoL'y 173, 176 (1988) (endorsing creation of special leadership committee).
339. Frye, supra note 308, at 15.
340. For a similar proposal that Congress create a "Foreign Policy Monitor," who would be
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gal staff, headed by a congressional legal adviser (corresponding to the
Legal Adviser's office in the State Department or the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Justice Department), which would coordinate the work of
the various committee staff counsel, act as liaison with executive legal
staffs, and brief and advise the core consultative group on questions of
international and foreign relations law."4 1 Equally important, the congres-
sional legal staff could also issue legal opinions regarding presidential con-
duct. By internal rule, Congress could require that either the congres-
sional legal adviser or the staff counsel of the relevant congressional
committee issue a "counter-report" whenever the executive branch trans-
mitted a declaration of national emergency, a war powers report, or an
intelligence finding. These counter-reports would establish a contempora-
neous record either accepting or rejecting the President's legal justifica-
tion, thereby creating a written record against which to test any future
executive claim of congressional acquiescence.342
Third, and finally, Congress should seek to enhance its access to both
the classified and unclassified information regarding national security
matters that the Executive currently controls. "The principal inefficiency
in our system," Professor Henkin has argued, "is the distorting effect on
the congressional function resulting from the President's monopoly of in-
formation and communication ... .""s Congressional exclusion from clas-
sified information both buttresses executive claims to superior knowledge
in foreign affairs and ensures uninformed legislative judgment in those
decisions in which Congress does participate. Yet classification of United
appointed for an extended term and subject to removal by a majority vote of either House, see id. at
11-15. Frye would assign the Monitor three tasks: "to alert the Majority and Minority Leaders of
both houses of impending issues and decisions regarding which they might wish to request full consul-
tation; to identify for senior executive officials potential problems on which they might wish to seek
legislative counsel; [and] to brief appropriate congressional leaders in advance of major consultations
in order to make such exchanges more focused and meaningful." Id. at 13.
341. See Falk, Remarks, in Appendices to MURPHY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 223, at 29
(urging the creation of such a congressonal unit). Although the staff counsel to the Senate Foreign
Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees currently play a similar role, the proposed congres-
sional legal adviser's jurisdiction would be wider, encompassing the issues of constitutional and foreign
relations law that are currently scattered across the judiciary, armed services, intelligence, and govern-
ment operations committees. In this respect, her role would be similar to, but broader than, that
currently played by the House and Senate Legal Counsel (whose offices could be merged or affiliated
with this new entity).
342. These reports would be analogous to the independent assessments that the Congressional
Budget Office currently provides to the foreign affairs committees regarding the likely cost of proposed
administration programs. See T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 31, at 245. In 1986, Congress
took a similar step when it created an independent five-person commission to monitor and report on
Central American negotiations and the contras' internal reform efforts and to prepare and submit
reports similar to those required of the President. See Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1987, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 213, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1783, 1783-
305 to-306; see also Meyer, supra note 50, at 88.
343. Henkin, supra note 230, at 19; accord Frye, supra note 308, at 10 ("The exclusion of
Congress from access to classified products of ... the National Security Council system is a virtual
guarantee of inadequately informed legislative participation in foreign policy decisions."). For discus-
sion of the two branches' relative proclivity to leaks, see supra note 328.
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States government information remains largely controlled by the Execu-
tive, not Congress. 44 To overcome this information gap, Congress should
either promise the Executive that its core consultative group will maintain
the confidentiality of highly classified information, as it has done with
respect to its two select intelligence committees, or it can take a more ac-
tive role in governing the declassification of information by enacting a
more comprehensive classification statute than currently exists.3 4 5
Congressional movement toward each of these basic institutional re-
forms would go a long way toward curing the four specific causes of con-
gressional acquiescence identified above: legislative myopia, bad drafting,
ineffective tools, and political will. Creation of the core consultative group
would partly redress the problem of legislative myopia. Because the group
would be drawn from the congressional leadership, its members would
view themselves, like the President, as representing a broad national con-
stituency as well as all other members of Congress, and would thus pre-
sumably be less susceptible to particularistic interest group influence."o
Over time, the group and its staff would develop an overview of the for-
eign policy terrain comparable to the President's own, without forsaking
the expertise of the existing specialized committees and committee
staffs.347 As the group gained greater understanding of the interrelation-
ship among the various arenas of national security policy, it would be less
likely to urge the introduction of fragmented legislation to solve different
344. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982), currently sets classification standards
for the entire government. Congress has enacted only a few statutes regarding classified documents,
including the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1982); the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
2161-2163, 2165, 2274 (1982); and the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-
16 (1982), which governs the disclosure of classified information in federal criminal prosecutions. The
last of these statutes has been prominently featured in the ongoing prosecution of Oliver North, John
Poindexter, Richard Secord, and Albert Hakim. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1988, at A17, col. 1.
345. The Espionage Act, for example, specifies that "[n]othing in this section shall prohibit the
furnishing, upon lawful demand, of information to any regularly constituted committee of the Senate
or House . . . or joint committee thereof." 18 U.S.C. § 798(c) (1982). This provision could be modi-
fied and incorporated into a broader declassification statute to ensure congressional access to various
forms of national security information that would otherwise remain solely in the Executive's hands.
Nor would the doctrine of executive privilege pose as serious an obstacle as one might expect. Al-
though the Supreme Court declared in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974), that utmost
judicial deference must be paid to a claim of privilege based on a need to protect military, diplomatic,
or sensitive national security secrets, "[e]xecutive privilege has not often been formally asserted in
foreign affairs matters." Henkin, supra note 230, at 14 n.32. During the Iran-Contra committees'
investigation, the President did not claim executive privilege, IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2,
at 689, and the privilege was extensively waived during the Senate Armed Services Committee's recent
study of the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty. See Koh, supra note 306.
346. See Fitts, supra note 336, at 1603-07 (because centralized institutions tend to represent
broad constituencies and experience fewer collective action problems, they are more likely to promote
public-regarding action).
347. Indeed, the core legislative group might come to gain greater perspective and expertise than
its executive branch counterparts, given the relative longevity in office of members of Congress. Com-
pare L. DODD & R. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 59 (1979) ("Once
elected, today's members... tend to develop congressional careers that often span twenty, thirty, forty
years.") with Frye, supra note 308, at 3-4 (Cabinet officers currently average only two years' consec-
utive service and Assistant Secretaries serve an average of only eighteen months).
The Yale Law Journal
facets of a common problem. For example, as originally enacted, the War
Powers Resolution took no account of either covert warfare or short-term
military strikes."8 The core consultative group could choose to address
covert warmaking by treating it as a warmaking, rather than as merely an
intelligence issue, and establish a joint "covert action" subcommittee of the
Armed Services and the Intelligence Committees in each House to take
jurisdiction over covert initiatives. The deeper familiarity of the core
group with the subtleties of past cases would also allow it to craft more
effective legislation, without resorting to largely symbolic legislative gim-
micks. Thus, for example, the core group could address the currently un-
regulated problem of short-term military strikes by attempting to revise
the original Senate version of the War Powers Resolution, which enumer-
ated circumstances under which Congress would approve in advance the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into actual or imminent hos-
tilities without a declaration of war.349
A skilled central legal staff sensitive to the need for more carefully
worded statutes would help to address Congress' second institutional prob-
lem: bad drafting.350 For example, that staff could amend the War Powers
Resolution to include more detailed definitions of the terms "armed
forces" and "hostilities." Moreover, the drafters could use the newly cre-
ated core consultative group to give greater operative content to the notion
that the President must genuinely "consult" with "Congress" before com-
mitting troops abroad, rather than merely brief a few selected members at
the last minute.3 51 Once the staff had developed a standard definition of
these terms, variations upon them could be inserted into both the modified
IEEPA and the modified Arms Export Control Act, depending upon the
core group's assessment of the relative need for executive flexibility under
each of these titles.
Even without these institutional reforms, better drafting would result
almost inevitably from a congressional effort to integrate the variegated
national security statutes into a single omnibus law. Congress could, for
example, decide whether to subject nonuniformed operatives carrying out
covert warmaking operations, who are not currently regulated as "armed
forces" under the War Powers Resolution, to the terms either of that Res-
348. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
349. See S. 440, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in T. FRANCK & M. GLENNON, supra
note 237, at 590; S. 2956, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 44,794-95 (1971) (similar bill
proposed by Sen. Javits). As Charles Black once pointed out, it is a peculiar War Powers Act indeed
that defines how many months United States troops may stay abroad, but "utterly refus[es] even to
begin the task of defining the conditions under which the president should not commit troops for even
ten minutes-the really crucial matter." Black, supra note 165, at 18. The Lebanon case illustrates
the truth of this insight. See supra note 15.
350. See generally W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 251, at 829-43 (presenting nine
drafting commandments).
351. See supra note 200. For example, Congress could require discussions between the President
or his advisers and the core group before any troops are irrevocably committed abroad.
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olution or of the covert operations laws. It could attempt to word its new
statutory delegations more precisely and narrowly. For example, to avoid
judicial manipulation of the type that occurred in Dames & Moore, the
new legislation could declare Congress' intent to preempt presidential
claims of inherent constitutional authority. 52 To ensure that Congress
clearly withholds statutory authority from executive activities it does not
wish to authorize, the law could emulate the current War Powers Resolu-
tion and declare that a court may not read silences or limited delegations
in the statute as congressional endorsement of related presidential initia-
tives . 53 Finally, Congress could specifically require judicial application of
the Kent v. Dulles "clear statement" principle when executive action
taken pursuant to the statute infringes upon individual rights.35
Enhanced congressional access to better information would partially
solve Congress' third problem of ineffective tools. "Congress must have the
sense of our foreign policy ... in important detail, be aware of attitudes
as they are being formed and commitments as they are being made, and
be able to inject influence earlier in matters on which it has constitutional
responsibilities, especially those on which it will have to take formal ac-
tion."' 355 To ensure that Congress will have sufficient information to ex-
press its views before executive action becomes a fait accompli, the new
legislation should insist that prior notice of proposed covert actions and
uses of force be given in every case, rather than "in every possible in-
stance," to afford key Members a meaningful opportunity to argue with
the President before he purposefully and irreversibly commits the United
States to a covert or forceful course of action.3 56
Congress can also redress the current ineffectiveness of its tools in three
other ways: by developing a constitutional substitute for the legislative
veto, by making more effective use of its appropriations power, and by
experimenting with limited application of criminal penalties for executive
violations of its national security statute. Under the legislative veto regime,
Congress delegated statutory authority to the President, while retaining a
right of subsequent review in particular cases. Despite its constitutional
infirmities, the legislative veto effected a crucial political compromise:
while the President gained current legislative authorization for his acts,
his need to return to Congress for subsequent approval gave Congress
352. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 34 (citing § 8 of the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.c. § 1547 (1982)).
354. Cf supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text (discussing "clear statement" principle).
355. Henkin, supra note 230, at 19.
356. See supra notes 199-200, 351. In extreme situations, the number of Members consulted
could even be reduced to a subgroup of the core group. Nevertheless, the President should always be
required to notify at least a "Gang of Four," on the assumption that any action that cannot secure at
least their minimal backing should not proceed, because it could not garner sufficient legislative sup-
port to be sustained. The four could either comprise the minority and majority leaders in each house
(including the Speaker) or the chair and ranking Member of the House and Senate intelligence com-
mittees, who have perhaps even greater expertise in deciphering cryptic executive notifications.
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some assurance that consultation would continue while his action pro-
ceeded. As a policy tool, the legislative veto had numerous disadvantages,
most prominently, the freedom it gave Members to avoid visible responsi-
bility for their actions. 5 ' One alternative that lacks this disadvantage,
while largely preserving the veto's beneficial political compromise, is the
so-called "fast-track" approval procedure, which has recently been em-
ployed, inter alia, to ensure ongoing congressional input into the negotia-
tion of international trade agreements.158 If triggered by objectively deter-
minable circumstances, rather than by specific presidential acts, fast-track
procedures could be used to privilege certain joint resolutions introduced
by any interested Member, thereby compelling Congress to vote up or
down quickly on resolutions challenging executive acts.3 59
The fast-track approval method also has the advantage of versatility,
inasmuch as it can be combined with "committee gatekeeping," "point-of-
order," and appropriations procedures to vary the intensity of its regula-
tion. Under a committee gatekeeping procedure, a majority vote of a single
congressional committee may "derail" a presidential proposal from the
357. See generally Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEo. L.J. 785, 794 (1984)
(legislative veto resolutions were rarely subject to roll-call vote); Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional
Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1309 (1977)
(recounting inefficiencies and constitutional defects of the legislative veto).
358. "Fast-track approval" is an expedited legislative procedure, found most prominently in the
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-93 (1982), whereby Congress authorizes the President to
initiate a foreign affairs action (for example, negotiation of a trade agreement), in exchange for a
commitment that he will submit the product of that action back to Congress for final approval. Under
modified House and Senate rules, Congress "promises" the President that it will require automatic
discharge of the completed initiative from committee within a certain number of days, bar floor
amendment of the submitted proposal, and limit floor debate, thereby ensuring that the package will
be voted up or down within a fixed time period. See Koh, supra note 33, at 1211-21 (describing how
this technique has been used in trade area). The fast-track procedure does not constitute a legislative
veto, because it requires bicameral action and presentment to the President, albeit on an expedited
basis. Cf supra note 213 (describing Chadha's rule).
As a congressional control device, the fast-track procedure has two disadvantages that the legislative
veto lacked. First, in cases where the President's action will take effect unless Congress expresses fast-
track disapproval, both houses must disapprove that act by supermajorities in order to override a
presidential veto. Second, because fast-track procedures are simply statutory modifications in internal
house rules, they are theoretically subject to change at any time by each house. See U.S. CONSr. art. I,
§ 5, cl. 2; Koh, supra note 33, at 1217 n.79; Meyer, supra note 50, at 98-99. The procedure's central
advantage, however, is that it allows Congress to overcome both the political inertia and the proce-
dural obstacles that most frequently prevent a controversial measure from coming to a vote at all.
Furthermore, because one-fifth of the Members present in each house retain the power to require a
roll-call vote on any matter, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3, an individual Member's vote on any
particular fast-track approval resolution would almost invariably be made visible to the public. See
Breyer, supra note 357, at 794. These considerations have contributed to the fast-track procedure's
inclusion in several other foreign affairs statutes, including the foreign assistance and war powers
legislation. See Meyer, supra note 50, at 78-79 & n.38, 86-88.
359. The War Powers Resolution provides fast-track procedures for considering certain joint reso-
lutions introduced after a presidential "hostilities" report is submitted or "required to be submitted"
to Congress. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1544(b), 1545 (1982) (expedited procedures for joint resolutions);
supra note 201 (describing "hostilities" report). Reasoning that a presidential report was "required to
be submitted" after U.S. forces had destroyed an Iranian oil platform, Senator Brock Adams recently
attempted to invoke this procedure to force a vote on the President's compliance with the War Powers
Resolution in the Persian Gulf. See Adler, Senator Adams' Gambit Paves the Way for Vote on
Tanker-Escort in the Persian Gulf, FIRST PRINCIPLES, Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 4.
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fast track-and in many cases, effectively kill it-thereby giving the Exec-
utive strong incentives to consult with the committee's members at each
step of the process.36 0 Point-of-order procedures, by contrast, exploit the
loophole in Chadha specifying that each House of Congress, acting alone,
retains the power to determine its own rules and procedures. 6 ' When a
House or Senate rule triggers a point of order in a certain circumstance,
any Member can raise that point of order and halt consideration of the
bill until the presiding officer considers and rejects the point of order."6 '
Thus, such rules could be used to block temporarily appropriations bills
that would fund a program that the President has implemented without
satisfying a prior statutory requirement, such as notice or prior
consultation.368
The proposed charter should also make more effective use of the appro-
priations process to police executive compliance with statutory terms.
While Members ought not use the appropriations process indiscriminately
to accomplish what they cannot agree upon by legislation, Congress as a
whole could properly use appropriations cutoffs to enforce other substan-
tive provisions of the charter, for example, by tying continuation of appro-
priations to the President's compliance with the charter's terms. 3" Con-
gress could either seek to make these appropriations cutoffs self-executing,
by tying them to objectively determinable facts, or judicially enforceable,
through judicial review provisions. 65 Moreover, Congress could also de-
mand executive accountability at another point in the appropriations pro-
cess, namely, when it is authorizing those programs which are to receive
appropriations.3 6 As Professor Casper has suggested, Congress could
adopt a long-term authorization review process, in which a joint subcom-
360. The fast-track provision of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b)(4)(A)
(1982), represents the most prominent and effective recent use of such a gatekeeping procedure. For a
recounting of the influence that this procedure afforded the House Ways and Means and Senate
Finance Committees over the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, see Koh, supra note 33,
at 1211-21; Koh, The Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the Proposed United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 193, 208-18 (1987).
361. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 n.20; U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may deter-
mine the Rules of its Proceedings . . ").
362. PROCEDURE IN "mi U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ch. 31, § 1, at 697 (looseleaf ed.
1982).
363. See Franck & Bob, supra note 33, at 942-43 (suggesting that each chamber could adopt
rules triggering point of order against such a bill).
364. For example, Congress could amend the War Powers Resolution to declare that "no funds
made available under any law may be obligated or expended for any presidential use of force not
authorized by Congress" under the terms of the amended War Powers title. Cf. Vance, supra note 15,
at 93-94; S.J. Res. 323, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S6239 (daily ed. May 19, 1988) (text
on file with author); supra note 338 (proposing similar amendment).
365. See, e.g., Clifford Statement, supra note 115, at 9 (urging Senate to amend S. 1721, supra
note 74, to add provision automatically terminating and prohibiting expenditure of funds for any
covert activity with respect to which President failed to follow oversight process, e.g., by failing to
notify committees or to sign finding as required by statute); Stith, supra note 127, at 1387 n.213
(collecting cases in which courts have determined whether Executive has exceeded specified appropria-
tions limitations).
366. See Stith, supra note 127, at 1370 n.135 (defining authorization).
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mittee of the foreign affairs and defense committees would evaluate and
review existing national security programs as a way of conducting regular
comprehensive congressional reviews of foreign policy. 6
Finally, Congress could choose to supplement its appropriations mea-
sures with criminal penalties. One of the original drafters of the 1947
National Security Act has recently proposed that criminal penalties be
imposed upon any government officer or employee who knowingly and
willfully violates or conspires to violate an express statutory prohibition
against the expenditure of funds for a particular foreign policy purpose.3 68
At the same time, Congress could reenact the Neutrality Act to provide
criminal penalties for private adventurism conducted at the Executive's
behest. 6 9 Enforcement of all of these criminal provisions could be con-
fided in an independent counsel,37 0 in an independent branch of the Jus-
tice Department analogous to the Office of Special Investigations, or in
departmental Inspectors General.
37 1
If enacted, this package of provisions would greatly alleviate Congress'
fourth and most intractable problem, namely, the problem of political
will. For each of these proposals is designed to be enforced by a considera-
bly lesser showing of congressional will than the two-thirds majority in
both houses that is currently required to enforce existing laws. Many of
these proposals, including the creation of the core consultative group, the
congressional legal staff, and the long-range authorization process, could
be implemented by concurrent resolution if necessary. The core consulta-
tive group and gatekeeping committees could express their will to the
367. See Casper, Remarks, in Appendices to MURPHY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 223, at
24-25. An analogous process has transpired with regard to foreign aid. See Hearings on the Separa-
tion of Powers Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1967) (statement of Sen. J. William Fulbright) ("foreign aid provides the
closest thing we have to an annual occasion for a general review of American foreign policy.").
368. See Clifford Statement, supra note 115, at 9. Such a penalty does not seem overly harsh,
given that once Congress has determined to deny appropriations to a particular activity, "the specific
activity is no longer within the realm of authorized government actions." Stith, supra note 127, at
1361.
369. See Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 959, 960-961 (1982) (criminalizing organization or initia-
tion of hostile expeditions on U.S. territory against a foreign country with which U.S. is "at peace").
Six individuals, including a former U.S. military officer, have recently been indicted under the Act on
charges of recruiting, training, and arming mercenaries to fight in Nicaragua. See N.Y. Times, Aug.
23, 1988, at A10, col. 1. See generally Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty
and Congressional War Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1983);
Note, Nonenforcement of the Neutrality Act: International Law and Foreign Policy Powers Under
the Constitution, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1955 (1982).
370. See, e.g., Official Accountability Act of 1987, H.R. 3665, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG.
REC. H10,723 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (introduced by Rep. Conyers) (bill authorizing independent
counsel to indict and convict U.S. government officials who "order or engage in the planning of,
preparation for, initiation or conduct of intelligence activity which violates any statute or Executive
Order in force or international agreements to which the United States is a party").
371. Cf Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 797
F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding Neutrality Act applicable to actions of government officials and
enforceable by independent counsel). The Iran-Contra committees also recommended that an indepen-
dent CIA Inspector General be created to conduct internal intelligence agency investigations. See
IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 2, at 425.
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President even without formal votes. The fast-track and point-of-order
procedures could be adopted by modification of chamber rules, and subse-
quently triggered automatically or by the action of a single interested
Member. The appropriations provisions could be made either self-enforc-
ing or enforceable civilly and criminally by the courts. Thus, even if Con-
gress cannot create political will where none exists, it can modify existing
institutions and procedures to give quicker and fuller expression to view-
points that remain dispersed under Congress' current institutional
structure.
C. Reinvolving the Courts
Congress cannot legislate judicial courage, any more than it can legis-
late executive self-restraint or congressional will power. Congress can,
however, seek to stem the Supreme Court's migration away from the
Youngstown vision and toward Curtiss-Wright by embedding into legisla-
tion the judicial role originally anticipated by Justice Jackson.3 72 With
respect to the courts, Congress' strategy should be to enact legislation that
would override the abstention doctrines that the courts have wrapped
around themselves. To authorize challenges to executive conduct, Con-
gress could insert "private attorney general" 373 or "congressional stand-
ing" provisions of the type that it placed in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
budget-balancing bill.374 Congress could create a statutory cause of action
to challenge violations of the statute, 37 '5 accompanied by a sense-of-Con-
gress resolution that violations of the national security charter do not con-
372. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
373. See Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs
and Defendants as Private Attorney Generals, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 295-327 (1988) (describing
utility of such provisions in deterring constitutional violations by government officials).
374. Congressman Synar invoked such a clause to bring his successful challenge to that legislation.
See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1378, 1381 (D.D.C. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Pub.
L. No. 99-177, § 274, 99 Stat. 1037, 1098). But see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (avoiding
congressional standing issue by relying upon standing of co-plaintiff). Cf S.J. Res. 323, § 4, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S6239 (daily ed. May 19, 1988) (text on file with author) ("Any
Member of Congress may bring an action in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that the President or the
United States Armed Forces have not complied with any provision" of the amended War Powers
Resolution.). Although such a statutory provision could not confer standing for purposes of article III
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court could explicitly adopt the District of Columbia Circuit's view
finding congressional standing at least in those cases in which a Member alleges that the challenged
action nullified a past or future vote. See, e.g., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 25-30 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430
(D.C. Cir. 1974). To limit a dramatic influx of litigation, Congress could impose a statutory require-
ment that such suits should not be brought until an individual Member had exhausted his or her
legislative remedies.
375. Alternatively, Congress could modify the relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) to afford private plaintiffs a cause of action under that statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1)
(1982) (foreign affairs exception); id. § 702 (right of review); id. § 706 (scope of review). Cf
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) (finding discre-
tionary nonmonetary relief under the APA "arguably available" against federal officials for unlawful
foreign affairs actions).
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stitute nonjusticiable political questions.'" Additionally, it could recon-
sider the various immunities against money damages afforded to official
defendants under extant law377 and seek to direct the manner in which a
federal court might award equitable relief against wayward executive
officials. 8
If Congress sought more extensive judicialization of the national secur-
ity area, it could lay venue for all claims of statutory violation in a partic-
ular court, for example, the District of Columbia Circuit.379 By laying
statutory venue in one circuit court of appeals, as it has frequently done in
administrative law statutes, Congress could create a counter-arena of cen-
tralized foreign affairs expertise within the judiciary analogous to that
which I have encouraged it to create within itself. By inculcating expertise
in a group of judges in the nation's capital who are comfortable handling
foreign affairs cases, Congress could reduce judicial deference and pro-
mote constitutional line-drawing by institutions other than the President.
Yogi Berra has been accused of another famous saying: "We could
eliminate all those close plays at first base if only we moved the bag one
foot further from home plate."' 80 In the same way, one could argue that it
would be pointless to enact new national security legislation so long as the
courts fail to adjudicate violations of those statutes that already exist. But
376. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1221 (1987) (judiciary is final authority on
issues of statutory construction); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221,
230 (1986) ("Under the Constitution, one of the judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes,
and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political
overtones."); see also Henkin, supra note 291 (political question doctrine serves only to mask de facto
affirmances on merits); Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question", 75 Nw. U.L. REv.
1031 (1985) (arguing that political question doctrine should play no role whatsoever in exercise of
judicial review power).
377. Congress might also, as Justice Scalia has recently urged, amend or overrule the Feres doc-
trine, a judicially created exception to the immunity waivers in the Federal Tort Claims Act, which
effectively immunizes the U.S. government from suits by servicemen. See United States v. Johnson,
107 S. Ct. 2063, 2071 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), the
Court granted the President absolute immunity from civil damages for actions taken within the outer
perimeter of his official duties, but left ambiguous whether Congress could expressly override that
immunity by statute. See id. at 748-49; accord Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.31 (1982).
Thus, Congress could also state exceptions to the doctrine of official immunities for particularly egre-
gious constitutional violations. See generally P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES
FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983); K. Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unan-
swered Questions (Aug. 1988) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (arguing that confused
Harlow standards require clarification).
378. See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane),
vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of subsequent legislation, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985)
(refusing to invoke equitable discretion to dismiss injunctive suit against American government offi-
cials which claimed that they acted in excess of their statutory or constitutional powers).
379. Cf. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4) (1982) (laying venue
in the D.C. Circuit for suits against foreign sovereigns). An alternative form of judicialization would
establish a secret court along the lines of the one created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982) (FISA), to which Congress could require the executive branch to
submit its justifications for not informing Congress of a particular covert action. Cf. Saltzburg, Na-
tional Security and Privacy: Of Governments and Individuals Under the Constitution and the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 129 (1987) (describing how FISA judicial
process has operated).
380. I am grateful to Professor Burt Neuborne for this Berraism.
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the point would not be simply to move the base, but rather, to reinvolve
the first baseman and the umpire in the game. The legislative goal here
should be not simply to pass new laws, but more fundamentally, to restore
the constitutional roles of both Congress and the courts as active national
security players. One need not advocate widescale judicialization of the
foreign affairs field to accept that the courts have currently excluded
themselves too thoroughly from the national security area, thereby remov-
ing themselves as a meaningful check on executive action. The courts have
too readily read Curtiss-Wright as standing for the proposition that the
Executive deserves an extra, and often dispositive, measure of deference in
foreign affairs above and beyond that necessary to preserve the smooth
functioning of the national government. Even apart from the judicial re-
view provisions proposed above, legislative clarification of the substantive
rules of foreign affairs law would encourage courts to speak more fre-
quently to the merits of foreign affairs claims. 8 ' Those rules would serve
as lines against which both congressional and executive actors could evalu-
ate the legality of proposed presidential conduct. Even if litigation were to
ensue over the constitutionality of particular provisions, judicial resolution
of those disputes would help to clarify currently ambiguous boundaries of
constitutional responsibility.
As the late Bob Cover recognized, judging is a quintessential act of
violence, with violence flowing as much from a refusal to judge as from
the act of judging itself.8 ' The role of judges is to define the rule of law
by drawing the line between exercises of power and authority. In my
judgment, the federal judiciary failed in that task during the Vietnam
War.3 83 Even without new legislation, judges retain a duty in the post-
381. I have elsewhere called for courts to promote the development of "transnational public law
litigation," even if Congress fails actively to support that trend. See Koh, supra note 285, at 193-202.
That phenomenon is also the subject of a forthcoming article described in id. at 200 n.104.
382. See Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) [hereinafter Cover, Violence].
The social consequences of judicial complicity in executive acts formed a recurrent focus of Cover's
work. See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 226-38 (1975); Cover, Violence, supra, at 1622 n.48 (A
judge "may or may not be able to bring a good prison into being, but she can refrain from sentencing
anyone to a constitutionally inadequate one."); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 57 (1983) ("The jurisdictional principles of deference
are problematic precisely because, as currently articulated by the Supreme Court, they align the inter-
pretive acts of judges with the acts and interests of those who control the means of violence."); Cover,
Book Review, 68 COLUM L. REV. 1003, 1008 n.31 (1968) ("[T]he judiciary as enforcers of [the
selective service] law cannot help but be accomplices in that which the Executive perpetrates."). Al-
though Cover's outrage at what he viewed as "judicial complicity in the crimes of Vietnam" sparked
his research about slavery and the judicial process, see R. COVER, supra, at xi, he did not live long
enough to conduct a systematic assessment of the role of judges in evaluating executive conduct in
foreign affairs. But see Cover, Violence, supra, at 1619-21 (describing judicial role in restraining
executive action abroad in United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979)).
383. Cf Cover, Book Review, supra note 382, at 1005-08 (1968) (reviewing R. HILDRETH,
ATROCIOUS JUDGES: LIVES OF JUDGES INFAMOUS AS Toots OF TYRANTS AND INSTRUMENTS OF
OPPRESSION (1856)).
1988] 1337
The Yale Law Journal
Vietnam era to ensure that in the field of foreign affairs, legal authority
does not become permanently decoupled from legal constraint.'"
D. Legislative Prospects
I harbor no illusions that any legislation as ambitious as that described
here will be enacted. But I do believe that a congressional attempt to con-
sider omnibus legislation along these lines will at least focus national at-
tention on the right questions. In the same way as the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Budget Act and the War Powers Resolution constituted first cuts
at constitutional line-drawing in their respective fields, so too would new
omnibus national security legislation redefine and unify the terrain of na-
tional security law.
The overriding purposes of any charter legislation should not be to en-
courage congressional micromanagement or improvident judicial activism
in foreign policy matters, but rather, to reduce the isolation that currently
surrounds executive branch activities, to enhance internal executive
branch deliberations before the Executive acts, and to increase congres-
sional-executive dialogue while broad foreign policy objectives are being
set and particular initiatives are being implemented. More important than
any of the individual proposals set forth above should be Congress' recog-
nition that executive practice has gained undue predominance as a source
of customary constitutional law in the foreign affairs area. Given this pri-
macy of executive practice, it hardly surprises that in the post-Youngstown
years, the constitutional balance that Justice Jackson sought to preserve
has shifted decidedly toward executive power. Enactment of national se-
curity framework legislation that would also promote occasional judicial
decisionmaking in the foreign affairs realm would supply two counter-
vailing sources of quasi-constitutional custom in this area, which would
serve as much-needed counterweights to unchallenged executive practice.
Even rudimentary legislation in this area would replace the barnacled
National Security Act of 1947 with a more recent, considered state-
ment-made jointly by Congress and the President and construed by the
courts-of how national security policy should be made.
The central problem of such a proposal, of course, is that it would test
the political will of Congress as a whole to rethink the national security
problem. If President Reagan's successor should veto this post-Iran-Con-
tra statute, as President Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution, recent
history suggests that the current Congress would be less inclined than past
384. Cf Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1543-44 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(Wilkey, J.) (responding to Judge Scalia's suggestion that no "special charter" authorizes judges to
keep Executive in line in foreign affairs: "IT]he Judiciary does operate under a "special charter" to
help preserve the fundamental rights of this nation's citizens. That charter is commonly known as the
United States Constitution.").
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Congresses to acquiesce.3 5 Yet a presidential veto need not be inevitable.
To make its restrictive charter provisions more palatable to the President,
Congress could couple them with others that expressly authorize the Pres-
ident to engage in certain forms of activities for which he currently lacks
express statutory authorization. 8 For example, the legislation could in-
clude provisions expressly authorizing the President to commit troops
overseas for the short-term purpose of rescuing American citizens endan-
gered abroad or invoking the taking of American hostages as a factual
trigger for the President's exercise of extraordinary emergency powers.
Not only would these provisions eliminate existing ambiguities regarding
the scope of the President's statutory authorities, they would render Con-
gress' legislative package more attractive to the President by unambigu-
ously elevating his newly authorized activities into Jackson Category One.
A bipartisan congressional-executive effort to enact new charter legisla-
tion would help to restore the balance between executive flexibility and
congressional oversight in national security matters.3 87 To those who say
that it would be politically impossible to draft and enact such wide-rang-
ing legislation, let me note that there is no shortage of current legislative
proposals, only of the congressional will to act upon them. 8 All Mem-
385. Only nine of President Reagan's 65 vetoes have been overridden. As of this writing, however,
Congress has overridden three of the six vetoes issued during the 100th Congress, after the Republi-
cans lost the Senate. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1988, at D26, cols. 5-6. See the overrides of the presiden-
tial vetoes of the Water Act of 1987, 133 CONG. REC. H515 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1987) (House over-
ride), 133 CONG. REC. S1691 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1987) (Senate override); the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1987, 133 CONG. REc. H1635 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1987) (House override); 133 CONG. REC.
S4408 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1987) (Senate override); and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988, 134
CONG. REC. H1037 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988) (House override), 134 CONG. REC. S2730 (daily ed.
Mar. 22, 1988) (Senate override). Despite its failure to override a fourth veto-of the omnibus trade
bill-Congress later ultimately secured nearly identical trade legislation. See supra note 304.
386. For example, the National Security Agency supported the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act in
part because that statute was the first congressional enactment to recognize and endorse that agency's
existence. See Remarks of Daniel Silver, former General Counsel to the National Security Agency,
American Society of International Law Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 20, 1988) (on file
with author). President Reagan eventually signed the 1988 omnibus trade bill, which contained nu-
merous provisions restricting his discretion, primarily to secure the congressional authorization to en-
gage in future multilateral trade talks. See supra note 304; N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1988, at D2, col. 1.
387. The swift ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, even after the Iran-
Contra Affair, is only one recent indicator that bipartisan agreement remains possible so long as there
is full consultation and significant consensus about substantive foreign policy ends. Significantly, nine
of the Senators on the Senate Iran-Contra committee, including three Republicans, endorsed all of the
Iran-Contra committees' legislative recommendations.
388. At this writing, Senator Cohen's bill to amend the Intelligence Oversight Act has passed the
Senate with sufficient votes to override a presidential veto, and Congressman Stokes' companion bill
has been reported out of the House Intelligence and Foreign Affairs Committees. See supra note 77.
Subcommittee hearings have been held on the promising bill to amend the War Powers Resolution
recently offered by Senators Byrd, Nunn, Warner, and Mitchell. See supra note 338. The proposal of
Senator Biden and Congressman Levine to amend the Arms Export Control Act remains viable. See
supra note 49. Although the intelligence committees have not endorsed Senator Specter's bills to re-
form the intelligence community, see supra note 316, they have modified the fiscal 1989 intelligence
authorization bill to require that the CIA's Director report to Congress more regularly about the
activities of the CIA Inspector General. See 46 CONG. Q. 2344, 2345 (1988). After subcommittee
hearings, Congressman Conyers' bill to impose criminal penalties against executive adventurism is
still pending before the House Judiciary Committee. See supra note 370.
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bers of Congress must accept the commonsense proposition that these vari-
ous proposals should be integrated because they address different facets of
the same problem: the need to restore the constitutional and institutional
balance in foreign affairs.
Equally important, both branches should recognize that each of these
reforms would ultimately serve not only Congress' long-term interest, but
also the Executive's. The creation of a core consultative group would
eliminate the President's chronic complaint that in emergencies, the con-
sultation requirements impose an intolerable burden upon the President to
find Members with whom to consult. 89 If Congress were to mandate reg-
ular confidential meetings between its core consultative group and the
President or his principal cabinet officers at the start of the new Adminis-
tration, the likelihood would increase that a practice of true consultative
decisionmaking between the branches would evolve. 9 ' Ideally, regular in-
teractions among the congressional legal staff and its executive counter-
parts would help to foster common constitutional understandings between
the branches regarding matters that would rarely be resolved in court.
And finally, as the experience of the intelligence committees has revealed,
regular sharing of confidential information has tended to advance the de-
velopment of congressional-executive partnership. 91 In short, the pro-
posed reform package ultimately promotes the long-term cooperation and
balance in foreign affairs decisionmaking that Youngstown's vision of the
National Security Constitution seeks to foster.
A bipartisan effort to enact the charter I have proposed could take place
any time during the early years of the next Administration. Both political
parties have good reason to embrace national security reform as a foreign
policy priority. A Republican President eager to engage in such an exer-
cise could use the concept of a national security charter as a way of put-
ting the Iran-Contra Affair behind him.392 A Democratic President could
use it as a means of declaring his seriousness about foreign policy re-
form. 393 Moreover, if the presidential candidates were to engage in the
389. See, e.g., G. FORD, A TIME To HEAL 252 (1979) (President could not consult with key
congressional leaders about 1975 Da Nang evacuation, because 10 were abroad and 12 were scattered
throughout U.S.).
390. Cf. C. VANCE, HARD CHOICES 14 (1983) (pointing out that during Iranian hostage crisis,
Secretary of State or his deputy spent up to two hours each day in meetings or briefing sessions with
Members of Congress).
391. See N.Y. Times, July 7, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (describing cooperative atmosphere between intel-
ligence committees and executive branch).
392. Vice-President Bush, the Republican nominee, has promised to establish a strict code of
ethics in government and a new ethics panel in the White House "to avoid the excesses of the past."
Indictment Day, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1988, at 30, 31. Significantly, neither of these proposals
would involve legislation.
393. Michael Dukakis, the Democratic nominee, has criticized the Reagan Administration's han-
dling of the Iran-Contra Affair, but apparently has not proposed any structural reform of the foreign
policymaking processes. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1988, at A16, col. 4; cf. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1988,
at A18, col. 3 (statement of Michael Dukakis) ("the way we're going to make national security policy
beginning in January 1989 [is] with a President and Congress that work together").
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kind of "competitive credit-claiming" for revamping the national security
laws that has occurred in past campaigns, they could achieve the kind of
"aspirational lawmaking" that led to the dramatic environmental reforms
of the late 1960's and early 19701S.
3 94
But even if impetus for national security reform does not quickly come
from the electorate or the presidential candidates, the time for a new na-
tional security charter will not have passed. Many of the most lasting
foreign affairs reforms of recent years became law some time after the
events that sparked their enactment, rather than in the immediate after-
math of the scandal. 95 Consequently, there seems no reason why this pro-
posal for a national security charter should not remain ripe well into the
next decade. Nor is there any good reason why impetus for enactment of
that charter must come from the President, rather than from Congress
itself. Making Congress aware of the threat of letting pass a rare legisla-
tive opportunity that will not return until after the "next Watergate"
could serve to overcome the "politician's dilemma" that would ordinarily
prevent individual legislators from pursuing such an initiative. 96 Similar
incentives have recently driven Congress to lead broadscale legislative ef-
forts in the areas of trade, tax, regulation, environmental, and civil rights
reform.3 97 The problem of national security reform is at least as important
as any of these. Since Vietnam, many notable foreign affairs reforms have
passed into law without significant presidential guidance or even over
presidential opposition. 8' Thus, even without strong presidential leader-
ship, a Congress committed to bipartisan national security reform could
pass a legislative charter that would redefine the allocation of national
security responsibility among the branches for the next forty years.
In sum, the release of the Iran-Contra Committees' report last fall
should have marked the beginning, not the end, of Congress' efforts to
deal with the national security crisis exposed by the Iran-Contra Affair.
As Justice Jackson suggested in his concurring opinion in Youngstown,
394. See Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federaliza-
tion of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 313 (1985) (arguing that competitive credit-
claiming between Richard Nixon and Edmund Muskie contributed to enactment of strict environmen-
tal laws); see also Elliott, supra note 104, at 350.
395. Recent examples include the Trade Act of 1974, the 1976 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, and the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act.
396. See Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, supra note 394, at 324-26 (using this concept to help
explain congressionally-led environmental reform movement of late 1960's and early 1970's).
397. See, e.g., J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOB-
BYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987) (describing enactment of Tax Re-
form Act of 1986); W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 251, at 2-28 (Civil Rights Act of 1964);
J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 9-13 (1984) (describing deregulation
movement of late 1970's); Koh, supra note 33, at 1200-08 (Trade Act of 1974).
398. For example, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 became law over presidential veto, while
the Trade Act of 1974 was enacted without significant presidential leadership. More recently, even
before the Democrats took control of the Senate, Senator Lugar, a moderate Republican, led the
successful floor fight to override President Reagan's veto of the South African sanctions bill. See 132
CONG. REC. S14,629 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986).
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"[a] crisis that challenges the President equally, or perhaps primarily,
challenges Congress .... We may say that power to legislate ... belongs
in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from
slipping through its fingers." 399
IV. CONCLUSION
The Iran-Contra Affair has started the pendulum of foreign policymak-
ing power swinging back to Congress for the first time since Vietnam. If
Congress aspires to preserve its role in national security policymaking, the
time could not be more ripe for it to seize the legislative initiative. The
undertaking is formidable and the time late. But if we do not learn the
lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, we will surely be condemned to relive
it.
399. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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